Washington may not fully appreciate how much international politics is changing. Here at Carnegie's Statecraft program, we have a new report examining the world's emerging powers, and the challenges and opportunities they bring to the United States.
THREAD: For nearly two decades, America has sought to remake Afghanistan on a western model. It turns out that Afghanistan was never America’s to fix. I was part of the foreign policy establishment that tried to find technical solutions for the challenges of nation-building. 1/18
I share the frustration over Putin’s murderous war.
But I fear we have grown accustomed to fighting enemies who had no way to out-escalate us.
A thread on what we can learn from the Libya
#NFZ
for our options today and the risks of escalation: (1/15)
🧵Many thanks to
@theEconomist
for the opportunity to lay out my thinking about why Western leaders ought to do more to bring the
#UkraineRussiaWar
to a negotiated close, even while continuing to support
#Ukraine
. 1/7
America’s great projects always come at a price. Improving women’s education in Afghanistan is laudable, but only possible at the point of a sword. Furthering our objectives meant killing Afghans. It is time for this to end, however ugly and painful to accept. 18/18
How does this end? One can imagine many scenarios, but if you think about it, there are really only two basic ones from where we are now: continued escalation toward the nuclear threshold, or a bitter peace that will be hard for many Americans to swallow.
Herein a deeper reckoning for America’s foreign policy establishment: Our idealistic plans for the world are often predicated on our immense capacity for violent coercion. Afghanistan does not work the way we want it to work without the U.S. military there. 17/18
Most difficult is perhaps the way this outcome underscores a central paradox about America’s role in the world by demonstrating both the futility of nation-building and yet also the extraordinary power of the US military, which was holding the whole country together. 16/18
Those who say America’s reputation is on the line may have a point, but America’s reputation with whom? The Taliban? The Afghan people? The Russians and the Chinese may gloat, but it served their interests better for America to remain. 11/18
But ultimately there can be no technical solutions for intractable political problems. Weapons and skills are transferable. The will to fight for your country is not. 2/18
For two decades, the Taliban was convinced America would eventually leave and they would recapture Kabul. Its leaders understood that America’s fight for abstract ideals could never outlast their willingness to give their blood to defend their way of life and their soil. 5/18
On Russia: “Russia almost certainly does not want a direct military conflict with U.S. and NATO forces and will continue asymmetric activity below what it calculates to be the threshold of military conflict globally.”
Putin almost certainly has both Qaddafi and Milosevic – and obviously Saddam Hussein – in mind when he looks at Ukraine today.
But unlike these despots, the one in the Kremlin has many options for escalation. Anyone who thinks he won't use them isn't watching the news. (15/15)
Withdrawing proves that the Taliban were right all along—that we weren’t going to stay—and this is hard to swallow because America could continue to prove the Taliban wrong by staying indefinitely. But this would be cutting off your nose to spite your face. 15/18
We've just published highlights from my Pivotal States discussion with Ashley Tellis and
@LisaCurtisDC
on the US-India relationship. (Full video is still up, if you prefer that).
Nearly a decade of peace talks with the Taliban in Doha yielded almost nothing. All-important talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government were even less productive because the Taliban always believed it had the upper hand and could prevail on the battlefield. 4/18
Meanwhile, America’s project in Afghanistan would have continued to suck up precious national security resources and distracted U.S. officials from more important strategic challenges: pandemics, China, Russia, cyber-attacks, and nuclear proliferation, to name a few. 12/18
But what would have happened if Biden had decided to scrap Trump’s plan for withdrawal and stayed the course back in May? The foreign policy establishment would have approved, but would America's interests have been served? It's doubtful. 7/18
The Taliban would have been energized by America reneging on Trump’s deal. American troops would obviously still be in the line of fire. To be sure, the Taliban wouldn't have made the gains it did, but America would almost certainly have had to put more forces in to respond. 8/18
Afghanistan was, for many, the “good war” of the early 2000s. Iraq was the war we fought, based on fictions, personal vindictiveness, and anger. Afghanistan was justified by the Al-Qaeda threat and, when this was not enough, the desire to do good for the Afghan people. 14/18
Much appreciated the opportunity to speak with Finland's Under-Secretary of State, Kai Sauer, just now about his country's likely application for
#NATO
membership. Sincere thanks to
@FinlandinUSA
and
@Ulkoministerio
for the kind invitation to engage on this important question.
