Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Military Technology at RUSI, London. Professor II at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy. Pilot. Views are my own.
New for RUSI today
We must invest urgently in ammunition production capacity to make Ukraine's war effort sustainable, we may have only a few years to get Europe's own defences in order against Russia, and why the US may not be coming to save us next time:
For what it’s worth, this doesn’t look or sound quite like an air strike using the typical IAF 1000lb or 2000lb JDAM/Mk80 series to me. Incoming projectile sounds like it’s under power and the explosion frames visible look like largely propellant fire rather than HE detonation…
First clear footage from the Al Ahli tragedy in Gaza, but what do you notice?
this is a surface explosion, almost no soil is thrown up, so it's not an air bomb.
Looks like a failed Hamas rocket that landed there, what a tragedy has Hamas brought to the people of Gaza!
No crater or obvious shrapnel pattern consistent with standard IAF JDAM/Mk80 series bombs visible in this image. Still not conclusive, but IF this is the extent of the damage then I’d say an airstrike looks less likely than a rocket failure causing an explosion and fuel fire.
And we now have footage of the (partially) burnt-out parking lot at the Ahli Hospital in Gaza.
Overall damage to the structures in the complex appears to be limited, a clay-tiled awning adjacent to the parking lot is still mostly intact.
Every defence minister, chancellor, and head of state in Europe needs to watch this.
It’s insane, but he believes it. if he wins the GOP will fold as they have on Ukraine.
We must urgently focus on building forces to defend Europe against Russia without major US reinforcement.
Trump: One of the presidents of a big country stood up and said, Well, sir, if we don't pay and were attacked by Russia, will you protect us? I said.. No I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want.
The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force. My analysis for RUSI on the surprisingly minimal Russian fast jet sorties, and their failure to secure air superiority in the first five days of the
#UkraineInvasion
. Some possible contributing factors:
Given interest in the Iranian Shahed-136 (and smaller Shahed-131) loitering munitions now being used at a rapidly increasing scale by Russia in Ukraine, and some of the breathless claims being made about them; a brief thread on what they can and can't do compared to jets (1/20)
Wow. Looks like pilot fatigue or mechanical issues from the constant ops tempo are taking their toll... Russian Su-25SM crashes after a dropping a wing due to a stall in a banking turn just after take-off. Looks fatal.
Doesn't look overloaded, just two S-13 rocket pods.
#VKS
It has now been more than a week since Russia invaded Ukraine. At this stage, early explanations are no longer sufficient and analysts need to ask the big question: Is the Russian Air Force Actually Incapable of Complex Air Operations?
#Ukraine
#Russia
A thread on the US approval for
#F16
transfer to
#Ukraine
once pilot training is complete:
This US decision is important as it clears one of the obstacles to delivery from European operators - US authorisation as the original manufacturer.
Several issues remain, however: (1/10)
Since the Dutch F-16 announcement has generated more talks on
#fighters
for
#Ukraine
; a few thoughts.
1) The Ukrainian Air Force would absolutely benefit greatly from Western fighters in terms of air-to-air and (potentially) air-to-ground lethality. But there are caveats (1/10)
Plea to defence journos + analysts: stop talking 'drones'.
'Drone' could be a $25 toy or a $100m+ stealth, long-range combat aircraft the size of an airliner.
UAS = Small 'coptors
RPAS = Remotely piloted UAVs (MQ-9, TB-2)
UCAV = Survivable, highly automated (RQ-180/X-47B/GJ-11)
We really shouldn’t fall into the trap of underestimating the Russians. Yes, they’re screwing up at the tactical level with casualty implications that we in the West would find intolerable. But they’re unfortunately learning, adapting and continuing to press forward.
In TNA today and just came across this wonderful little
#RAF
minute from D-Day, which should please all those who feel MAA regulations unduly hamper military operations...
On Saki Airbase in
#Crimea
. The first two explosions happen in the middle of drifting smoke from a clearly already established fire. Looks black like fuel. No missiles visible in any footage. Later a third explosion exactly the same size, colour and propagation rate occurs.
