Vice President
@CarnegieEndow
; twice US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; former James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor
@Miller_Center
; Asia's future.
1: Thread ... I've spent much of the pandemic building programs at
@CarnegieEndow
but I've done a good bit of writing too, and a boatload of podcasts and talks. Some highlights: five on Taiwan, two on Korea, four on U.S. statecraft in Asia, three on China, two for the historians.
1: A quick thread on China's policy evolution, tactical positioning, and strategic choices in the face of the Russian invasion and the dramatic events now unfolding in Ukraine. Beijing will not want Washington to frame its alternatives and choices but balance its own interests.
“More and more people are questioning vaccines and why people need vaccines,” said Kimberlin, the University of Alabama doctor. “They’re gonna find out pretty soon.” No kidding.
Florida’s measles outbreak is the largest in the U.S. right now.
And what Florida’s health officials are doing, or not doing, is drawing fire from experts who study the way diseases spread.
1: The US and China are seriously talking past each other. This is not just about Pelosi. The US thinks this is about Chinese coercion. The Chinese think this is about a drift from “one China” to "one China, one Taiwan." That disconnect will lead to a very unstable new baseline.
If you think Xi Jinping's trip to Central Asia is only about the Beijing-Moscow entente, you'd be wrong. If you think China's interests are one-dimensional, Xi may surprise you. But if you think local players have no power, you've lost the plot. My latest:
1: Long thread follows … A lot of the commentary on RCEP today, some of which disses it as a minimalist trade deal, misses the point. If you’re American, you can’t just look at it while ignoring the larger context of 25 years of change in Asia.
Pick up a newspaper these days and you may think Beijing is about to invade Taiwan sometime between next Tuesday and, say, 2024. But
@JohnCulver689
has spent a lifetime watching the PLA and if war is Beijing's plan, he says, then these would be the signs:
Didn’t the USG cut off a meaningful chunk of China's chip supply and then build a coalition with Japan and the Netherlands to restrict some chip exports to China? But the US is outraged and "won't tolerate" Beijing acting against Micron? Irony seems dead but maybe I’m just dense.
Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said the US “won’t tolerate” the recent decision by Chinese authorities to ban chips by Micron Technology in some critical sectors
Xi has met 9 of the G20 leaders in the last 10 months alone and been traveling again, including the Gulf, Africa, Central Asia. His premier has been traveling, including Europe, the G20, and the ASEAN summit. But sure, they are “retreating from international diplomacy.”
Tucker Carlson, when asked about Alexei Navalny, opposition leaders and journalists in Russia: “Every leader kills people. Some kill more than others. Leadership requires killing people.”
Just stop already. Note to editors: before running the 7,647th version of this story, you might want to ask why all these resources are still sitting in the ground after 20 years of US engagement? PS: The first time I read this story was around 1995 ... it's a hardy perennial.
Afghanistan has rare earth minerals and, perhaps most importantly, what could be one of the world's biggest deposits of lithium — an essential but scarce component in rechargeable batteries and other technologies vital to tackling the climate crisis.
Folks, Central Asian countries have not been “Russian vassals for 30 years,” they did not exchange Russian “vassalage” for Chinese “vassalage,” China is not new to the region, they do face challenges from landlockedness and developmental but they have interests and agency. Stop.
I am so tired of so many of these China-Afghanistan hot takes. Beijing is not going to just do "what we did" merely because we did it. Shoehorning literally everything, everywhere into "great power competition" while mirror-imaging misses local dynamics and regionalization of it.
1: Two things jump out at me immediately from the US readout: The first is the reference to joint working groups - suggests a basis for (modest) progress and that there was some Chinese give on the suspension of various dialogues after the Pelosi visit.
Here’s how we protect Taiwan without going to war with China: open a branch of the
@NRA
in Taiwan, put an AR-15 in the hands of every family, and train them how to use it. That’ll give Xi Jinping a taste of American exceptionalism.
Am old enough to remember when, just a couple of weeks ago, this platform was alive with BS about a "coup." Now Xi is the Qianlong Emperor reborn. Geez.
Again with the pipeline ... If we add up all of these Twitter takes on what China is supposedly going to do next, Afghanistan should look like Abu Dhabi by next Tuesday.
