"No to war," screams man on Moscow's Arbat as he is dragged away by Putin's riot police. For those Westerners claiming to "stand with Ukraine" by lashing out at Russia from the safety of your couches, this is what standing with Ukraine and standing up to Putin actually is.
Prigozhin's outburst reveals a growing awareness in Moscow of what no one can say out loud: just how much this invasion was a mistake. My latest in
@spectator
Watching with dismay the expert coverage of the Belarus-Polish migrant crisis, it occurred to me that we may need to retire the hybrid war concept, at least from news coverage. It’s become unhelpful at best and dangerous at worst. A (very long) thread.
How about this: when we talk about Belarus, let's finally ditch the divisive "democratic, pro-Western" combo trope. Whoever comes next can be democratic without being either pro-Western or pro-Russian. They can be democratic AND have ties with both.
I didn't want to have to write this book. The nights in DC and Moscow, staring at the page and then staring into the red dusk, trying to wish it all away and go play outside... but now that they've arrived I am so glad I did
Hearing assumptions from some senior US officials that winning is an existential imperative for Putin. Yes, but the logical gymnastics of how Rus MOD are spinning losses show that definition of “winning” is in flux & can simply be invented. /thread
I know some EU people follow me so I need to say this: I get the emotions, but supporting a visa ban on Russians is like supporting the Iron Curtain: the same measure the Soviet regime used to *safeguard its power.* Let that sink in. It's not just unfair. It's irrational.
Ebury Press (
@EburyPublishing
) has acquired The Warlord,
@MarkGaleotti
and Anna Arutunyan's (
@scrawnya
) “revelatory” new biography of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the figure behind the recent attempted Russian coup.
Read here:
I fear that the whole 'decolonize Russia' discourse was born when American academics discovered that Russia consists of other ethnicities and in their usual way felt compelled to teach Russians this discovery they made that they are so proud of
With the plucky FSB solving the Dugina bombing so quickly, a popular emerging theory is that it was their false flag op to drum up support for a renewed offensive. While I can’t rule anything out, I don’t really buy this idea. Thread/
I don’t know what this means yet, and I don’t think anyone truly does. But some thoughts on what’s been happening and what might be happening now. 1. Putin could have arrested Strelkov-Girkin in the summer of 2014… /Thread
Strelkov has been arrested. So far, based on a charge from a former Wagner employee. Strelkov has been virulently critical of Putin since 2014. Odd if he goes down for criticism of Wagner. But those who know him say he's quite good at insulting everyone
If Ukraine is to win back Donbas and Crimea, it will need to win back its people - millions of Ukrainian citizens who in effect have closer ties to Russia than Ukraine. So far there's not really a conversation on how to do that. My latest for
@spectator
I took the time to look at some Russian state TV to gauge how Russia was propagandizing the US riots. I tuned into two programs on trusty old Channel 1 – a straight-forward newscast, and one or two segment of a talk show. Here’s what I saw and what I think it means. /Thread
Some thoughts on Putin’s logic, what we’re ascribing to him, and what we are missing by focusing on this reshuffle as a grand plan to stay in power. There are other things at play here. He wants to build up institutions capable of rule without him. THREAD 1/
Interesting. Take out all the patriotic hyperventilating, and the common thread these Russian MPs are voicing is: it's time for an exit plan. Doesn't mean Putin will announce one, but certainly indicative of elite sentiments.
1/ Russian politicians are hoping that Vladimir Putin will announce his plans for the end of the war in Ukraine. They want him to achieve a quick victory this year, with no further mobilisation and no closing of Russia's borders to block those attempting to flee the country. ⬇️
The Kremlin may be unable or unwilling — and likely a mix of both — to confront and rein in some of the most toxic pillars of its regime. This is a sign of impotence, not power. It doesn't absolve the Kremlin. My latest for
@MoscowTimes
I didn't expect my tweet to flush out so many Twitter cowards. Let me be clear: this man will likely be tortured and thrown in jail (I pray he is not). Unless you're willing to go to Ukraine or Russia yourself and fight, have the basic decency to keep your judgements to yourself
"No to war," screams man on Moscow's Arbat as he is dragged away by Putin's riot police. For those Westerners claiming to "stand with Ukraine" by lashing out at Russia from the safety of your couches, this is what standing with Ukraine and standing up to Putin actually is.
Just arrived in America & wrote this on Belarus scenarious for Putin and the West. He's not dying to back Luka or invade. So let's not make it zero sum this time.
