It is entirely legitimate for Ukraine to strike oil or gas facilities in Russia if they are being used to advance military objectives: they can be categorised as 'dual-use facilities'. However, each facility has to be assessed on its own merits. 🧵
Things RUSI is unlikely to research:
• Beards in the Army
Things RUSI thinks are important for the Army:
• Combat logistics/sustainment
• Concentrating mass/firepower
• Countering drones
• Electronic warfare
• Ground-based air defence
• Urban warfare
Watch this space!
Deeply frustrating that some pieces highlighting the threat from Iran skip past the fact that the JCPOA was probably the only bit of Western policy with significant impact, until it was trashed without replacement by the previous US administration.
Interesting to see the direct contrast with German squeamishness about linking the supply of weapons to effect: this statement is almost boastful about UK weapons being used to 'lay waste to nearly 30% of Russia's Black Sea Fleet'.
Some thought on today's report of a failed Trident missile test. It's important to open by saying, we have very few details, so need to exercise some caution on conclusions.🧵
A reminder that when calculating the 'NATO 2%' figure the MOD includes the cost of operations, but when funded by the Treasury, these are not part of the Defence *budget*. The budget 'Red Book' sets the latter, so be cautious of calculations that conflate the two.
I always enjoy listening to
@campbellclaret
and
@RoryStewartUK
and while the thrust of their scepticism on defence spending is about right, I did rather twitch a few times at some of the generalisations or errors in here. 🧵
The video version of this week's main podcast episode is now available to watch!
Join Rory and Alastair in this week's episode as they delve into these pressing current issues:
👉 Humza Yousaf's resignation from the SNP
👉 Defection in politics
👉 How much each country spends…
It's approximately 15 hours after UK personnel used force in defence of Israel (presumably after an update to UK Rules of Engagement) and it's a little bit odd that the only thing we have is a 50-second clip from the PM with almost no detail, long after everyone else.
The problem with the 2/2.5% graph (on its own) is that is fails to include the state of the economy. Occasionally, it would be useful to remind ourselves of a real-terms comparison (like this, from
@commonslibrary
).
The original War Book was designed for full-scale nuclear war, and as pointed out in the work of Peter Hennessy or
@JulieAMcDowall
a lot of it was unrealistic, bordering on futile. Some might therefore question
@kpd_musing
’s concern at the lack of a modern equivalent. However…
EXCLUSIVE: The government has no national plan for the defence of the UK or the mobilisation of its people and industry in a war despite renewed threats of conflict,
@SkyNews
has learnt. 🧵/1
UK warheads are UK-designed and manufactured, but the missiles themselves come from a pooled stockpile in the US. Continued US successful testing therefore gives some confidence in the overall reliability of the Trident missile.
And that’s a wrap! NATO at 75 discussions hosted by
@UKNATO
, organised by
@RUSIEurope
and
@EdArnold_RUSI
, with special appearance by
@David_Cameron
, who provided a masterclass in sticking to schedule (a certain unnamed panel chair is taking notes).
Good point by my colleague: the scale of the attack, including over 100 ballistic missiles, means this can’t be seen as purely theatre. It compares to the start of the invasion of Iraq (ave. 500 strikes a day), and only surpassed recently by Russia’s initial strikes in Ukraine.
'Look at the size and scale of this latest attack – this was not a salutary move. It was designed to inflict real damage, but the fact that it didn’t is damaging to
#Iran
’s credibility' says RUSI's Sidharth Kaushal to
@guardian
. Full article below ⬇️
Trident's record is pretty good. The US has claimed 191 successful test launches, and there have probably been a single figure number of failures. 95% success compares well with the reported 50% testing failure rate of the Russian Bulava missiles recently accepted into service.
Finally, the third panel looked at society and resilience. There were some good examples from Finland (
@minna_alander
) and its drive for 'total defence' creating a strong willingness to fight to defend the country, plus good defences and preparedness for attack.