I'm sorry, I really just don't get this. How does one get to a place where one concludes that hospital staff treating patients don't need to be vaccinated against an infectious disease? "Gov. Ron DeSantis objects to vaccine mandates at Florida hospitals"
Note the conversation in Chinese. Tokayev studied Chinese in Beijing a couple of years before I did and then worked in the Soviet embassy in Beijing as a young diplomat.
“Reluctant Stakeholder” - A long piece from me on what kind of power China is and isn’t, some anecdotes about dealing with China as it burst onto the global stage in the decade of the 2000s, and a plea for Washington to whine less and compete more.
A snapshot of the Russian economy: an investment expert goes live on air and says his current career trajectory is to work as "Santa Claus" and then drinks to the death of the stock market. With subtitles.
China’s economy is a basket case. It grew over the decades because the United States wanted it to grow as part of our strategy of incorporating China as a stakeholder in the rules based system. Now that China is challenging the system, the free world is kicking the ladder down.…
NEWS: President Biden has officially cut short his trip and will return to the U.S. on Sunday after the G7 in Japan. He will not go to Papua New Guinea or Australia, per administration official, because of ongoing debt ceiling talks.
If America Really Is Unpopular, We Have Only Ourselves to Blame: Washington is giving developing countries plenty of reasons to cozy up to China. via
@scottlincicome
She makes the point well - one that I often urge us to reflect on. Treating countries as objects not subjects - as proxies in our strategic competition rather than as agents in their own effort to foster growth, development, and innovation - is not a recipe for strategic success.
1/5: For those of you speculating about what the Chinese will now say about Donetsk/Luhansk, you might look at what China said in 2008 about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For example:
1: Thread: Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices.
WHO needs reforms big time. But we're going to take our ball and go home (1) in the middle of a pandemic, (2) without a single ally or partner, and (3) on the day that China pledges $2 billion and to make a vaccine available to developing countries? Good strategy.
Talking and doing business, two things that used to be considered completely normal just a few years ago, now = "bowing" ... Just in case anyone was wondering how much the narrative arc has shifted in a very compressed timeframe.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz will kick off a three-day visit to China today — marking both his longest and most important foreign trip since he assumed office in late 2021.
And for good reason: Scholz needs China.
🔗
If you're one of those who thinks the China-Russia convergence only began sometime between last Monday and last Thursday, you might want to revisit Chinese reactions to NATO ops in the Balkans in the 1990s. I have argued for 20+ years that this was a fairly significant moment ...
With Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Beijing cannot reconcile its competing objectives. It will have to jettison one or another, or else uncomfortably shift its position from day to day under the glare of international scrutiny. I write for
@CarnegieEndow
:
"If Xi Jinping decided that it was a high priority to end this war, he could end the war literally in five seconds."
Atlantic Council Senior Fellow Jamie Metzl discusses why European leaders are in Beijing.
Those who think China is diplomatically "back footed" should ask why Xi never has to leave home. Went to Central Asia, went to Moscow, went to the Gulf. Otherwise, everyone just goes to him. Scholz, Macron, von der Leyen, Fernández, Marcos, Tshisikedi, Castro, Hipkins ...
1: No, it really isn't fine. For one, it infantilizes third countries. And it doesn't reflect the complex experience many of them have had with China. BRI is not "a debt and confiscation program," although there are indeed very troubling cases. Above all, whining isn't competing.
@EvanFeigenbaum
@prchovanec
This line reflects the substance of the matter, bursts the narrative of the PRC’s inevitable rise, and aims to persuade European audiences, not just ones in the Global South. Maybe not the best time for this line but it’s… fine?
@CarlosLozadaWP
Go back to the BBC serial versions of "Tinker, Tailor ... " and "Smiley's People" with Guinness, Hepton and Foster. They are all on YouTube un-cut, and they are extraordinary, deliberate, thoughtful. And they didn't need to "recreate" 1970s British gloom sine they filmed in 1979.
This line will get zero traction in many places and will, in fact, make the US seem petulant across many parts of the Global South. BRI is falling under its own weight anyway and China itself has begun to deemphasize it. There's little reason to get into this pissing contest now.
Biden takes a swipe at China's Belt and Road infrastructure initiative:
"The Belt and Road initiative turns out to be a debt and confiscation program -- not going very far," Biden says at an appearance with PM Sunak of the UK.
1/4: This piece perfectly captures the circularity of the current US debate about China. Focus on the Middle East? It's a "win for China" because we're not pivoting to focus full-time on Asia. Leave the Middle East? Also a "win for China" because now China will "fill the vacuum."
