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@kse
.org.ua
@FT
Thank you for featuring our research! Hopefully soon all the gaps in the sanctions regime will be addressed and Russia will lose access to Western components for weapons.
1/5 🇷🇺 has lost $113B in oil exports due to EU & G7 sanctions, plus an additional $55B from the 🇪🇺 shift away from 🇷🇺 gas. Four steps could slash another $50B from the Kremlin's annual export revenues.
New paper by
@sanctionsgroup
:
What should be done 👇
1/5 Total Russian exports fell to $33B from last month's $40B. With imports stable, the trade surplus is around $10B/month in Jan-Oct 2023. The external environment is less supportive than last year but not critically pressured. Full Chartbook:
1/5 In 2023, Russia's current account surplus fell to $50.2B (-79% from 2022's $238B). Trade surplus shrank to $118.3B (-63%), with goods exports down 29%. The less supportive external environment is undermining macro stability:
1/2 About 75% of the decline in Russia’s energy revenues can be attributed to Western sanctions, not market prices, based on analysis of oil sales records.
Read more from
@NastyaStogney
article for
@FT
, featuring KSE Institute research:
🇺🇦
@elinaribakova
: It is important to hold accountable any country that wants to dominate, aggress and invade a neighboring country.
Watch the
@ACEurasia
event on a renewed policy of containment towards Russia:
1/4 As of Feb 20, 2024,
@USTreasury
sanctioned 27 Russian crude vessels: 16 tankers were unloaded, 8 loaded ones are stationary, and 3 with planned shipments but no final destination. Full Russian Oil Tracker:
1/ In 1Q2023, exports of oil and oil products from 🇷🇺 fell by $15.6B, or 29%, compared to 4Q2022, partially as a result of restrictions imposed by the EU and G7, according to «Russian Oil Exports Under International Sanctions» by
@KSE_Institute
@elinaribakova
@ben_hilgenstock
1/3 Russian imports of CNC machinery tools surged to $292M in Jan-Oct 2023, a 33% increase. Key suppliers, including Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan, collectively account for over 82%. Concerningly, many Russian buyers remain unsanctioned.
📌 1/6
@elinaribakova
, in testimony for the Senate
@HSGAC
@HSGAC_GOP
hearing on The U.S. Technology Fueling Russia's War in Ukraine, highlighted key issues and offered policy recommendations to stop the flow of critical components to the aggressor. 🧵👇
3/5 Updated projections foresee Russian oil and gas exports at $225B in 2023, $186B in 2024, and $176B in 2025. Earnings this year will surpass estimates by $27B, contributing to an overall 2023 surplus of $55B. Sustained pressure from sanctions is vital.
5/5 After a base effects-driven dip in spring/summer, both headline and core inflation are on the rise. Projections indicate headline inflation reaching ~ 8% by year-end. Notably, the FMCG-based price index has surged 47.9% since Feb '22 (vs. ~20% of the overall CPI).
1/3
@KSE_Institute
& other experts stress in a FREE Policy Brief: Sanctions are crucial against 🇷🇺 threat to the rule-based international order. Notably, sanctions' targeting Russian energy exports have significantly hit 🇷🇺 macroeconomic stability
🧵👇
1/4 Russia heavily relied on the NWF, depleting ~50% of its liquid assets (~4.8 trln rub) since Feb '22. In Dec '23, hard-currency holdings, including euros, hit zero. Only $55B in yuan assets & gold remain. Budget funding via the NWF becomes challenging.
5/5 Our recommendations: 1️⃣ Alignment of Sanctions 2️⃣ Broader export controls 3️⃣ Improved company compliance 4️⃣Increase Responsibility 5️⃣ Better utilization of existing institutions
This measures can prevent sanctions violations, and curb Russia's ability to continue the war
4/5 Ruble's drastic drop—down 41% vs. USD, 43% vs. Euro since Oct '22. Recent capital controls and CBR rate hikes aim at stabilization. The regime prioritizes ruble stability and controlled inflation ahead of the 2024 elections.
1/9
@KSE_Institute
Russia Chartbook: "Sanctions Impact Exports and the Ruble, but Continued Effectiveness Needs to Be Ensured." Trade balance declined 68% Jan-Aug YoY, leading to an 86% drop in current account surplus. More action is needed.
Chartbook:
2/5 While the surplus bounced back moderately to $17B in Q3 2023, it remains 78% below its peak in Q2 2022. The improvement is attributed to a larger goods trade surplus and a reduced income and transfers deficit.
For total exports of Russian crude oil, prices dropped from $73.32/barrel in November and $73.70 in December to $60.03 in January, $56.06 in February, and $59.49 in March.
@ben_hilgenstock
@elinaribakova
@Nataliia_Shapo
@melindaharing
From a technical standpoint, 🇮🇱 is believed to have efficient anti-drone systems that 🇺🇦 urgently needs. Besides technical questions we cant help, but ask why 🇷🇺 is still a member of the UN Security Council and when it will be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism?
1/5 Despite 3.6% GDP growth in 2023 from war-related stimulus, Russia lost ~$170B in exports.
@elinaribakova
in op-ed for
@FT
notes: sanctions aren't catastrophic, as isolating the RU economy is costly & shares 3 lessons from Russia's war in Ukraine.
@SergiyKyslytsya
@Iran_UN
@KSE_Institute
calculated that the total amount of damage to 🇺🇦 infrastructure is $114.5 billion. 🇮🇷 should be as responsible as 🇷🇺 and 🇧🇾 for war crimes in 🇺🇦
2/5 Russia's foreign trade stabilizes at $35B/month in exports and $25B in imports. Weaker exports cost around $14B monthly vs. 2022 due to sanctions & moderating energy prices. Increased price cap enforcement could lead to critically low foreign currency inflows in 2024.
#Sanctions
Despite attempts to circumvent sanctions, Moscow's energy revenues continue to decline. In June, oil and gas revenues of the 🇷🇺 federal budget amounted to ₽528.6 bn (~US$6.3 bn), marking a 26.4% YoY decrease and a 7.4% decrease compared to May.
Despite attempts to circumvent, 🇷🇺 O&G revenues continue to fall.
In June, they equaled 528.6 bn RUB. This is 26.4% less YoY and 7.4% less than in May.
2/3 Most CNC machine sales and shipments to Russia come from China, Hong Kong, and Turkey. Coalition entities only accounted for 10.6% of sales and 21.7% of shipments in Jan-Oct 2023. The EU, South Korea, and Taiwan still contribute, but Turkey stands out.
1/4 Sanctions are a tradeoff between maximizing the sanctioned country’s economic loss & minimizing the loss to the sanctioning countries. And now coalition countries are in a stronger position than RU. Read the FREE Policy Brief:
🧵👇
1/5 February's 'Russian Oil Tracker' by KSE Institute:
@USTreasury
Targeted Sanctions on Shadow Fleet are Working, but Russia Seeks Ways to Bypass. Despite efforts by Ukraine & allies, Russian export volumes and revenues stay high. More:
1/3 Russia relied on the NWF, depleting ~50% of its liquid assets (~4.7 trillion) since Feb 2022. In Dec 2023, hard-currency holdings, including euros, hit zero. Only $55B in yuan assets & gold remain. Budget funding via the NWF becomes challenging. More:
1/3 Multinational companies in Russia paid $3.5B in profit tax on $213.9B of revenue in 2022, indirectly supporting the war in Ukraine.
Discover more insights in the joint report "The Business of Staying" by
@B4Ukraine
and
@KSE_Institute
@SelfSanctions
:
1/7
@KSE_Institute
Russia Chartbook: “Sanctions are Working, But No Inflection Point in Sight". Federal deficit has declined from 3.4T rubles in Jan-April to 2.6T in H1 2023. Q1 2023 GDP is down by only 1.8% YoY.
Chartbook:
@ben_hilgenstock
@JPavytska
3/5 Russian oil exports grew by 6.8% in Deс. Notable shifts include a 15.4% drop in shipments to China, stable exports to India, and 1.0 mbd to unknown destinations. Overall, 2023's steady export volumes indicate the success of the price cap in stabilizing the oil market.