It was sad to watch the U.S. national security bureaucracy spin its wheels over Afghanistan during the transition from Trump and Biden. Because Biden was the anti-Trump, nearly everyone assumed he would do the opposite on everything, including Afghanistan. 6/18
America’s national security establishment struggles to overcome its groupthink over Afghanistan. America's best and brightest all worked the file. But years of dedication to the cause of saving Afghanistan hardly created open minds. 13/18
A conservative estimate would be that hundreds and hundreds of Americans would have lost their lives in the next decade, after nearly 2,500 have already perished. This is not to mention the costs to American taxpayers— $8 billion annually. 10/18
<Thread> It's increasingly clear that the habits of primacy and exceptionalism that history has bestowed on today’s U.S. foreign policy elites may not serve the nation well in a more competitive 21st-century world. (1/9)
Consider the reports that Russia has deployed several air defense systems to the theater, including S-400s, their most advanced. These would have to be eliminated for NATO pilots to fly safely over key parts of Ukraine, including potentially Kiev. (6/15)
This means NATO -- and almost certainly US pilots -- would have to bomb Russian units outside of Ukraine (e.g. S-400s in Belarus). They would also have to engage Russian planes flying over Ukraine. (7/15)
Contrary to what some believe, the “resolve gap”
@stephenwalt
explains in this excellent piece isn’t a question of national will. It’s structural: Biden struggles because he’s inherited many commitments that just aren’t vital and so don’t justify the full application of US power.
When a great power is very secure yet militarily committed in lots of far-flung places, local foes tend to have greater resolve because the stakes matter more for them. This is a fundamental problem for the United States. Latest FP column here:
These are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Washington should expect that they will challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own international agendas.
Diplomats would have to aim low at first, but even a temporary end to the fighting would offer a chance for emotions to cool, lives to be saved and resources spared. Another frozen conflict is better than the risks of a hot war for years to come. 7/7
Meanwhile, the historical precedents of NATO NFZs would almost certainly encourage Putin to escalate. Libya is one precedent Russians often complain about, but the 1999 Kosovo air campaign is no less important for several reasons. (12/15)
No. Everyone was surprised when the operation dragged on for months – just like in Libya. Eventually NATO widened its strikes to include civilian infrastructure in Serbia itself. Milosevic capitulated and within a few years was overthrown – just like Qaddafi. (14/15)
NATO would struggle to fly passively over Ukraine's cities while Russia showered them with cluster munitions. We would probably end up attacking Russian forces on the ground. That's not a risk I'm ready for. (11/15)
.
@stephenwertheim
makes many compelling points in this essay, but the most important one is methodological: We should not allow simplistic, monocausal readings of history to drive our foreign policy. I hope even those who disagree with him on other points can acknowledge this.
For decades, U.S. officials have widely recognized that enlarging NATO, especially to Ukraine, ran at least some risk of putting the United States on a collision course with Russia. Below are some quotations that I didn't have room to include in my piece.
I sympathize with Ukraine’s desire to fight on, but their maximalist war aims are unrealistic. They are unlikely to be achieved without an huge increase in support from the West, but the West lacks the vital interest that would justify this. 3/7
“For at least a decade, Beijing and Moscow have used high-profile, combined military activities to signal the strength of the China–Russia defense relationship but have made only minor enhancements to interoperability in successive exercises.”
Eleven years ago, the U.S. was on the cusp of imposing its no-fly zone over Libya to stop Qaddafi’s attacks on civilians. Now pressure is growing for a
#NFZ
over Ukraine. (2/15)
Concern a negotiated settlement would “reward” Putin, and perhaps encourage Chinese aggression in
#Taiwan
, is overblown. If the negotiations froze the battlelines where they are now, Putin would have paid a very high price for very limited gains. 5/7
Getting diplomacy going will require tough conversations to persuade Ukraine to adopt a more realistic approach to its war aims. Western leaders have the right and a responsibility to do this. 4/7
The U.S. should continue to support Ukraine, including with Patriots, but I hope US leaders take this chance to have frank conversations with Zelensky about his professed war aims, which are a recipe for a new genre of forever war.