The most powerful potential asset against Putin and his war have always been Russians themselves. Yet ever since the war began the EU has done everything to push them into Putin's arms. Sometimes idiocy is truly more destructive than malice.
The EU needs a coherent strategy on Russian sanctions
Apparently it’s ok to buy Indian-refined Russian crude, but potentially necessary to confiscate phones and toothpaste from Russian travellers and emigres.
Some grumbles from me in
@SpecCoffeeHouse
While Putin is disengaging from politics, the business of actually running the country has fallen to Prime Minister Mishustin. Who, as evidence suggests, doesn't seem to support the war. My latest for
@spectator
on what this means (and what it doesn't)
I want to unpack what happened in Moscow yesterday, when police arrested over 1300 protesters. Here's a picture of riot police I took - hours after protesters had dispersed on Trubnaya. The amount of force deployed is a bit ott. Here's why. /THREAD
In my book, Hybrid Warriors, I only mention Dugin once or so - I don't buy this Western notion of his influence. But his supporters in Russia think that mistaken Western obsession with him is what led to the bombing. I don't necessarily buy it, but interesting that they say that
I don’t know whether Girkin’s arrest is the start of a purge. But it is suggestive: that, paradoxically, not just the so-called “party of peace” is quietly against the war, but that many in the “party of war” are too. /End
I’m only ok at two-dimensional chess, I hardly ever play it, but I’ve been following Russian foreign policy for over 20 years and one thing I can say with certainty is that chess is the absolute last analogy for Putin’s behavior on the world stage.
So, in sum, yes, Putin has to win in order to survive, but he will have no problem defining a victory after the fact, manipulating the realities on the ground to fit the narrative he has just come up with. Or even, simply, lying.
For a while, I’ve been strategically exercising my right not to have an opinion (much harder than it sounds). But I’m beginning to see a certain logic to Russia’s
#COVID
-19 measures. Mainly, Kremlin operates with less centralized control than we assume. THREAD
A great take from
@SevaUT
Gunitsky on what’s wrong with the fight against Russian disinformation. This is becoming a pretty serious problem, and it’s fed by three key mistakes about how we envision Russia twisting facts to sow discord. THREAD
Every Russian barred from emigrating through this kind of discrimination (incidentally illegal in the EU) is a gift hand-delivered to Putin with a big red bow. No excuse for this stupidity.
.
@markgaleotti
has been one of the only voices to make the obvious point that few seem to want to admit – that making Putin responsible for Lukashenko has the effect of pushing them together.
The mutiny has shown is that Putin rules by fear. Fear of him, but especially fear of what would happen were he to lose control. And there is nothing more dangerous than a weak man with a big gun. My latest in
@spectator
EU ban on Russian cars hurts both ordinary Russians and Ukrainian refugees trying to flee Putin -- must be much easier to kick the vulnerable than to crack down on western technology exports that continue arming the Russian military.
The Kremlin is ever most afraid of the faction that backed it the most: in this case, the hawks who are turning against the invasion itself. And after the mutiny, this is becoming more evident
Any one of these, however, would have the Kremlin and Dugin’s supporters responding by blaming Ukraine, just as they could blame Ukraine for anything, from Covid to a solar eclipse. No need in engineering any of these things ahead of time.
Ukraine’s Western allies signal resolve to “defeat” Russia without actually knowing what they mean by defeat. Strategic ambiguity masks what they understand too well: their maximalist goals are unrealistic. Moscow sees this as weakness. My latest in
@CNN
Ostensibly, Prigozhin’s qualms were specifically with the MOD and its efforts to suborn Wagner. But increasingly he gave voice to what I suspect lots of hawks are grappling with: this war is a failure and we need to find a way out.
Some personal news: as of June 15 I will no longer be working at Crisis Group. It’s been a fun run but I’m excited to move on to work on several Russia-related projects in DC including a book, plus more writing in general. Analyzing all things Russian is & will remain my passion.
Russia doesn't have a lot of options in its near abroad because its clout is more about optics and less about real influence than we think. My latest for
@MoscowTimes
#OpEd
The unrest in Belarus, Nagorno-Karabakh and Kyrgyzstan show that Putin’s foreign policy has been to establish a presence in foreign countries to disrupt or influence — without a coherent strategy for an actual end,
@scrawnya
writes
Or poorly planned, at the least. That line of thinking – of hawkish, pro-war factions increasingly horrified by the gaping mistake that the invasion has become – culminated in Prigozhin’s mutiny.
