I've just finished the final revisions of my book on the Syrian conflict. This book answers two key questions: Why have Jihadis, or groups overlapping with them, dominate the conflict? Second, why have some Jihadi groups rejected global jihad and adopted a more pragmatic approach…
My first book on Egypt will finally be published in a few week! It is a comparative study of the two historical jihadi groups in Egypt, al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad, that yields importance lessons beyond Egypt. Why is it important? (1)
After two years as advisor for non state armed groups
@icrc
I am thrilled to join
@CrisisGroup
as senior analyst on Jihad and Modern Conflict. Don't hesitate to reach out!
Crisis group (
@CrisisGroup
) has just published an encompassing overview of how other Islamist militants perceive the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan, including Syria, Yemen, Somalia, the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Philippines.
Zawahiri’s death is clearly an important turning point for AQ, since nobody else has a sufficient public stature to replace him. The killing also raises important questions. A thread
@CrisisGroup
@CrisisGroup
(1) this must have taken months to prepare to coordinate land / air / sea forces in a coordinated matter, each with clear tactical objectives and preparedness. It’s can’t be just a short term response to recent developments including Saudi Israeli normalisation
@CrisisGroup
(2) it is a massive intelligence failure for Israel, not even remotely comparable to the 2006 inability to predict Hizbullah’s attack in the North. It will have domestic consequences
@CrisisGroup
(5) the long term background of these events is the situation in Gaza, which has been under siege since 2006. Remember that many of today’s participants were probably toddlers or young kids when the siege started.
we published a new article with
@patrickhaenni
on HTS’s evolution, and what it means for our understanding of global jihad. It is based on the extensive field research with the group’s leadership in Idlib
@CrisisGroup
(3) this occurs 50 years after the 1973 war, which can’t be a coincidence. And the objectives of the war at the time was not to for Egypt to win militarily, but to change the regional equation by showing that the status quo was not sustainable
@CrisisGroup
(7) but this is also a bet, which can easily result in a pyrrhic victory, with Israel launching an assault like never before, with no external actor willing or able to contain, and whose consequences are unpredictable
@CrisisGroup
(6) so what is Hamas looking for? It is possible that Hamas is telling the world that the previous rounds of fightings, which did not change anything for Gaza, cannot continue. Hamas instead is likely pulling all its strength to impose a new formula that forces external actors
@CrisisGroup
(4) this is very different from the previous confrontations in which Palestinian groups tried to pressure Israel with missile strikes. Palestinian factions have entered Israeli cities and taken hostages (so they want to a negotiate or deter Israel)
Limited research analyses if and how jihadi group can become pragmatic and politicise. This is an article on a group partially associated with this trend in Syria, Ahrar al-Sham. Although AaS has been less covered, it is one of the most interesting experience in Syria (1)
@patrickhaenni
and myself have just completed a new research on HTS based on extensive field research in Idlib. We interviews Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, the group's commander, Abu Abdullah al-Shami, its main religious figure, and the head of the military Abul-Hassan
A Crisis Group
@CrisisGroup
Q&A on the October War in Gaza A slow Israeli response? Why the attack occured now? what's next? What is the role of external actors?
Crisis group published many reports on conflicts involving jihadi groups over the years, and the prospects of negotiations. Before publishing a comprehensive report on the topic this month, let’s review important milestones. (1)
The book is based on extensive field research with leaders and members of the two groups, many of whom passed away since then in Syria and Egypt. I extensively quote the interviews to illustrate the group’s comparative views on violence and non-violence (2)
My response is that what matters is not simply ideology, but how jihadi groups institutionalise, and how their institutionalisation shapes their long-term strategic choices. Ideas matter, but how a group organises is more important (5)
In light of recent developments in the Sahel, here are two reports on engaging jihadists. Follow the threat for more information on how the ICRC engaged AQ leader Belmokhtar in the Sahel!
But the book is not only empirical. I develop an institutional approach to jihadi groups to understand how these groups form and evolve. I wanted to understand why two groups with a similar ideology can evolve so differently when faced with similar environmental changes (4)
The earthquake in Syria recalls attention to the north west. What happened there for the past few years? How is the security situation, and the position of HTS, the former al-Qaeda affiliate, on IS and al-Qaeda? A report and a thread (1)
This, but the outcome is also to de-politicise a group like Hamas, emphasising that we can't negotiate with it, that its objectives are nihilistic (cf the focus on its charter), and that it can only be fought militarily
The phrase "militant Islamism" also serves to conflate the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS, by implying that ISIS is just the Brotherhood + guns. There too, the real-world harms are clear in terms of enabling authoritarians to crack down on nonviolent MB dissent.