(1/4)
One final plea (in vain). Please stop calling them 'suicide' or 'kamikaze' drones. Shahed, Harop, Qasef, Switchblade etc are munitions. That they are propeller-driven and can loiter in flight doesn't mean a term we wouldn't apply to any other missile is appropriate... (20/20)
After some radio silence (did I miss much on Twitter the past few weeks?) I'm looking forward to releasing a new RUSI Special Report on Russia's Air War against Ukraine on Monday
Based on fieldwork in Ukraine, it aims to fill in some of the many gaps in the public picture so far.
A few thoughts on Western choices on supplying heavy weaponry and continued munitions shipments to
#Ukraine
;
There is a misleading narrative emerging about the political choices around the cost of long term support and the need for a ceasefire sooner rather than later (1/8)
For those on the give Ukraine Tranche 1 Typhoon train, since the question has been asked;
1) The RAF does not have 53 serviceable Tranche 1s to give. There are far fewer now (c20-25).
2) Those remaining have much more limited combat/weapons capabilities than Tranche 2/3 (1/6)
Furthermore, they must disperse with a minimal visible ground operations and logistics footprint to avoid focused Russian missile strikes on airbases. This mediates in favour of Gripen or F-18 as types able to operate from rough, short fields with compact support equipment (9/10)
Iran also regularly launches loitering munitions from Syria towards Israel, including more sophisticated designs with some stealth features. They are almost all intercepted and shot down, like this one by IAF F-35s, as Israel has a dense, multi-layered air defence network. (7/20)
Great news about steps towards Gripen transfer. F-16 is absolutely part of the solution at least in the medium term, but Gripen has huge advantages in terms of maintainability in theatre, and Meteor compatibility. It was literally designed for the Ukrainian Air Force CONOPS.
Ten outcomes of our talks with
@SwedishPM
Ulf Kristersson.
1. We agreed to work on the joint production of CV-90s armoured vehicles in Ukraine.
2. Ukrainian warriors began training to operate Swedish “Archers”.
3. Ukrainian pilots are already taking part in testing “Gripen”
Russia's Shahed-136s are certainly an increasing problem for Ukraine. Air defences cannot intercept them all, and they will cause damage to cities, bases and probably SAM radars. Western partners should increase deliveries of short- and medium-range air defences to help. (14/20)
Fifth, they are slow- and low-flying, which significantly limits their utility as responsive weapons against a sudden threat at range and also makes them comparatively easy to intercept with old-fashioned radar-laid anti-aircraft guns like the German Gepard SPAAG. (11/20)
The damage caused will be tragic and militarily inconvenient. However, Ukraine is united and winning despite whole cities ruined, and heavy barrages of cruise and ballistic missiles. Shahed-136s, even if hundreds get through, are highly unlikely to change the outcome. (15/20)
The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence
New RUSI Special Report based on fieldwork explains:
- How Russia's air force failed thus far
- Why it still poses a serious danger
- Why Western aid must now prioritise Ukrainian air defence
A few more shots from Tuesday flying with the Swedish Air Force. Im extremely grateful to everyone at SwAF HQ and F.21 Wing who made it happen!
If you want to see how to do dispersed fast jet basing in an era of long range precision strike threats; these are the real experts!
Far from being cutting edge, loitering munitions have been around since the late 1980s; the Israeli Harpy being the most successful. They are essentially slow, propeller-powered missiles. Early variants had anti-radiation seekers to home in on enemy SAM radars. (2/20)
Any western fighters that could plausibly be sent would still be at high risk from Russian SAMs, so would have to fly at very low altitudes within several tens of kilometres of the frontlines. This would dramatically reduce effective missile range and limit strike options (2/10)
If one still needs convincing that (while extremely useful, and here to stay) they are not a replacement for fast jets, look at the first user and most prolific developer (and target) of loitering munitions. Israel 'gets it', yet is pouring money into both F-35 and F-15. (19/20)
These considerations matter because Western capacity is not limitless
Logistics, training and personnel working on jets for Ukraine is capacity not used for other things like SAMs, vehicles, ammunition. The question is should this be the priority now, or should it wait? (10/10)
The VKS has a bad habit of leaving piles of munitions next to parked aircraft, including ones that are fuelled and armed. My working theory is that Ukrainian loitering munitions or saboteurs caused an initial fuel fire that engulfed either piles of bombs or armed aircraft..