Secondly, a false flag op intended to drum up support for a new offensive or mobilize the population would have targeted civilian objects (apartments?) and not a relatively obscure pundit
First of all, the Kremlin doesn’t need either a pretext or much popular support to do whatever it wants in Ukraine. So far, all of its escalations have been unilateral moves, with support and justification drummed up post factum.
Very happy this is out. For 5 years since going to Donbas, I've collected stories & data that just didn't fit accepted narratives about the war. Strategies, if there ever were any, kept changing. Everyone wanted different things & pushed their own visions. No one believed anyone
Insiders told me back then he had backing in the FSB. Now, we need to be clear on what that means: some interpret that as “the institutional FSB”. But the institutional FSB has only one purpose: to serve the Kremlin, i.e. Putin.
Oddly enough, when Girkin openly became opposed to the Kremlin in fall of 2014, no one touched him. For nine years, it was as though he had a carte blanche to criticize the Kremlin, openly airing its dirty laundry.
And there it is: the border closures during the pandemic eroded the line between liberal democracies and right-wing populist regimes. It set a dangerous, xenophobic precedent: border closures as a go-to security policy. By far, it's not just Putin and Trump destroying liberalism.
If the pandemic was reason enough to limit ordinary Russians’ travel to Finland, surely the atrocities committed in Ukraine are as well. While there are (hopefully more than we know) Russians who are against the war, there is no way around a collective responsibility here.
Likewise, when the “special military operation” began in February but failed to achieve an immediate capture of Kyiv, the goals promptly changed to the capture of Donbas, though in a way as to make clear that Oceania was always at war with East Asia.
But for whatever reason, Putin didn’t. Nor did he take the opposite strategy, of invading Donbas like Girkin and so many in the military then expected him to do. Instead, he chose the worst possible option of not making a decision at all.
Were the Kremlin to wrap up the special operation, it will simply declare that it achieved the goals it had set out to achieve from the very beginning, which, after all, were known only to the wise, far-seeing emperor.
But here’s the thing: however “pro-war” and hawkish, ultimately the decision to invade was not theirs, it was Putin’s. And as some FSB-curated mil bloggers, including Girkin, have been writing, that decision was a poor one.
And I mean that literally. I don’t know what it means. To know means to presume that Luka knows what he’s doing, that there’s some kind of reasonable plan. I’m not so certain. Putin warned against Belarus threatening to cut off oil and gas supplies.
This idea is Putinist at its core: embracing the corrupt notion that values and beliefs are for sale. I am against this war but the moment anyone tries to force me to declare a stance in exchange for financial privileges, or access to a job or a gig, I lose any respect.
Don’t know why I feel this is a bad idea. Perhaps it’s the whole notion of having a certificate signed by, idk, Kasparov and co, to get access to banking services. Seems kind of stupid. “I need a mortgage therefore… um… let me get a certificate that I’m against this war.” Geez.
It transpires that Putin’s order to pay medics infected with COVID failed because of the wrong… paperwork. A little thread on how things happen in Russia, or don’t happen at all.
This is the logic of an agent that perceives itself to be extremely weak, under dire existential threat, on the defensive, and which thus must appear to have a formidable, but unknowable, plan to keep the enemy guessing in the absence of an actual one.
That scenario presumes the Kremlin is fantastically stupid or fantastically smart. That it’s actually taken strategy to a level of three-dimensional chess that makes my head spin AND that its relations with Luka are seamless and trustworthy.
#OpEd
Journalists love street interviews for their candidness and spontaneity. But in Russia, people aren't free to speak their minds. Anonymity is a myth, and the legal repercussions can be severe, argues
@protivorechie
.
We have become locked in a vicious and dangerous feedback loop by qualifying every selfish and nasty thing that Russia or its allies do as part of “hybrid war.” Russia is doing the same. The result is political escalation and the increasing fear, if not threat, of real war.
Instead, these are hawkish elements in the FSB that, through various initiatives, first drove the covert invasion in 2014, and then lobbied for an overt one in 2022.
To its population, to Ukraine, and, most of all, to itself, the Kremlin must project the illusion that it knows what it’s doing and that it has a plan. That the plan is enigmatic and keeps changing might sound like a ploy, but it’s a weakness
Obviously the FSB would have needed to “solve” it quickly and pin it on Ukraine, which is just what they did. But that doesn’t mean they need have carried out the bombing in the first place.
If you look at the eight years of this war, the Kremlin’s objectives have shifted multiple times in reaction to the situation on the ground, without a clear long-term plan.