He says Turkey "lied" as they said they killed Abu Al-Husayn. Says he was killed in clashes with HTS in a village near Idlib as they were trying to incarcerate him.
A preliminary article based on field research and interviews with the HTS political, religious, and military leadership in Idlib, to be followed by a much larger research paper with
@patrickhaenni
The interviewees have a rich history in the jihadi movement, from directing the assassination of Sadat in 1981 to joining bin Laden in the late 1990s to the death of one of them of a US drone strike in Syria (3)
Crisis group (
@CrisisGroup
) will shortly publish an overview of the perceptions of the Taliban’s victory by jihadi groups. This is not merely perceived as a military victory as opposed to a political AND military victory, which shows the limits of AQ and IS’s approaches to jihad
The last UN report on AQ/ISIS sanctions shows some of the limits of terrorist listings: HTS, which formed out of the Nusra Front remains listed (though it clamped down on AQ). But Hurras al-Din, which includes the dissidents who remain with AQ, is not listed
NEW Q&A | A Death In Idlib: The Killing of the Top ISIS Leader and Its Impact
"Qardash’s death is significant and should not be downplayed", explains
@dkhalifa
and
@jeromedrev
.
@CrisisGroup
Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul is not surprising. Some of his associates told us that the Taliban either ordered him to maintain a low presence, or that AQ simply understood it as a necessity. Zawahiri’s emphasis on general issues in his communications tend to support this
Jihadi groups are learning their own lessons of the Taliban victory. We have to be careful before claiming that violence will necessarily escalate. A recent talk of HTS’s highest religious authority, Abd al-Rahim Atun, illustrates important key points. (1)
@CrisisGroup
Being hosted by Haqqani might simply suggests an agreement with AQ that some of its leaders could be protected locally, without implying any intentions about external attacks that could compromise the Taliban’s commitments
Very recommended interview: "the difference between Hamas and PIJ is that Hamas is a political movement engaging in the military field, while PIJ is a military movement engaging in the political field."
📝 What do we know about the Palestinian Islamic Jihad?
@KacperRekawek
interviewed
@ErikSkare
to discuss the group in the context of the current Israel-Palestine conflict, its history and what it stands for
Read the full interview ➡️
@CrisisGroup
The recent UN SC report confirmed that AQ “lacks an external operational capability and does not currently wish to cause the Taliban international difficulty or embarrassment” in Afghanistan.
The book hence revises the two groups’ histories from their early ideological development in prison, approach to violence in Egypt in the 1990s, and partial creation of political parties after 2011 (6)
@CrisisGroup
AQ faces a real strategic conundrum since its strategic direction is a failure. While AQ framed its rationale as the necessity to fight foreign enemies to establish local Islamic states, but the latter are now possible only as long as local groups cease transnational jihad
@CrisisGroup
The same report claims that: “Next in line of seniority after al-Zawahiri are: Sayf-al ‘Adl (Qdi.001); 1 Abdal-Rahman al-Maghrebi; Yazid Mebrak (Qdi.389) 2 of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Qde.014); and Ahmed Diriye (Soi.014) 3 of Al-Shabaab.”
An important review of research on armed groups' governance, its multilevel characteristics, legitimacy, the nature of authority and long term impact. For jihadi groups, a notable question is under what circumstances can jihadi groups give up some power and for what purposes
Crisis group
@CrisisGroup
will publish a long report in the next few weeks about negotiating with jihadist groups: where do negotiations occur, what do they entail, what are their consequences and prospects (4)
We discussed
@CrisisGroup
with
@dkhalifa
our forthcoming research on IS in Eastern Syria as well as what HTS has been doing in the North West against IS and other groups
Most research on Palestinian Islamists is focused on Hamas. Here is a new research on a previously little understood group, Palestinian islamic jihad. Definitely the most comprehensive research on the topic. Highly recommended!
and I hope *you* are looking forward to reading A History of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (
@cambridgeup
). You get a 20% discount with the promo code “Skare2021”.