(3/4)
In a bit of personal news, I'm delighted to have accepted a part time Professor II position to teach at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy this year. I will also continue to work as the SRF for Airpower at RUSI.
Almost all militaries (except Israel) have been far too slow to take the threat of loitering munitions (and especially small UAS) seriously. But, against simple, cheap types that can swarm there are many routes to countering them, from SHORAD, to EW systems and MANPADS. (16/20)
Really interesting (+ surprisingly uncensored) Mig-29 combat footage here. Main highlight is AGM-88 HARM launches, including two double-launches from medium altitude. Suggests reasonable stocks.
Combat air patrols at very low level with R-73 and R-27R also shown
#UkraineWar
One of the 🇺🇦 pilots has made a footage of the MiG-29 fighter jets combat operations.
🇺🇦 pilot Ivan dedicates this video to major Yevhen Lysenko, his fallen brother in arms, who heroically died in an aerial fight against the 🇷🇺 invaders on March 9.
I was lucky enough to fly on the mighty Rafale with the Armee de l’Air last Friday. Interesting cockpit design with lots of SA from the central collimated display, plenty of power, slick air-to-ground weapons/sensor integration, and loads of fuel - an impressive combination!
They were developed to combine the capabilities of target decoys with those of anti-radiation missiles. Due to fuel efficient, slow flight, they could travel hundreds of kilometres and loiter for several hours. If enemy SAM radars illuminated to engage, they would be hit. (3/20)
New photo circulating of Pakistani soldier posing on wreckage appears genuine as
#IAF
markings are clear and pitot tube (blue) and hatch/fairing position (red) confirm this is the starboard side nose section of a Mig-21Bis
#IndiaPakistan
Most common Western close-air-support weapons like Paveway II and AGM-65 Maverick require the pilot or a JTAC to use a targeting pod or other sensor to find, ID and designate the target for precision strikes. This sort of CAS is far harder when confined to very low level. (3/10)
The basic technology required is extremely basic compared to traditional combat aircraft. A small piston engine designed for light or model aircraft, a simple flying wing body from plastic, metal or composites, basic navigation capabilities and a seeker or some kind. (4/20)
Iran has enthusiastically embraced the technology, and has supplied training and critical components to its Houthi allies in Yemen. The resultant loitering munitions have proven able to hit oil infrastructure and military bases throughout Saudi Arabia for many years now. (6/20)
A key outcome of Russia's failures in Ukraine for Defence is that in future states will place far more weight on assessing opponents ammo stocks, logistics capabilities, training and exercise quality. Deterrence will require demonstrating depth, not simply having frontline assets
The big change in the last decade has been the ballooning availability of cheap consumer micro-electronics with ample processing power and GPS-based navigation (e.g. smartphone components). This has given even non-state groups access to reasonable accuracy vs fixed targets (5/20)
Physics still applies, and anything small and cheap enough to expend in great numbers can either go fast or far but not both, and payload will be small. If you add multi-mode seekers, advanced navigation, stealth and EW resistance, costs will be like other modern missiles (17/20)
Today loitering munitions like the Shahed-136 offer a relatively cheap way for states and some non-state groups to mount long range attacks on fixed targets (using GPS/INS navigation) or radars (using an anti-radiation seeker). However, there are significant limitations (8/20)
Third, the components are typically commercial, with little or no protection against anti-UAV systems that use high-powered microwave or other electronic effects. Fourth, simple ones cannot easily be used to strike moving targets, which limits flexibility on a battlefield (10/20)