Yes
@campbellclaret
and
@RoryStewartUK
it is important to have a serious debate on defence and foreign policy, particularly on building effective armed forces. It's great to see it raised here, but we need to ensure it is properly informed. Hopefully,
@RUSI_org
will do so!
A good demonstration of 🇫🇷 capability, but another example of how difficult it can be to degrade even an ‘irregular’ force if you don’t have extensive intelligence (and yes, ‘deterring’ the Houthis failed a long time ago).
A missile test is 'just' one part of any DASO. That said, it's obviously pretty important for the deterrent. Given there was also (allegedly) a failed missile test during the last DASO in 2016, it's now been over a decade (2012) since the last successful Royal Navy Trident test.
That means judging the expected military advantage from striking it, as against the consequences. If there are civilian workers on site, the risk of casualties has to be taken into account, as well as, for example, the impact of potentially hazardous substances being released.
International Humanitarian Law is actually quite flexible, but it does require proper consideration of what is known and what risks can be assessed. In this case, Russian facilities being used to fuel or otherwise keep the Russian war machine running are within scope as targets.
An interesting choice, but he has experience in No.10 as the Military Assistant to the PM, and did a stint as one of the Deputy National Security Advisers.
BREAKING: The UK's deputy military chief will become the next national security adviser – marking the first time a top military officer has held the position.
General Gwyn Jenkins will replace Sir Tim Barrow, who has reportedly been lined up to become next UK ambassador to the US
A final reminder and caveat: in the absence of real and firm details, it's difficult to know how serious this is for the technical capabilities of Trident, and we may never know. So be wary of either apocalyptic doom or complete dismissal in the absence of good information.
Worth considering this in conjunction with the panel at the recent RUSI Combat Air Conference discussing the Nordic air defence agreement (video to be available for members soon). The Nordic countries really are serious about implementing change.
The Nordic countries all mean business. Even if Norway and Sweden had rather small forces, both are making a serious effort to scale up asap.
Although, looking at you Denmark…
🇩🇰👀 (but Denmark is throwing huge sums into Ukraine support which cannot be forgotten)
But here, the focus is diplomatic and economic, not military. Defence is more modestly doing classic engagement and building relationships in the background. The Offshore Patrol vessels are perfect for this.
Of course, neither of those adversaries was a nuclear-armed state, but it's worth reflecting that escalation dynamics have changed a lot since 2022. The Ukrainians are within their rights to strike infrastructure targets where they can link them to military activity.
We don't know what happened here, nor have we confirmed the cause of the 2016 incident, so it's difficult to work out whether this alone causes a bigger problem or not, though it's embarrassing for the UK that the two most recent (known) failures were during Royal Navy DASOs.
In spite of the failure, given the overall reliability of Trident (and the ambiguity over the cause) it would be a particularly bold and/or foolish adversary who decided to take a chance on nuclear deterrence based on two UK tests nearly eight years apart.
…both Brexit and Covid demonstrated that the government ‘machine’ didn’t have as good an understanding of how the state and country actually functioned as it thought it did, particularly under pressure.
And the presence of civilians doesn't prevent a strike outright, nor make such a facility a 'civilian target'. Conversely, the Ukrainians can't just attack infrastructure 'because the Russians do', nor freely attack *any* such facility. Retaliation is not a justification.
Oh, one other thing: a laser is, by definition, directed energy, so can we consign 'laser directed energy' to the same black hole as 'PIN number'. It's a 'laser weapon'!
The argument that they shouldn't be attacked because of 'escalation' is a policy judgement, not a legal one. The recent history varies: Daesh's use of Syrian oilfields for oil smuggling to generate revenue meant they became targets for the Coalition (albeit with mixed success).
Professionals talk logistics (including medical support). So make this your morning reading today if you want to understand the evolving threat to battlefield sustainment (and some possible solutions).