Of course, KSA and UAE are not “dropping” China. We can just look at KSA’s digital and tech buildout to see scope of China’s role. The problem with “counter BRI” is that it is a US narrative, while local narratives are nearly always about multiplication/addition, not subtraction.
One of the biggest stories of the G20 summit is a deal developing on the sidelines: An infrastructure accord between the US, India, KSA, and UAE. If finalized, it would be a game changer that strengthens connectivity between India and the Middle East and would aim to counter BRI.
3: ... (1) a strategic relationship with Russia; (2) commitment to longstanding foreign policy principles around “noninterference,” and (3) a desire to minimize collateral damage to Chinese interests from economic turmoil and potential secondary sanctions from the US and EU.
1: A few folks asked me to elaborate on this. I'll try. And please note that I don't mean to pick on the Kahl speech per se, since his speech isn't really about China. But the way China is framed there is (1) endemic in US rhetoric but (2) spectacularly ineffective, in my view.
1/2: Sorry, the US is just not going to get far trying to reduce countries in this region - or others, especially in the Global South - to proxies in its *own* strategic competition with China. This has been put to a market test repeatedly in recent years and keeps falling short.
“96 percent of German respondents have no plans to leave the Chinese market; 72 percent plan further investments.” Business Confidence Survey - KPMG Germany
𝗦𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗻𝗲𝘄𝘀: Chicago is my kind of town. I've loved every day living here and my awesome team at
@MacroPoloChina
. I'm wistful about moving on but am utterly thrilled to be joining another amazing team as Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment.
We are delighted to welcome
@EvanFeigenbaum
as vice president for studies, overseeing work on a dynamic region encompassing both East Asia and South Asia.
Read the full announcement:
One tiny comment, since we're less than 24 hours from the announcement of AUKUS. To me, the twin announcements neatly capture a key duality: the US approach to the region boasts great initiatives and steps, but is security-centric. China is still playing a geoeconomic long game.
Folks, Beijing did not "discover" Afghanistan when it launched the Belt and Road in 2013. There is a LOT of history, including diplomatic history going back decades. I worked on a bit of it from 2001-05 and there were decades of activity before that. The BRI-centrism is too much.
1: Some background from me for the Xi trip to Moscow, where I expect Beijing to reinforce an entente that is both unsentimental and directed largely at shared ambivalence about (1) US foreign policy, (2) tools of US statecraft, e.g., sanctions, and (3) backfooting Washington.
5: To me that suggests we're headed for a highly destabilized situation. And since this is not an event but a process, the PRC will start/stop, ratchet up/back, mix/match kinetic/non-kinetic coercive tools and continuously bring pressure in ways that are *meant* to be escalatory.
1: I'm thrilled to welcome
@SheenaGreitens
to our team at
@CarnegieEndow
as a nonresident scholar in our
#CarnegieAsia
program. Sheena's work spans security, East Asia, and authoritarian politics and foreign policy - and she is a switch-hitter with expertise on China and Korea.
An entire article on war with China that doesn't even once mention the words "nuclear weapons." Might be nice if folks at least considered the issue of escalation control instead of just presuming it doesn't exist ...
President Biden and Secretary of Defense Austin must order the Pentagon to focus on high-intensity combat with China, especially in the Taiwan Strait, where the threat of war is greatest, and to downsize or eliminate other missions, Michael Beckley argues.
1: I'm thrilled to launch
#ChinaLocalGlobal
, an innovative new
@CarnegieEndow
initiative that digs deeply into Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
2: Not suprisiungly, in my view, the Chinese will be selfish about their own interests. They are in a difficult spot because they are attempting (both rhetorically and substantively) to balance three goals that, quite simply, *cannot* be reconciled ...
I'm sorry, but if the United States is dumb enough to voluntarily blow up its own alliances then China is merely the incidental beneficiary. It is neither cathartic nor ultimately very satisfying to blame the other team because you scored a completely unnecessary own-goal.
Beijing’s reasoning is simple: Cementing distrust between the United States and Europe is the best way to prevent the emergence of trans-Atlantic policies detrimental to Chinese interests, columnist
@AgatheDemarais
writes.
I guess I just don't find the Macron interview as surprising as others do. First, it's Macron. Second, it's France. But third, haven't the signals been flashing that (1) European attitudes to China have hardened hugely but (2) this does not mean a securitized "American" approach?