By contrast, fast jets are expensive and complex to maintain, but offer much heavier, more flexible firepower; far more potent sensor suites; reusability; signalling options; visible deterrence; and survivability. They are so more than precision strike delivery platforms. (18/20)
So; Western fighters will undoubtedly provide a major boost to Ukrainian Air Force survivability and air-to-air lethality against the Russian VKS once supplied. However, they would still be at risk from Russia's SAM systems, and have limited dynamic ground attack options. (8/10)
Stand-off weapons like AGM-154 JSOW, GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb or AGM-158 JASSM are (broadly) designed to hit fixed targets. Glide weapons are also dependent on altitude and speed of the launch aircraft for range so would be more constrained from low altitude launches. (4/10)
For example, Morocco reportedly paid $22 Million in 2021 for 15 of the advanced Israeli Harops. While highly capable, these are not 'swarming' because few could buy them in large enough numbers. At this cost they are competing with traditional missiles for many missions. (13/20)
As such, only Meteor would likely provide an absolute effective range advantage over R-37M carried by high-altitude Su-35S and Mig-31BM CAPs. Supplying these weapons would help the Ukrainian Air Force a great deal, but they are sensitive and available in v limited numbers. (7/10)
Well wow!
Whether due to a Ukrainian anti-ship missile attack (which should not have got past the Moskva’s defence systems if they were functioning and crewed properly) or another ammunition handling accident, RIA says she’s being abandoned…a disaster for Russia if confirmed!
Firstly they rely on commercial GPS for navigation and terminal accuracy. If GPS is jammed then both will degrade rapidly. Secondly the warhead capacity is small (typically 5-30kg) which limits damage and viable target sets compared to regular bombs, missiles or artillery. (9/20)
Many of these limitations can be mitigated. Multi-mode seekers can be added. Advanced warheads can open up more target sets within weight limits, small turbojets can increase speed. Military grade electronics can improve EW resistance. But all are expensive and complex (12/20)
So while Western fighters with stand-off weapons would offer Ukraine an improved capability to destroy fixed Russian targets near the frontlines from a safer distance, they would be adding to existing strike options like HIMARS and drawing from limited stockpiles. (5/10)
If Ukraine wins, it will still need long-term support but Russia will face political turmoil and need time to re-arm (likely with Chinese help)
If we hold back support now and the war prolongs, then 🇺🇦 and NATO will need to spend far more holding back emboldened 🇷🇺 forces (8/8)
Air-to-air, altitude constraints due to Russian SAMs also apply. Western fighters would offer much better range if supplied with latest AIM-120C/D or (ideally) Meteor than Mig-29/Su-27 with R-27R/ER. But handicapped by firing from low and slow compared to Russian fighters (6/10)
Therefore, the policy choice isn't to supply Ukraine with heavy weaponry at scale or not. The choice is whether to do it now, when Ukraine has a real chance of taking back most or all of its lost territory. Or later, when Russia has had time to take back the initiative (5/8)
Some good stuff here, but a few notable errors:
Ukraine had several brigades of S-300PS/PT and S-300V1 when the invasion began, plus SA-11s (which got most Russian jet losses), some SA-15 and plenty of SA-8s. They didn't start with MANPADS and then get S-300 from Slovakia (1/3)
Really pleased this is out.
@edwardstrngr
and I have written an article for
@TheAtlantic
on the air war over Ukraine, looking at both why the Russians might be underperforming and the Ukrainians have done so much better than most expected.
Lastly, the weapons given will be critical to how effective an F-16 fleet can be. Key items like the long ranged AIM-120D variant of AMRAAM and JASSM standoff missile have yet to be approved, and may be deemed too sensitive to risk Russian (and Chinese) capture/ analysis (10/10).