Then we get carried away with the 'carriers are obsolete argument' and Rory claims we can't protect them. Except, we can deploy with the necessary frigates, destroyers, air cover (and add in partners, though they aren't necessary).
.
We're going to have a lot to say on missile defence later this week, but before that it's worth reading this
@RUSI_org
paper. It examines a capable but relatively small (compared to the US) Western air force. Lots in here for others in NATO (including the
@RoyalAirForce
).
New report I’ve been working on is published today and is free to download on the RUSI website!
Policy Recommendations for Optimising Dutch Air and Space Power:
#RNLAF
#Airpower
Essentially, it didn’t know where all the vulnerabilities and chokepoints were, and so plans had to be torn up and decisions made as improvisations.
@SuzanneRaine2
has commented in the past on whether the risk register system needs updating.
Particularly important to highlight people: both in-service conditions (accommodation, infrastructure, training, terms) and numbers (general recruitment, particular specialisms) need support *just as much* as pieces of equipment. Otherwise don't have capabilities we can use.
Government IT is incredibly variable in quality and sophistication. I can't help but wonder how much of what it will bring in is *actually* AI, and how much will just be 'software that isn't more than a decade old'. I'm looking at you
@DefenceHQ
...
Resilience is a product of the ability to both take a blow and respond *and* adapt in the face of events. Planning doesn’t guarantee success, but it provides a better foundation for adaptation than simply winging it, especially if it has promoted the buildup of resources.
With apologies to my old MOD colleagues in the legal team if I have mangled or misremembered their wisdom on the fundamentals of IHL (not something to be done lightly!).
Important to see what this consists of. Defence *spending* under the NATO definition can include operations, so the money from the reserve for Ukraine is included. Beefing up the Armed Forces will involve increasing the defence *budget*, to fund personnel and the Equipment Plan.
Somehow, the government has to protect the operational security of the deterrent while reassuring as to its capability, to a domestic audience. One missile test doesn't tell us much: the overall state of the current fleet and replacement programme is probably more of an issue.
There’s no one template, and a single ‘plan’ might not be the answer, but many of the lessons from elsewhere show the value of planning and *particularly* of preparing the public, industry and society, if not also involving them in the development of such plans.
By the time HMS Dreadnought and its contemporaries start replacing the Vanguards in the 2030s, they could be a decade or more older than intended. That stress is already apparent in the system, as the observed length of deterrent patrols grows.
Both
@RobertClark87
and
@haynesdeborah
highlight the usefulness of military experience in dealing with the MOD. But it's not a pre-requisite; what matters is the ministerial ability to make *timely* decisions, use evidence, and interrogate the experts who work for you.
Labour team equally inexperienced - at least
@JohnnyMercerUK
has relevant & credible military experience, which is still fundamental imo to properly grapple with the challenges facing the department, & UK national security more widely.
But a Type 45 destroyer (which would defend a carrier) has just shot down a ballistic missile in the Red Sea, and the Chinese are building a carrier force as quickly as they can. Carriers are not yet obsolete!
The recent
@RUSI_org
paper from
@Jack_Watling
and Sidharth Kaushal is mentioned in here. Both they and
@Justin_Br0nk
would no doubt add that, if the the UK is to re-design its air defence system, it should do so based on a plausible threat.
Missile & drone attacks on Ukraine & Israel are stark reminder of complexity of air threat we now face. We need an integrated air & missiles defence system to protect UK homeland & allow our ships, planes & army air defence units to be on frontline.
There's a degree of irony in that General Carter is quoted approvingly, yet was in charge of the Army and later the Armed Forces at a time when many of the problems emerged (including with the Ajax armoured vehicle they mention).
The
@RFAHeadquarters
isn’t sexy, but if it doesn’t sail, we can’t sustain
@RoyalNavy
operations at long distances from shoreside bases, or for any extended duration.