ABOARD COTAM UNITÉ— Europe must reduce its dependency on the U.S. and avoid getting dragged into a confrontation over Taiwan, French President Emmanuel Macron said in an interview with
@POLITICOEurope
.
By
@JamilAnderlini
and
@cleacaulcutt
:
1: Thread … I'm thrilled to welcome
@ashleytownshend
to
@CarnegieEndow
as Senior Fellow for Indo-Pacific Security. Ash will join us on May 31 to spearhead exciting new directions in our
#CarnegieAsia
research and programming on regional security, deterrence, and defense policy.
1/2: Sorry, the US is just not going to get far trying to reduce countries in this region - or others, especially in the Global South - to proxies in its *own* strategic competition with China. This has been put to a market test repeatedly in recent years and keeps falling short.
Essentially the message was that China represented a major threat to global order and that regional countries should recognise that China was a transactional and opportunistic player in the Middle East. But don’t take my words for it: best to check the transcript.
#IISSMD22
7: And if you want context on this, listen to
@JohnCulver689
on
@SinicaPodcast
this week. He provides chapter and verse on what is happening, and sets it against a historical backdrop that he knows better than nearly anyone.
4: Bluntly, Beijing will not be able to have all three of these simultaneously, so it will have to jettison one or another of these goals and maybe shift from day to day. I'm confident they will straddle on the principles while power politics and practical considerations remain.
(1) It’s hard to mediate when you are not, in fact, a neutral party; (2) if “mediate” is code for “pressure Russia to make concessions,” forget it — Beijing won’t do it; (3) Beijing’s history on this is thin, eg, its role on Cambodia was via a UN process; not many good analogies.
JUST NOW
Macron raises prospect of China mediating on Ukraine:
- I believe in the coming months China can take on a role of mediation
- To prevent resumptions of large-scale land offensives after the winter
- I will visit China in early 2023 to discuss this
1: Really, the US would do a hell of a lot better by leveraging addition and multiplication instead of subtraction and division. It has a lot to offer. And the BUILD Act helps. But it is not going to get anywhere by trying to write China out of Asia's story as rhetoric or policy.
#UPDATE
Pence encourages Pacific nations to embrace the US, which, he says, in a swipe at Beijing's massive "Belt and Road" infrastructure initiative, does not offer a "constricting belt or a one-way road"
Churchill didn't downplay the threat Britain faced to "avoid panic" and "instill confidence." He leveled with the British people about the reality of the threat ... and thereby avoided panic and instilled confidence. Some of the arguments I've heard today are just indefensible.
11: Instead, Beijing now is, quite clearly, leaning toward some of Moscow’s preferred language while still trying to duck and cover by calling for "dialogue." And yesterday's MFA presser, which called the U.S. "the culprit" was striking and, frankly, stunning. It's a choice.
"To succeed in Asia, President-elect Joe Biden will need an administration that whines less, competes more, and leverages American strengths in the Asia that actually exists, not the one of its wishes, dreams, and fantasies." My latest in
@TheNatlInterest
:
In
@ForeignAffairs
, I write with my friend Adam Szubin, who headed
#OFAC
, about what Beijing has learned about economic warfare from Moscow's war in Ukraine. We explore how Beijing went from loathing sanctions to copycatting them, while also fearing them.
1/3: I’m so pleased to welcome
@mattsheehan88
to
@CarnegieEndow
as fellow for China Studies in the
#CarnegieAsia
program. Matt is a prolific writer and trenchant analyst of China’s relationship to technology, from AI to data to talent. He is a terrific new asset for our program.
1: Thread ... I'm pleased to launch two new
@CarnegieEndow
studies of China's activism and local response in eight "pivot" countries in two strategic regions. They're based on a sharing of experiences across national boundaries by dozens of influencers with deep local knowledge.
1: We’ve added a whopping 11 new scholars to our Washington-based
@CarnegieEndow
Asia programs over the last three years - six full-time and five nonresident scholars. They are brilliant, innovative, and disruptive to conventional wisdom. If you don’t read their work, you should!
1: "Russia says" are the operative two words. Need to see China's readout. The "Beijing straddle" since Feb 24 has NOT been this unnuanced - it's been lean into Russia strategically/diplomatically; broadly comply with Western sanctions to not be a target; pretend to be "neutral."