#UkraineRussianWar
#Zelensky
Biden first discussed the prospect of Zelensky visiting Washington during a call Dec. 11. A formal invitation was extended a week ago, launching joint consultations on the security parameters of the risky, highly secretive trip.
@Kevinliptakcnn
Across the globe, a diverse group of nations that view world politics differently from the United States are rising and increasingly active. These emerging powers are neither allies nor adversaries of America but stand to play a much larger role on the world stage in the future.
NATO had to destroy these threats for its planes to fly safely.
And so, the US and UK fired 130 Tomahawk cruise missiles, US B-2 Stealth Bombers dropped 45 precision-guided bombs on Libya, and other NATO aircraft attacked across the country. (4/15)
In 1999, the United States began an air campaign against Serb forces who were killing Kosovars. Many experts at the time expected the nationalist Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic would capitulate after only a few days. Did he? (13/15)
Emerging powers strike a middle ground on great power competition. None has closely aligned with U.S. policies toward Russia. On U.S.-China competition they will resist efforts to pull them closely into a U.S.-led camp.
What would this look like in Ukraine eleven years later? Russia isn't Libya, so naturally, the military requirements would be much more stressing. And escalatory. (5/15)
“Russia is contemplating how U.S. electoral outcomes in 2024 could impact Western support to Ukraine and probably will attempt to affect the elections in ways that best support its interests and goals.”
Is American foreign policy reconfiguring? Here's an interesting piece by
@benwallacewells
on the unusual bedfellows the
#UkraineCrisis
has created.
The New Doves on Ukraine via
@NewYorker
I'm concerned that too many experts are giving up on
#UkraineCrisis
diplomacy because they're convinced it's futile. But who can say? As NIO, we never would have had the confidence of some experts out there who have far less information than we did about these kinds of things.
NATO expected a quick no fly zone operation in Libya. Conditions were favorable because most of Qaddafi’s air force had defected.
But the Libyan dictator still had old Soviet long-range surface to air systems -- SA-2 Guideline, SA-3 Goa, and SA-5 Gammons. (3/15)
From the intro: “Often, U.S. actions intended to deter foreign aggression or escalation are interpreted by adversaries as reinforcing their own perceptions that the United States is intending to contain or weaken them”
One of the most vital lessons of the Iraq war is the importance of welcoming—or at least protecting space for—dissenting views, especially when it comes to the use of military force.
My new piece in
@ForeignPolicy
Excited to join
@CarnegieEndow
to lead this new program. Will draw on Carnegie’s world class reach and intellect to help navigate the challenges of the coming decade.
We are pleased to announce that Chris Chivvis (
@CChivvis
) has joined the Carnegie Endowment as a senior fellow and director of our new American Statecraft program.
Maybe, but let's be clear that a conventional U.S. response doesn't stop nuclear escalation. To the contrary, Russia would probably respond to a U.S. attack of this magnitude with nuclear strikes on U.S. or NATO forces. And what then?
5 Lessons of
#Iraq20YearsOn
:
1 An imperfect strategy may be your best one
2 Foreign policy is even less rational than you think
3 Unilateralism stinks
4 Listen to your critics
5 Wars always cost more and last longer than planned
Big thanks to
@just_security
for the invitation.
Talks also offer promise of post-conflict reconstruction. And that is where Ukraine’s true victory over Russia will lie: in becoming a vibrant
#democracy
well integrated into Europe. That process is already likely to last until the 2030s or beyond. 6/7
The world must renounce Putin's irresponsible nuclear threats, but the danger is real. He is a dangerous autocrat, surrounded by yes-men, who has surprised us too many times before. I explain here:
Such a narrow negotiating path ahead, but failure will damage US strategic interests, divert military resources from other priorities, push China & Russia closer, worsen divisions in NATO, and probably end in war. Not a good outlook.