For the avoidance of doubt, this is really alarming and the result of years of underfunding. Royal Fleet Auxiliary sailors play a vital role in supporting the
@RoyalNavy
& UK resilience/defence. HMG neglects them at all of our peril…⚓️
Source? Doesn’t match up to the latest figures in (for example)
@IISS_org
’s Military Balance. And what types are covered? In what state? I’m not putting much faith in Iranian air power. Yes, the RAF *is* spread thinly at the moment, but let’s start analysis from a solid position.
It's unlikely that it changes the calculations of countries like Russia or China. Nuclear powers watch other countries' tests, and this one was (as normal) announced in advance. They probably knew before today's story that no missile was successfully launched.
But looking back at Iraq in 2003, invading US-led forces refrained for hitting southern oil infrastructure where possible, to protect them for the post-invasion Iraqi state and try and avoid an environmental catastrophe. The fact they funded Saddam was a lesser consideration.
A demonstration and shakedown operation (DASO) is about testing the full capability of a submarine and its crew. HMS Vanguard has been away from operations for around eight years, so its certification and return to availability is welcome for a small and stretched force.
For the UK, the problem is probably more one of domestic reassurance and handling. The Dreadnought programme is late, and the Vanguards are being run for several years beyond their originally-planned service lives.
This puts pressure on both crews (going months without contact either with the outside world or their families) and the submarines (which must remain undetected for every second of each patrol).
@haynesdeborah
@ForcesNews
@RoyalAirForce
The air policing mission essentially has a rota. So the question is whether the Typhoons were on a ‘hot’ week or not. If the former, it’s a problem. If the latter, it’s a logical choice as they were close and ready for air to air missions. We should also watch how long they stay.
They are right to criticise the slow buildup of the F-35 force, which is probably not getting enough flight time (and I know there is time spent in simulators, but they aren't a substitute for the real thing).
If we wanted to be critical, it would be to point out one such deployments suck up the vast majority of the Navy's deployable forces; relies upon an aging support ship; and the airborne early-warning radar has disappointed.
@salisbot
It weights the truly great air combat towards the earlier episodes, and the fact that it tries to be faithful to history means that a *lot* of people die and it’s hard to stick with characters. But overall, it’s a strong and emotional story.
@balmer_tim
This started about nine years ago. Pensions are allowed under the NATO criteria, but it isn't uniformly included across the Alliance, and in this case it was largely to allow the UK to say it would meet the 2% target.
The Written Ministerial Statement from today is - unsurprisingly - not giving much away. It could be read as suggesting something unusual in the test circumstances or procedures contributed to the failure, but even that is speculation.
Given the rhetoric about being in a ‘pre-war’ period, it’s not unreasonable to ask if those vulnerabilities have now been considered in the light of an actual deliberate threat, acting with malice, rather than an unthinking virus.
I’ve finally seen Dune: Part Two. It was excellent, but more importantly I now have a slim chance of understanding my team’s memes and enjoying some brief popular culture relevance. Maybe RUSI should do more work on the utility of tactical nuclear weapons…
#DunePartTwo
As I said elsewhere yesterday, you need to look at what qualifies as defence spending, and how the baseline has been created. The figure below would allow the MOD to balance the *current* equipment plan, and give a bit of room for changes to that and/or investment in personnel.
To get the £75 billion number, the government has assumed a baseline with spending frozen in cash terms and then added up all of the differences. If you instead assume a baseline of spending frozen as a % GDP, it's an extra £20 billion over 6 years. Details here.
@pinstripedline
I am mildly bothered that people - including in government - think SIA means 'security and intelligence agencies', when it's Single Intelligence Account...
The question here is whether the 148 Challenger 3 tanks that the MOD is aiming to have, as upgrades from Challenger 2, are enough. It's not very many...
Air and missile defence is important you say? Can I interest anyone in forthcoming research from
@RUSI_org
on this subject and our Integrated Air and Missile Defence Conference next week? Link and more details in next message below!
See also
@StaciePettyjohn
's recent article for
@WarOnTheRocks
, making the same point about the current role of drones complementing artillery, both as precision strike weapons and for targeting.
And in preparing a ‘national defence plan’ there are several good examples from which to draw.
@elisabethbraw
has been writing about this for several years. The MOD also mentions this.
@pinstripedline
It could be the Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) not normally regarded as part of the budget. The last figure we have is the £13.9bn in 2022/23.
Domestic political and public support is important to maintain the goodwill and funding necessary to operate a complicated and expensive nuclear deterrent. As my colleague
@harries_matthew
has highlighted, this happened several weeks ago, but government handling has lagged.
Having recently joined
@RUSI_org
it seems appropriate to start here on TwitX (or whatever we're calling it now) by highlighting the work of the Military Sciences team. They've had a busy week! Plenty here to consider over your coffee or Saturday brunch. 🧵
Rory then claims that '40 to 45%' of the MOD budget is spent 'buying kit'. It's about right for what the full Equipment Plan covers, but remember that includes *both* buying equipment (procurement) and supporting it in service.
The first highlighted the huge challenge: shrinking militaries, faced with a need to have a wider set of skills, including to handle technology. What is the 'offer' to new recruits, and their families? Culture change was needed, not easy in organisations wedded to tradition.
Rory is rather snooty about patrol ships in the Indo-Pacific. The Defence Committee also posed some questions about Defence's role in the so-called 'tilt'.
Ukrainian success in the Black Sea has boosted morale and re-opened grain corridors, but it isn't a substitute for being able to defend against the Russian land threat in 2024. Ukraine still needs its international backers to provide a significant volume of artillery this year.
Interesting timing, coming just after the US vote (still to be ratified by the Senate and President Biden) and with European deliberations underway. Looks to be the UK again trying to encourage/reinvigorate support for Ukraine. A couple of points to note in the statement. 🧵
Ensuring Ukraine wins is the most important thing we can do for global peace and security.
That’s why we’re increasing our support - backing Ukraine with £500 million for military aid and delivering our largest-ever package of equipment.
#StandWithUkraine
Very interesting. Looks like Israel used an air-launched ballistic missile in the attack on Iran.
(Also: hurrah for OSINT; what would be the odds of getting either images of debris out of Iraq & later sat image of the target if this attack occurred 20 years ago?)
Timely
@RUSI_org
Military Sciences research out today, on the use of drones (including what we mean by that loaded term in this case). It should help dispel some of the myths about what they can achieve, as well as explaining how to maximise their impact.
Very pleased to be publishing Mass Precision Strike: Designing UAV Complexes for Land Forces - co-authored with my colleague
@Justin_Br0nk
at
@RUSI_org
.
I LOVE this new
@AusAirForce
campaign!
It reminds me of exactly how I felt as a teenager looking for a career that would combine my two loves of science and adventure. I found both in the RAAF, and so much more.
It is not unreasonable to expect hundreds of casualties per day during periods of large-scale warfighting. So how would the NHS cope with war?
@EdArnold_RUSI
and Si Horne explore this question in today's
#RUSICommentary
.
This follows (though is an improvement upon) the previous test failure, where the government took seven months to make a statement to the House (and said little anyway).
The ability to test - repeatedly - strategies and plans before implementation is important if you don’t have much margin for error. Combine this with existing technology (never mind what’s developing) and we might just make better decisions, if we listen.
We have partnered with
@UKStratCom
in the development of a new centre for defence experimentation and
#wargaming
, helping Defence respond to evolving global threats
👉
Deployed Government Communications Officers (GCOs) are absolutely vital to military operations (apart from when they're briefing from other people's products 😉). Pretty much any operation you can think of today (and a few you can't) probably has GCO support.
Our support to our military has existed for as long as we have, so wherever and whenever they have deployed over the years, we have supported them.
In recent years, over 300 of our staff have received campaign medals in recognition for their work alongside the military overseas.