Strelkov has been arrested. So far, based on a charge from a former Wagner employee. Strelkov has been virulently critical of Putin since 2014. Odd if he goes down for criticism of Wagner. But those who know him say he's quite good at insulting everyone
It’s sovereign, managed “democracy” 2.0. It’s weening institutions off of Putin, in a way. I don’t know if it’s workable, but that seems to be at least a part of the long-term logic of it all based on the comments I’m seeing and the conversations I’ve had here. END.
To presume that Luka & Putin are coordinating all these actions and statements, and especially that it’s somehow connected to Russian troop buildup on the Ukrainian border as part of a concerted hybrid pressure play against Europe …. to do what, exactly? End sanctions?
Whether they specifically support Navalny or not, whether they have fled the country or stayed, whether they protest or quietly hold on to their hope – millions of other Russians believe that their country has a future. Navalny showed the way. My latest.
Simply put, it is being nasty to your neighbor or another country by using non-military means together with military ones. By definition, most wars are hybrid wars in that they involve propaganda, diplomacy or politics.
I just moved to England and became an emigrè of two countries, Russia and America. But my past still haunts me: when I order fish and chips with a gherkin, I can't help saying Girkin.
Tons of resources are poured into countering Russian online disinformation. But that's exactly what trolls are after: engagement. So why are we making them stronger? My latest in
@SpecCoffeeHouse
How about we all stop? As journalists, analysts, and policymakers, isn’t it our job to make sense of facts, and to avert, rather than exacerbate, crises? And not to write screenplays for future Netflix war epics?
With the start of disengagement in Donbas, lots of reports that Russia is sending more special forces and reinforcements to back the separatists. I want to unpack possible Russian rationales here, since not all is what it seems. /Thread
The is precisely because when US and EU officials make irresponsible comments tying up Luka and Putin in some kind of wholesale “hybrid war” against the west it only vindicates Kremlin paranoias.
“Within three days, an operation was carried out to regroup the Izyum-Balakley group of troops and transfer them to the territory of the DPR.” So, everything’s going according to a plan which is simultaneously obvious to everyone and yet known only to the Kremlin.
2)Kremlin-affiliated assassination (intended for Dugin) to remove an inconvenient figure (much like they might like to remove Girkin but can’t, for his nice krysha)
Pleased to say I am finishing my book on the origins of the war in Donbas, focusing on non-state actors, due out later this year. I'm afraid the level of discussion on Twitter does more harm than good in our understanding of this conflict, so I'll be limiting my presence here.
#Oped
"the Kremlin has no clear investment in Trump, nor in a destabilized United States," while the Russian media may favor Trump, that does not mean the Kremlin does, writes
@scrawnya
I am at the
#RussiaAfricaEconomicForum
in Sochi. Seeing all the varieties of things Russia is doing on the African continent these days - biz, selling weapons, sending advisers - I think what comes down to is Russia exporting sovereignty. /Thread
“To achieve the goals of the Special Military Operation, it was decided to regroup troops in the areas of Izyum to build up efforts in the Donetsk direction,” MOD said on 10/9.
@Matthew_Kupfer
I've always respected your work, Matthew. But in one tweet you have managed to insult Russians while empowering Putin in a way RT would find enviable. I don't think it was your intent to do either of these things, so I just wanted to point out the implication of your statement.
This is untrue. The criticism from the start was that asylum was incredibly difficult already, so tourist visas were the most common way dissidents fled. Now you are cutting asylum. Fine, close your borders for your own interests, but don't appeal to values.
But I would also argue that our very fixation on the term “hybrid war” to describe what is happening is making the problem worse, nor is it clarifying what's actually going on.
For a great deal of Russians, love of their country and of their government are two different things. My latest in
@spectator
on the kind of Russian patriotism that Putin has done so much to stifle - and that shows up, nevertheless.
What these infowarriors - from Prigozhin to NAFO - have in common is a video game idea of war. (I noticed this a lot among volunteers I interviewed for my book, Hybrid Warriors.). A generation that has forgotten what real war is like is eager to relive it online, & fuels it IRL.
Great thread in Russian on how a piece of Kremlin trolling and fake news is being jointly spread by Prigozhin’s propagandists, Ukrainian intiwarriors and NAFO - all because it aims to discredit Navalny.
This is how the symbiosis of warmongers works in real life.
Thirdly, the party of war punditry has been calling for targeting the “centers of decision-making” regardless of Dugina, for them the bombing was just another pretext. But if not the bombing, they have so many pretexts to invent without the messy business of bombing cars.