@andrewsweiss
@stephenwertheim
@aarondmiller2
Biden deserves credit for meeting with Xi last week, even though the deliverables were modest. This was a reminder that the U.S. should talk to its rivals more often, I argue in
@guardian
today.
“Russia’s inability to achieve quick and decisive battlefield wins, coupled with Ukrainian strikes within Russia, continues to drive concerns that Putin might use nuclear weapons.”
<Thread> Producing a national security strategy may seem like just another bureaucratic exercise with little bearing on real-world threats. But it actually matters. In my latest for
@CarnegieEndow
, I outline what the strategy should look like. 1/11
#Sweden
and
#Finland
want to join
#NATO
. But Washington shouldn’t rush in headlong.
The Dilemma at the Heart of Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO Membership Bids via
@CarnegieEndow
America will need a positive value proposition, one that offers meaningful benefit to their economic and political development, sovereignty, and aspirations for an enhanced voice in international affairs.
As competition between the United States, China, and Russia intensifies, these powers are flexing their diplomatic muscle in ways that complicate American statecraft. But they also offer unrecognized opportunities to build a durable world order that benefits the United States.
But an increase to 300K troops is MASSIVE. Nato has been struggling to generate 40K, the current response force size. Without far-reaching changes in European militaries, where will these forces come from?7/9
I’ve been wondering what the difference between these two questions is and what the implications for NATO’s mutual defense commitment are:
1) Should Ukraine join NATO?
2) Should the US be prepared to fight a nuclear war over Melitopol?
“Beijing worries that bilateral tension, U.S. nuclear modernization, and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) advancing conventional capabilities have increased the likelihood of a U.S. first strike.”
“The PRC may attempt to influence the U.S. elections in 2024 at some level because of its desire to sideline critics of China and magnify U.S. societal divisions. PRC actors’ have increased their capabilities to conduct covert influence operations and disseminate disinformation.”
The big challenge is to find a way to integrate these powers into a broader U.S. foreign policy strategy when attention in Washington is fixated on Russia and especially China. These powers do not pose a threat of the kind U.S. adversaries can, but they also can’t be ignored.
The war in Ukraine is on track to be among modern history’s bloodiest
“A warning for everyone watching the war to brace for a protracted, sanguinary conflict.”
Great piece by
@ProfPaulPoast
Many of these nations were part of the Nonalignment Movement during the Cold War, and their foreign policy traditions are rooted in that history. But today they are far more ready to shake up the status quo and have more capability to do so.
How can we best short-circuit all of the endless speculation about whether Putin has “lost it”? Best bet is to read these compelling insights from one of the Westerners who understands him the best: Chris Bort, former National Intelligence Officer for Russia/Eurasia
Unless US policymakers can arrive at a constructively pragmatic realism on
#Ukraine
, disaffected voters could revolt in a manner that exacerbates America’s existing domestic political fractures.
My new essay in _Survival_.
Unless US policymakers can arrive at a constructively pragmatic realism on
#Ukraine
, disaffected voters could revolt in a manner that exacerbates America’s existing domestic political fractures.
My new essay in _Survival_.
Very interesting.
“Washington could overestimate its leverage: when push comes to shove, Vietnamese leaders may not choose the partner that helps them protect remote islands over the one that helps them avoid being overthrown or killed by domestic opposition.”
A growing number of countries are receiving security assistance from both Beijing and Washington, write
@SheenaGreitens
and
@IBKardon
. How should U.S. policymakers navigate these patterns of overlapping cooperation?
Market access remains a forceful tool the United States has to this end. Other mutually beneficial opportunities are imaginable, as is cooperation on infrastructure investments, tech manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, deforestation, and public health.
On China: “ China’s leaders will seek opportunities to reduce tension with Washington when they believe it benefits Beijing and protects core interests”
Nice short piece. One of the best quotations is from
@suea_thornton
“the problem is you can’t do nuanced policymaking because anything you do will be ammunition for the other side” - aptly describes the degradation of our foreign policy discussion.