5/5 KSE Institute predicts oil and gas exports at $228B (2023), $186B (2024) & $176B (2025). Current account surpluses expected at only $41B and $31B in 2024-25. Stressing sustained sanctions as a $10/barrel oil price change can affect earnings by ~$25-30B/year.
3/3 Mass exodus of skilled workers from 🇷🇺 continues to escalate, with over 1.3 mn people under 35 leaving the country only in the past year alone. New potential waves of mobilization will likely trigger more.
Details:
1/5 On the 2nd anniversary of full-scale war,
@B4Ukraine
's report urges the G7/EU to tighten sanctions. It also advocates for the withdrawal of companies that continue to fund the war, reinforcing
@KSE_Institute
's consistent call:
Why it matters 👇
Two years since Russia’s invasion, Ukraine continues to heroically resist with the help of its partners. But as long as Russia has the funds to continue waging wars, it will do so. Sanctions have not fully delivered as Russia found ways to circumvent them.
Our new report calls
@KSE_Institute
welcomes
@elinaribakova
, a specialist in global markets, economic governance, and economic sovereignty, a non-resident senior fellow at
@PIIE
and
@Bruegel_org
, as a new Director of KSE International Program!
1/ What's going on with sanctions against Russia?
We'll discuss it on May 15th at 4 pm (BST) in the first episode of
#KSETalks
with
@elinaribakova
and
@AgatheDemarais
!
Subscribe so you don't miss the Youtube and Facebook broadcast!
Register -
1/3 In Feb 2024, the shadow fleet accounted for 73% of crude oil volume share & 52% for oil products, posing a threat to price cap leverage. In Q4 2023, only ~2% of seaborne crude oil exports were <$60/bbl, with G7/EU services contributing to ~30%. More:
3/ Despite current sanctions and export controls, Analog Devices (186), Texas Instruments (145), Microchip Technology (96), Intel Corporation (63), and AMD (62), all US-based, emerge as the leading suppliers of hi-tech components in Russian weaponry.
1/3 Russian economy heavily relies on oil & gas: 60% of exports & 40% of gov revenues. In '23, falling O&G prices + sanctions, led to a $113B loss in oil export earnings. Plus, the EU's shift away from RU gas caused a permanent $55B loss since Feb '22:
1/3 Enforcement of sanctions is crucial, with ongoing efforts by governments, think tanks, and the private sector to close loopholes. Dismissing these actions undermines their impact & dismantle the sanctions regime. FREE Policy Brief:
4/5 Ruble has lost ~41% vs. USD, 43% vs. Euro since Oct '22. However, it has stabilized only due to tough policies — capital controls and CBR rate hikes. Now, the regime focuses on stability and controlled inflation ahead of the 2024 elections.
2/3 The embargo on 🇷🇺 oil and oil products, coupled with falling oil and gas prices, will result in a 41% drop in oil and a 64% decline in gas revenues for Moscow in 2023.
Since Oct 2022, ₽ has depreciated by 33% against the $, and the trend continues.
1/7 ‘Just over 500 days since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia is importing as many, if not more, Western-produced components than it was before the attack’, writes
@ElinaRibakova
for
@barronsonline
:
More in our study:
1/4 In 2023, Russian oil and gas revenues reached ₽8.8T ($169B), a -24% YoY decrease compared to record-breaking 2022 (-$67B), and -3% from the pre-invasion 2021 (-$20B).
🇷🇺O&G revenues:
Dec 23: drop to 650 bn RUB or -30% YoY. This is -32% to Nov, - 60% to Oct - confirms that sanctions enforcement matters,
@KSE_Institute
@sanctionsgroup
will keep pushing this
2023: drop to 8.8 trln RUB (-24% YoY, -3% 2021). In $ terms -67$bn YoY, -20$bn to 2021
Over 90% of Ukrainian exports, including grain, flow through Black Sea ports (Odesa, Chornomorsk, Pivdennyi). Russia's withdrawal from the
#GrainDeal
and brutal attacks on 🇺🇦 seaport infrastructure caused devastating consequences, as
@elinaribakova
shared with
@bsurveillance
🎙️We are live! The inaugural episode of
#KSETalks
is now streaming. Join us as
@elinaribakova
&
@AgatheDemarais
delve into the realities of sanctions against Russia
🔗YouTube:
🔗Facebook:
Tune in now for an insightful discussion!
1/2 India led Russian seaborne crude oil imports, rising 11% to 1553 kb/d in Dec 2023. Turkey also set records with 433 kb/d in Nov and 421 kb/d in Dec. In total, India, China, and Turkey accounted for 91% of RU crude exports in Dec. Full ROT:
@sanctionsgroup
and
@KSE_Institute
will hold an online discussion “Expert Conference on the Impact of Russian Sanctions” on December 21 at 5:00 p.m. Kyiv time
Pre-registration is required:
5/ Main exporters of dual-use tech to 🇷🇺 are Hong Kong (46%), China (25%), and Turkey (8%). In 4Q 2022, sellers from China (including HK) accounted for over 87% of all Russian semiconductor imports — a significant increase from the corresponding figure of 33% in 4Q 2021.
During
@HSGAC
hearing,
@elinaribakova
highlights Russia's heavy reliance on US & coalition countries for critical components. Ukraine has identified over 2800 foreign critical components in RU weapons, 95% from coalition countries, 70% from US alone. More:
1/2
@derspiegel
highlights a crucial problem – Russia's shadow fleet. It not only funds the Kremlin's military but also poses an environmental threat. Thanks for featuring
@KSE_Institute
and citing our research. More:
3/3
@sanctionsgroup
unveils 4 measures for a $50B annual cut in 🇷🇺 oil and gas earnings. In just 2 years, O&G sanctions have already cost Russia a whopping $170B, hitting ~10% of the 2023 GDP. More actions ahead to keep squeezing 🇷🇺 military machine:
3/4 Russia's reserves of $634B face immobilization, with ~$288B locked by sanctions on CBR & NWF. Accessible funds: $152B in gold & ~$118B in FX assets, mainly yuan. Despite capital outflows, favorable BoP dynamics led to $187B accumulation in foreign assets from Q1'22 - Q3'23.
1/7
@KSE_Institute
joined a FREE Policy Brief to refute doubts on sanctions' effectiveness expressed in media amid the 2nd anniversary of 🇷🇺 invasion.
Sanctions aren't a substitute but a complement to financial & military support for 🇺🇦:
3/ Western companies remain heavily involved in 🇷🇺 crude oil exports in the Pacific. At the same time, almost all oil is sold above the price cap level of $60/barrel.
@KSE_Institute
believes this is strong evidence for sanctions violations and requires further investigation.
6/ Among key policy recommendations for enhanced sanctions and export controls for high-tech components are expanded control regimes, tightened documentary requirements, targeting third-country intermediaries, and others. More:
5/5 Isolate Russia's Oil and Gas Sector: Sever access to essential Western technology and services, further straining Russia's energy production capabilities and costs.
Read full Paper by
@sanctionsgroup
@McFaul
@AndriyYermak
:
1/3 Recent newspaper articles laud Russia's economic resilience, but they overlook a critical shift: it's becoming a war economy, driven by war stimulus. In 2024, $100B in defense expenditures is projected to boost RU GDP growth by 2.5%. FREE Policy Brief:
2/4 The small January deficit meant that Russia didn’t have to rely on the NWF, and new OFZ issuance was moderate. Domestic borrowing declined by 10% in 2023—to an average 220B rubles/month. Meanwhile, domestic banks are the only remaining buyers for OFZs.
1/4 KSE Institute predicts a deepening recession and weakening ruble in 🇷🇺 due to
#sanctions
and falling energy exports in 2023.
Read the full overview “One year of sanctions” via link:
🔥The RF federal budget deficit for January-April reached 3.4 trillion rubles!