Beyond violence, the Taliban’s victory raises the issue of negotiations. Militants look at the Taliban’s willingness to engage directly with the U.S. for instance. Other governments might also feel that it’s better to speak to militants now than after a potential foreign pull out
@CrisisGroup
None of them are real public figures, or with the same credentials for AQ. This is an issue since all the affiliates theoretically have to pledge allegiance to any new leader to remain within AQ, since the baya is given to an individual
عمل مميز من الأخ عبيدة. من أهم كتب أكاديمي حول الحروب الأهلية باللغة العربية اول مرة. مترجمة هذا الكتاب جزء من جهود كبيرة مستحق للاعتراف به من عبيدة وزملائه
@CrisisGroup
Zawahiri’s term was difficult since IS emerged as a major international competitor, and AQ’s most successful affiliate in Syria severed its ties to the group, subjugated its remaining loyalists, and reached out to foreign countries
The Taliban’s takeover might be a morale boost, but its real-like impact is uncertain. Most conflicts remain primarily driven by local dynamics, and militants are unlikely to change course after the Taliban's victory
I don't think that people fully realise the emergency. The first few days are critical. Foreign countries need to get their act together to assist the population that lives outside of regime areas, which precisely fled the regime in the past. Assistance cannot rely on Damascus
It's been 36hrs since the earthquake.
To my knowledge, the international community has provided *zero* aid into NW
#Syria
, home to 4.5 million people, 3 million of whom are displaced.
Zero.
1,200 are dead, 1,000s injured & 1,000s more still under rubble.
Just utterly gutting.
NEW BRIEFING | Winning Peace in Mozambique’s Embattled North
Troops from Rwanda and southern Africa have helped stem an insurrection in
#Mozambique
’s Cabo Delgado province.
However, the threat is not yet gone.
very interesting
@abdsayedd
@ToreRHamming
on the TTP: Three factors help explain why the TTP has prioritized a localized agenda: al-Qa`ida’s decline in the region, massive losses suffered by the TTP over the years in U.S. drone strikes, and the successful approach of the Taliban
@CrisisGroup
So what will the succession indicate about power dynamics within AQ? Could it be an opportunity for some groups to simply abstain from renewing their allegiance, or trying to impose their views and / or leaders over the group?
Nearly finished this highly recommended book on the tawheed movement in Northern Lebanon in the early 80s. Incredible levels of details of the group’s localism, interconnections with other actors, internal tensions, and ideological development. Many lessons beyond Lebanon too!
So happy to share news about the publication of my new book, Jihad in the City! 🙂
This book is about how the Lebanese civil war unfolded in the city ofTripoli. But it is also a broader story of how behind militant Islamism often lies many shades of grey - and why this matters.
1. Pleased to share my article for
@CTCWP
Sentinel examining the complex role of civilian employees in the Islamic State’s caliphate. IS relied on tens thousands of civilians to staff its governing institutions in roles such as teachers, doctors, electricians and accountants.
Extremely important, how the Syrian regime is trying to weaponise humanitarian assistance to rehabilitate itself and ultimately deny the (legitimate) case for cross border assistance
It seems that UAE has succeeded to make a deal between donors, Turkey and Assad regime to deliver aid to who affected by the earthquake.
The deal include:
1. Provide a fair exchange rate for money allocated to the response.
🎙️ New Episode | No Going Back? Hamas's Atrocities and Another Catastrophe in Gaza
@atwoodr
is joined by Crisis Group experts
@JoostHiltermann
,
@MairavZ
and Azmi Keshawi to discuss
#Hamas
's shock attack on
#Israel
and its potential consequences.
This is really good for those who haven't yet had the chance to watch. The head of AQIM clarifying his views on negotiations, truce, humanitarian workers, the group's expansion, etc. Highly recommended.
1. 6 years ago I spent time with an AQ affiliated battalion in Idlib province Syria. Many of them were Muhajirs or foreign fighters. Whilst not relevant then, the 2 on the right claimed to be linked to Afghanistan, this is immensely relevant now given the Taliban take over.
How is the ICRC interacting with armed groups? highly recommended article with new updated information about the ICRC's assessment of how many civilians live under the direct and indirect control of armed groups worldwide
1/3 Over the years we've seen Raqqa transform from a ghost town that witnessed some of the war’s most dramatic shifts into a bustling hub in NE Syria .The investment put into Raqqa delivered value remarkably disproportionate to its low costs.
You can also read the much longer research report that features extensive interviews with Abu Muhammad al-Jolani and Abu Abdullah al-Shami among others there
There should be a real debate on how to engage AQ affiliates or former affiliates beyond short-term military campaigns, which have not yielded any lasting strategic results
Highly recommended report on the Shabaab in Somalia. Military means have exposed their shortcomings after more than 15 years of conflict, could other choices including engaging the group lead to a different outcome?
Al-Shabaab’s 15-year insurgency in
#Somalia
has cost countless lives.
Military means alone cannot end the war.
The new government should test whether talks are possible as a viable alternative to stop the violence.
New report ⇊
This research covers a wide range of issues. First the SSG: how was it set up? What are its relations to HTS? What are its characteristics? Second, what are HTS and the SSG's religious policies? Is the group still salafi? salafi jihadi? Is HTS setting up a radical entity?
Thrilled to announce that the e-book I co-edited with Olivier Roy is out! "Salafism: Challenged by Radicalization? Violence, Politics, and the Advent of post-Salafism".
How has ISIS adapted to it’s post-Caliphate fate in Syria & how does it exploit the fault lines & failures of the different forces still battling it?
@dkhalifa
& I examine the intricate relationship b/w the ISIS insurgency in northeast & central Syria:
Are Lions' Den in
#Palestine
a paper tiger? Or something more potent? My colleague
@CrisisGroup
Tahani Mustafa, who was in Nablus in March, takes a closer look at the group, and similar groups that have emerged in the Israeli-occupied West Bank recently.
Only analysing armed groups' ideological production has limited value without understanding armed groups' relational configuration. Armed groups ideological evolution is informed by a combination of (i) armed groups' internal debates and (ii) interactions with other actors (3)
@dkhalifa
@patrickhaenni
For Atun, the three movements are similar since they (i) fight foreign occupation, (ii) focus only on their immediate enemies and oppose external operations, (iii) rely on their military capabilities to build a political project, and (iv) build relations with other actors (4)
Pleased to say that this is not too far away - now looking at proofs for my new book with
@OUPAcademic
. Very grateful to everyone who supported my work!
@abdsayedd
@ToreRHamming
This is very different from other cases, like HTS in Syria, yet it shows that global jihad is no longer benefitial even for a group like the TTP
One of the main argument is that jihadi groups' politicisation is not simply the outcome of armed groups' independent ideological revisions. Politicisation largely results from a set of constraints that shape insurgents' trajectories in civil wars (2)
Why Rebels Stop Fighting.
My new
@journal_IS
article with Juan E. Ugarriza on Organizational Decline and Desertion in Colombia’s Insurgency, based on reports of more than 19.000 deserters of the FARC guerrilla.
@CSS_Zurich
@URosario
Free access here:
The paper is based on extensive field research and interviews in Idlib, including with Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, Abu Abdullah al-Shami, and the military leader Abul-Hassan, in addition to many other figures
This case study is important beyond Syria. It shows that armed groups have to balance internal and external interactions, and that their ability to do so explains their choices including their potential radicalisation or politicisation (5)
@dkhalifa
@patrickhaenni
Atun compares HTS to both the Taliban and Hamas to emphasise important similarities and differences. Those who rely nearly exclusively on these groups’ publications too often overemphasise ideological or even theological differences, which are not even alluded to by Atun (3)
In the aftermath of the largest military operation of the
#Islamic_State
since 2019,
@patrickhaenni
and Arthur Quesnay analyse IS’s resurgence strategy and assess Western countries’ engagement in the
#war_on_terror
.
🔗
"A team of 16 workers— some from the Islamic State, some from the Syrian government, some from American allies drove to the site, according to the engineer, [] The distrust and tension were so thick that at points fighters shot into the air. They succeeded in repairing the crane"
@dkhalifa
@patrickhaenni
Despite real differences in terms of geography, positioning in the Muslim world, and societies, the comparison justifies the need for HTS to position itself differently both regionally and internationally (5)
#Syrie
voici ce que j'ai vu à
#Idleb
,
@France24_fr
a eu un accès inédit à l'enclave rebelle, à ses acteurs, une rencontre avec Abou Mohamad al-Joulani & Abou Maria al-Qahtani entre autres, à sa population, à ces villages chrétiens
@julienfanciulli
The system is broken. The researchers write for free, peer review for free, ans the public mostly pays for their salaries. now the journal makes 10k to make it open access?
In this scenario, the cost of publication is covered by an Article Processing Charge (APC) paid at the time of publication. The APC for Nature Neuroscience in 2022 is €9,500/US $11,390/£8,290.