A quick thread on the prospects for Western fighters for the Ukrainian Air Force (UkrAF) in the short-medium term
First, what are they needed for? Well there are two primary tasks, alongside others like SEAD and strike:
First primary one is intercepting cruise missiles (1/n)
@RadiofreeTheo
The flames look more like propellant from a missile or rocket igniting than they do the conical high explosive detonation signature from a bomb. Maybe there was a fuel on site that was hit, which would explain that. But just saying what initial impressions are from that footage.
If this is indeed damage from the same engagement as the reported A-50U shoot down, it supports the theory that Patriot PAC-2 GEM was the weapon used, since the latter has a large blast fragmentation warhead that could produce a pattern consistent with this damage.
#A50
When that fire hit detonation temperature for the munitions either piled up or on the aircraft, they exploded, causing the first two explosions in the footage. This spread more burning debris around, engulfing either another armed aircraft or another pile that did the same.
(4/4)
There is no policy choice which avoids the UK and other European capitals having to significantly increase defence spending and in particular invest in ammunition, spares and vehicle manufacturing capacity at scale. Russia has unfortunately made that choice for us. (6/8)
The first is who will service and turn the jets once in country? F-16 is a complex aircraft and the airframes likely to be sent are quite old. Even on high risk timeframes it will take years to train journeyman or master level maintainers who can supervise and assure. (2/10)
I know this will be unpopular and is deeply frustrating given the ongoing Russian atrocities in Mariupol, Kharkiv and other cities in
#Ukraine
. But since it is still being pushed:
A Ukraine No-Fly Zone Would be Ineffective, Dangerous and a Gift to Putin
This is an issue because any F-16 bases set up inside Ukraine will be priority targets for Russian cruise and ballistic missile strikes. Therefore, more ground support equipment and contractors are needed to enable dispersed basing, and they’ll still be actively targeted (4/10)
This means that just like any other FMS customer that the US has helped set up with an F-16 fleet, there will be a heavy reliance on civilian contractors to supervise and provide on-the-job training to Ukrainian maintainers in-country, even after months of initial training (3/10)
The F-16s likely to be sent are Dutch, Danish and Norwegian, but those air forces need their own F-16 maintainers + contractors to retrain on F-35 to support their current fleets. Thus, where the required maintainers come from is a key question that is so far unanswered (6/10)
It will also take significant time to train Ukrainian pilots as formation leaders to execute the complex 4-8 ship tactics required for the F-16 to operate effectively near the frontline under the concurrent threats of Russian layered SAM systems and fighter CAPs with R-37M (9/10)
From Ukrainian clip, range from the nearest likely forward location for Patriot launcher is ~140km from where the
#A50
orbit was when reportedly shot down. A long shot, but should be within envelope for PAC-2 GEM and PAC-3 MSE missiles.
High risk, but what a result if confirmed!
Coming to the final section of my last long form piece of writing analysing the war in
#Ukraine
this year…I’m reminded once again of the Ukrainian soldier who gave us the most succinct and accurate assessment of
#Russian
military decisions and tactics during the invasion:
Given a lack of European capacity, the key is finding a way to support Ukrainian Air Force to set up and sustainably operate F-16s without unacceptably drawing finite PDA budget away from more critical supplies of artillery, ammunition, tanks, IFVs, Patriot missiles etc.
(8/10)
So, my best guess is that Ukrainian forces hit the base with a fairly small loitering munition or improvised UAV, like the strike in Sevastopol a few days ago.
()
But this time they got lucky and hit a parked aircraft or fuel truck, starting a fire.
(2/4)
This increases the political risk of Western contractors being killed by Russian strikes and in any case the US Administration has a ‘no boots on the ground in Ukraine’ policy, so no US contractor support is likely without a major policy change there. (5/10)
Another key question is how to finance this in the near term. F-16 is cheap by Western fast jet standards but is still very expensive. Essential US support would have come out of the limited Presidential Drawdown Authority budget for military support to Ukraine as a whole (7/10)
Those who argue that supporting Ukraine is unaffordable long term must understand that however this war ends, Russia will remain a committed and increasingly re-armed adversary. Crucially, US military presence in Europe will also significantly decline as it focuses on China (7/8)
@SkyNews
This is an exceptionally poorly informed set of statements. Finland is the best example of what good strong national defence looks like in Europe. Puts our capability, resilience, doctrinal coherence, spending and readiness to shame in many areas.