It now exceeds the planned full-year deficit of 2.9 trillion rubles.
Our forecast for 2023 is a deficit of 12.5 trillion rubles.
@elinaribakova
@Nataliia_Shapo
@JPavytska
@ben_hilgenstock
2/5 Stop the Russian Shadow Fleet: Intensify sanctions and enforce oil spill insurance to make Russia depend on the compliant mainstream fleet. Enhance scrutiny and penalties for sanction evasion.
1/11 The debate for and against the confiscation of frozen Russian assets has resurfaced in the G7 and the EU.
@KSE_Institute
has consistently argued that this measure is legal and justified. All the arguments in our legal report -
🧵👇
1/4 In Dec, 196 loaded Russian shadow fleet tankers left Russian ports, with 73% of them built more than 15 years ago, increasing the probability of an environmental catastrophe for which Russia will refuse to pay. Read more:
Tomorrow
@elinaribakova
will testify before the
@HSGAC
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on how Russia is still able to import US technology for its weapons even after two years of full-scale war. More:
An honor to be invited to testify on Russia's access to critical components for its military before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, alongside James Byrne
@RUSI_org
and
@damspleet
@conflictarm
1/3 The Canadian
@CBCTheNational
is exploring how Western parts end up in Russian weapons & how the West, including Canada, contributes via intermediaries.
@BMakuch
met Ukrainian hackers and
@bilousova_o
from
@KSE_Institute
. Watch the investigation here:
4/ Majority of transactions are facilitated through shell companies. In March-December 2022, close to 80% of all critical components were produced in four countries: China (27%), Malaysia (22%), Vietnam (18%), and South Korea (13%).
1/2 Russia’s economy outperformed expectations in 2022, with GDP only falling by 2.1%.
However, we project that the economic crisis will deepen this year (-6%) and next (-2.6%) as net exports weigh on activity.
1/3
@KSE_Institute
forecast for RU O&G exports: $204B in 2024 & $179B in 2025, down from $225B in 2023.
Current account surpluses: $51B & $44B in 2024-25.
Sanctions are crucial as $10/bbl oil price change affects earnings by ~$25-30B/year.
Full study:
4/5 Complete the EU and G7 Ban on Russian Hydrocarbons: Enforce a total ban on Russian LNG and gas, eliminating key export revenues and promoting diversification.
Russia continues to sell oil well above $60. Ships and insurance companies from the West play a role here, writes
@BenjaminBidder
for
@DerSpiegel
, highlighting the
@KSE_Institute
study "Russian Oil Exports Under International Sanctions":
2/ The largest number of imported components in 🇷🇺 weaponry are microchips (336), ~43% of which are utilized in the production of Kalibr, Iskander-K, Kh-101, and Kh-51 missiles. Other popular foreign components: processors (146), transistors (48), and memory devices (47).
1/4 New edition of 'Russian Oil Tracker' report by KSE Institute: in July-August Russian seaborne oil exports was the lowest since September 2022, but revenues surged due to narrowing discounts on crude & oil products and soaring world prices
More:
1/4 January's 'Russian Oil Tracker' by KSE Institute: December's oil exports fell by $1.4B to $14.4B, but export volume increased by ~6%. Moreover, Russian crude shipments have low reliance on Western maritime services, heavily using the shadow fleet:
2/ The Kremlin has almost completely shifted its focus from 🇪🇺 to 🇨🇳 and 🇮🇳. These two countries purchased 75% of 🇷🇺 crude oil.
But the dramatic shift in demand in some market segments has led to wider discounts for crude, especially for Urals where it widened by $10-15/barrel.
At the
@HSGAC
hearing,
@SenBlumenthal
quotes
@elinaribakova
's
@FT
op-ed: The need for stronger sanctions on companies, stricter penalties & detection, as the credibility of sanctions is at risk in areas with limited leverage (export controls & oil market).
1/2 Russia's dependency on advanced hardware & software products, coupled with recent exits of foreign companies, their investments, & expertise, is impacting the industry. A complete cut-off would disrupt LNG production and escalate oil production costs.