@samjampk
Protest, threaten nuclear annihilation, and then do nothing
Reality is that Western fighters like F-16, Gripen or F-18 would have no ability to operate in any sustainable way over Russian territory due to the GBAD threat. Unless supplied with ALCMs, fighters are purely defensive.
That's a really expensive way to bombard infrastructure... Supports the theory that Russia is running uncomfortably close to its strategic stockpile minimum threshold limits on standard Kh-101, Kh-555 and 3M-54 cruise missile stocks.
On UK training UkrAF pilots:
No this doesn’t mean training on Typhoon, or that the UK will soon supply jets.
Training NATO tactics, cockpit procedures in (non-type specific) simulators will speed up later conversation to F-16/Gripen etc, and add tactical value with current types.
Great to see. TOS-1A is a particularly horrendous weapon in terms of the effects its large thermobaric barrages have on dug-in troops and urban areas; and there aren't a huge number of them. One fewer today.
The massacre of Russian forces at Avdiivka continues; an FPV drone operated by the Ukrainian 59th Motorized Brigade hits a Russian TOS-1A Solntsepyok thermobaric MLRS, causing a huge explosion.
If some sort of stalemate is reached (it absolutely has not been for now), and a ceasefire forced on Ukraine by limits on Western support; Russia will continue to rebuild offensive capability at scale. Therefore, Ukraine would still urgently need Western weapons at scale (2/8)
Russia doesn't have '4000 combat aircraft' to play with. It has approx 110 Su-35, 150 Su-30SM/M2, 130 Su-34 and c120 Su-25SM/SM3 plus c150 Mig-31BM/K. Deployed around 320 fighters/fighter bombers for Ukraine ops, has lost at least 25. (2/3)
My colleagues ‘
@Jack_Watling
and Nick Reynolds are back again from
#Ukraine
and have produced this superb analysis of how Russian tactics have changed during the war. For those interested in the latest in the air, pages 20-23 are particularly relevant:
It is important to understand that currently Russian forces are slowly taking ground in the Donbass but at massive cost, and the appearance of bad Ukrainian force ratios is because 🇺🇦 is holding forces back to build up mobile units to go on the offensive again in Spring (3/8)
Russia has put its industry on a war-footing and is preparing new waves of mobilisation. Ukraine has the advantage for now, but 🇷🇺 production and trained troop numbers will increase by Autumn. The window for decisive 🇺🇦 advances is finite, and the threat is a long term one (4/8)
Delighted to share that '
@CNA_org
has just released a report by me assessing the short, medium and long term threat posed by the Russian Aerospace Forces in light of the first year of the Invasion of Ukraine. Free to download here:
#VKS
#UkraineWar
#Russia
Both have lots of ground-based air defences and little SEAD capability. I think this is the primary and relatively simple reason why neither side can gain air superiority and use it effectively over the frontlines. Below the SAMs, there are MANPADS... (4/4)
Interesting (and disappointing) to find out that the F-35B that was lost from the QE was ZM152; she first flew in June 2019 and is, therefore, one of the newer F-35Bs in the UK fleet, with significantly lower Block IV upgrade requirements than older airframes. Thus a greater loss
7) The value of any Tranche 1 gift would be almost purely symbolic, rather than a practical and sustainable UkrAF asset.
8) That symbol might be worth it if it politically enables Sweden to supply Gripen C or another partner to supply F-18.
(4/6)
Getting Serious About SEAD: European Air Forces Must Learn from the Failure of the Russian Air Force over Ukraine.
My immediate lessons learned from the first phase of the air war for RUSI: