In a bid to foster more representation in 🇦🇺 debates about 🇨🇳 & bilateral ties, I’ve created a directory of Chinese-Australian 🇨🇳 experts.
This is still a work in progress, so corrections/additions/suggestions welcomed (especially other people to add):
Flagrant disinformation from 🇨🇳’s Ambassador to 🇦🇺 in The Sydney Morning Herald.
Including this: “the one-China principle … is … the consensus of the international community.”
Like many countries, 🇦🇺 doesn’t endorse 🇨🇳’s view that 🇹🇼 is part of 🇨🇳.
Beyond the revelation of a Director of Strategic Affairs at the 🇦🇺 Office in Taipei to engage w/ 🇹🇼's defence ministry & security agencies, 🇦🇺's 🇹🇼 language seems to be shifting.
DFAT now saying that 🇦🇺 "works across" its "regional security" interests to promote 🇦🇺-🇹🇼 ties.
1/3
My latest for The Canberra Times: The Albanese government should do more to explain the military uses of nuclear-powered submarines.
A more open conversation will be hard. But the stakes are too high to not brief the 🇦🇺 people in.
Non-paywalled version:
My latest w/
@mhar4
for
@LowyInstitute
:
Enhancing Australia’s Taiwan ties
🇦🇺 should use the flexibility of its 1-China policy to increase trade & political engagement w/ 🇹🇼.
Including backing 🇹🇼 to join the CPTPP, pursuing a bilat 🇦🇺-🇹🇼 FTA & sending 🇦🇺 ministers to visit 🇹🇼.
Ex Malabar ‘23 will be the 4th time in a row that all Quad countries participate. & given growing warmth of 🇦🇺-🇮🇳 ties, it seems likely for now that 🇦🇺 will be invited to future iterations.
More & more, it looks like a Quad naval exercise in all but name.
It seems (I think?) to have gone largely unremarked in the press, but 🇹🇼's National Science & Technology Council Minister Wu Tsung-tsong recently (23-26 Oct.) visited 🇦🇺.
Here he is visiting 🇦🇺's Department of Industry, Science and Resources:
🇦🇺's latest 🇮🇷 sanctions include Press TV, reportedly on the grounds that it broadcast forced confessions.
Makes 🇦🇺's unwillingness to sanction 🇨🇳 entities especially conspicuous given 🇨🇳 media outlets have a track record of airing forced confessions.
Yet more signs 🇦🇺 PM wants an invite to 🇨🇳 this year: 'The sources ... confirmed Albanese is ... “anticipating to visit Beijing” later this year...'
PM Albanese's apparent priority poses a bit of a 🇨🇳 policy dilemma for Canberra.
1/6
An influential member of 🇦🇺’s Shadow Ministry rejects efforts by 🇨🇳 to redefine 🇦🇺’s one-China policy.
Senator Paterson’s speech to the opening night of the Track 2.0 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 Dialogue at the Lowy Institute encapsulates significant strains of Opposition thinking on 🇨🇳.
Another example of how the 🇨🇳 government is ably navigating the 🇦🇺 media landscape:
28 Aug: 🇨🇳 Perth Consul-General Long Dingbin publishes an effusive piece in the Communist Party of Australia's Guardian
8 Sep: The same piece appears nearly verbatim in The West Australian
Possibly (probably) against my better judgement, I've started a Substack on 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 rels. It's my rough & ready take on a few of the key bilat developments each week, w/ a focus on broader defence/foreign policy Qs. Hate mail/encouragement welcome:
🇩🇪’s foreign ministry:
“🇹🇼 is a democracy & an important partner for 🇩🇪 in terms of trade & investment. In that sense, regular exchanges & reciprocal visits by the relevant ministers are completely normal.”
It’s been more than a decade since an 🇦🇺 minister visited 🇹🇼.
From
@FT
: "
#Taiwan
will host its first visit by a German federal minister in 26 years next week, a trip that has highlighted divisions in Berlin over the handling of its relationship with
#China
."
Children tried Laoganma for the first time.
Rave reviews.
Child 1: "It's like a flavoursome explosion. It's like 9 volcanoes bunched together."
Child 2: "I'm just going to eat this everyday."
The presumed inevitability of 🇨🇳’s use of force against 🇹🇼 is especially concerning:
“Once the Chinese government is forced to use force to resolve the Taiwan question…”
Lieutenant General He Lei describing PLA plans to inflict a horror on the people of Taiwan and curse the region with unmanageable crises - economic, political and moral - for generations.
Such sad news.
Allan Gyngell was a first-class public intellectual, a friend and mentor to so many, a dedicated servant of Australia, and, most importantly, a humble and generous individual.
Vale
The Australian Institute of International Affairs is very sad to hear of the death of our immediate past president, Allan Gyngell AO FAIIA, this morning. Allan's contributions to the institute and to Australian foreign policy have been enormous. Our thoughts are with his family.
Slipping back way too easily into full-time Canberra life.
Dropping mum & children off at Questacon, working from the National Library & Brodburgers by the Lake.
The Canberra caricature is pretty good tbh.
Australia's liberal credentials on the line in UK-Mauritius sovereignty dispute. & 🇭🇲's response so far undermines its efforts to get 🇨🇳 to play by global rules + laws. My piece for
@LowyInstitute
:
Short bilateral 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 Joint Statement
No resolution of disputes.
But big news on high-level engagement: restarting/starting anew on (nearly) all fronts.
Human rights dialogue one conspicuous exception. Plus no specific mention of leader-level meetings.
FM Wong’s Beijing visit🟰big milestone in 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 rels
Unless I missed something:
➡️ 1st 🇦🇺 FM visit to 🇨🇳 since Nov. 18
➡️ 1st 🇦🇺 ministerial visit to Beijing since Aug. 19 (Trade Min. Birmingham)
➡️ 1st 🇦🇺 ministerial visit to 🇨🇳 since Nov. 19 (Trade Min. Birmingham)
Links 👇
Today years old when I learnt that the iconic Viennetta is made in 🇵🇹.
Trust the Portuguese Embassy in Canberra will incorporate this into their public diplomacy.
The 1st Beijing to Canberra and Back for 2023 (Dec & Jan 2022-23):
1️⃣ 🇨🇳 pursues relationship repair without 🇦🇺 reversing policy positions
2️⃣ The (limited) impact of the Albanese gov’s softer 🇨🇳 diplomacy
3️⃣ 🇨🇳 seemingly lets expectations of 🇦🇺 slide
Signing off for a few weeks of leave. Let’s be honest, I’ll still be silently lurking on here for the memes. But otherwise, catch you next year. If it’s that time of year for you too, happy holidays & best wishes for 2023! Most of all tho, stay safe & look after each other. 🌏❤️
Alliance politics difficult to square w/ market logic in age of econ coercion:
"🇺🇸 coal exports to 🇨🇳 have risen steadily from virtually nothing in October, while 🇦🇺 exports of the commodity have dropped to zero in the past 4 months." 30 Apr 2021
Today years old when I learnt that the 🇺🇸 & 🇨🇳 operated a joint SIGINT facility in Xinjiang in the '80s to monitor Soviet missile tests. Apparently paramount leader Deng responded sympathetically to then-Senator Biden in '79 when the facility was raised.
🇨🇳's readout of the Wong-Wang meet has 2X refs to 🇦🇺's "one-China principle".
Pretty inconceivable FM Wong would've said that.
Hard not to conclude:
1⃣ MFA readouts of other gov positions=dubious
2⃣ 🇨🇳 misrepresenting other govs as part of anti-🇹🇼 strategy
It seems 🇮🇳's R&AW intel agency may have assassinated a 🇨🇦 citizen in 🇨🇦.
This looks likely to have implications for 🇦🇺 & 🇦🇺-🇮🇳 ties.
🇦🇺's publicly taciturn approach to 🇮🇳's human rights record under Modi likely come under more domestic pressure in 🇦🇺.
But more importantly...
1 to watch for 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 rels:
"Tianqi Lithium Energy Australia launched a $136 mil bid for 🇦🇺 lithium developer Essential Metals in early Jan, setting up a trigger for approval by FIRB. Essential recommended the bid & will seek shareholder approval by Apr."
🇨🇳 put on notice by 🇦🇺+🇯🇵 vis-à-vis CPTPP accession:
"Ministers [Farrell & Nishimura] noted that economic coercion and unjustified restrictive trade practices are contrary to the objectives and high standards of the Agreement."
A firey AUSTRALIA IN THE WORLD as Allan
@AIIANational
and I debate the merits of AUKUS. Our debate I think reveals a lot about the stakes, and how differing assessments of Australia’s strategic landscape will shape views on this issue:
🇮🇩's House of Reps members visit 🇹🇼.
Despite 🇦🇺's generally proactive diplomacy on 🇹🇼, there doesn't seem to have been a parliamentary visit since 2017.
& that 2017 visit only seems to have included Coalition MPs/Senators?
Time for a bipartisan 🇦🇺 parliamentary visit to 🇹🇼?
Great to meet with a cross-party delegation from the
#Taiwan
caucus of the Indonesian House of Representatives
@DPR_RI
. We deeply value our friendship with
#Indonesia
& look forward to even closer cooperation to advance the well-being of both our peoples.
Update:
It now seems clear that 🇦🇺's Trade Minister Farrell didn't discuss 🇹🇼 during talks w/ 🇨🇳's Commerce Minister Wang.
So, the message that "🇦🇺 did not support 🇹🇼's membership [of the CPTPP]" was likely never conveyed to 🇨🇳 during the visit (at least not at min-min level).
I'm deeply sceptical of this, but big if true.
According to an anonymous "source" w/ "direct knowledge of Canberra’s actions":
"Farrell told [🇨🇳] 🇦🇺 did not support 🇹🇼's membership [of the CPTPP] – referring to the Albanese statement in November 2022".
The recent 🇦🇺-🇮🇳 2+2 statement includes references to "democracy & pluralism" + "rule of law".
Hard to reconcile that w/ recent plausible allegations of successful & foiled assassinations by 🇮🇳 in 🇨🇦 & 🇺🇸.
A growing case for 🇦🇺 to tone down the shared values language w/ 🇮🇳?
Pressure likely to mount on 🇦🇺 gov. to use Magnitsky sanctions against 🇨🇳.
Approx. 1 million Tibetan children "affected by 🇨🇳 gov. policies aimed at assimilating Tibetan people culturally, religiously & linguistically through a residential school system".
Worth reading on the strategic implications of 🇨🇳's infrastructure investments:
"Chinese companies' control over international port assets in wartime or other crisis scenarios remains incomplete & vulnerable to foreign military & host state action alike."
My take on the case for 🇦🇺 parliamentarians visiting 🇹🇼:
1️⃣ Counteracting 🇨🇳’s isolation efforts
2️⃣ Raising parliamentary & public awareness of the threats to 🇹🇼’s liberal democracy from 🇨🇳
3️⃣ The likely (relatively) low-key response from 🇨🇳
2 quick takeaways on '22 Vs '21 AUSMIN language on 🇹🇼:
1⃣ There's some more precise language that is likely to reassure 🇨🇳 without downsides for 🇹🇼
2⃣ But there are also 2 examples of conspicuously weaker language on 🇹🇼 that are likely to cause concern in Taipei (& elsewhere)
1/5
Chinese tech companies like Huawei are becoming development & security partners of choice for Indonesia.
There are lessons for 🇺🇸/🇦🇺/🇯🇵 & others as they seek to compete w/ 🇨🇳 in South-East Asia.
My latest w/
@dvanderkley
&
@GPriyandita
for
@ForeignPolicy
:
Way down in the weeds of 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 rels, but do I see a little diplomatic flex in FM Wong’s press release?
Specifies “at the invitation of” 🇨🇳, suggesting that Beijing did the asking?
Contrast that w/ FM Payne’s press release from the last equivalent visit in ‘18: “hosted by” 🇨🇳.
Another milestone in 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 rels: Trade Min Don Farrell talking w/ Commerce Min Wang Wentao this afternoon AEDT (virtually).
1st direct conversation at the ministerial level * in the trade portfolio between 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 since Senator Birmingham was in 🇨🇳 in 2019.
I'm deeply sceptical of this, but big if true.
According to an anonymous "source" w/ "direct knowledge of Canberra’s actions":
"Farrell told [🇨🇳] 🇦🇺 did not support 🇹🇼's membership [of the CPTPP] – referring to the Albanese statement in November 2022".
After a few years keeping (relatively) quiet on Twitter, I'm back out in the world thanks to a research role
@ANURegNet
. Excited to launch into a new project on geoeconomics & China's statecraft with
@AntheaERoberts
+ a crew of brilliant colleagues at
@ANUasiapacific
.
Essential reading for everyone in 🇭🇲-🇨🇳 debates: 31% of Chinese-Australians have been verbally abused + 18% physically threatened or attacked. 52% say 🇭🇲-🇨🇳 rels have contributed & 66% say COVID has. Kudos to
@jennifer_hsu
@natashaskassam
&
@LowyInstitute
:
🇦🇺 gov on Landbridge Group’s Darwin Port lease: “not necessary to vary or cancel the lease.”
PM Albanese in 2015: “to give up a strategic asset to a company that has links with the People's Liberation Army in 🇨🇳 is, I think, a grave error of judgement”.
Update of 🇦🇺’s Critical Minerals List includes new Strategic Materials List (copper, nickel, aluminium, phosphorous, tin & zinc).
What does this mean for 🇦🇺’s approach to 🇨🇳 investments in “strategic materials”? A prelude to more 🇨🇳investment rejections?
Regardless of one's position on AUKUS, 🇺🇸 force posture in 🇦🇺, & 🇦🇺+🇺🇸 intel cooperation, MINDEF Marles' address to Parliament yesterday is worth reading.
A few highlights that caught my eye below (on 🇦🇺 sovereignty, military capability decisions, & intel facilities).
The (v. abridged) case for an 🇦🇺 FTA w/ 🇹🇼
🧵 1/5
Then FM Bishop in 2018:
“The 🇨🇳 government made it clear to me that circumstances had changed between 🇹🇼+🇨🇳 and that 🇨🇳 would not look favourably on 🇦🇺 seeking to pursue a free trade agreement w/ 🇹🇼.”
While we’re driving, child 2 opens car window & starts yelling at passing cars:
“Do you have candy?!?!”
Poor Halloween etiquette? Innovative approach? 🤷♂️
Beijing to Canberra and Back (fortnight of 15 to 28 August):
1⃣ What's wrong w/ the misleading 1-China op-ed by 🇨🇳's Ambassador?
2⃣ Options for the 🇦🇺 government (& DFAT) to counteract 🇨🇳's disinformation
3⃣ Aggregate 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 leader-level meetings since '72
Me trying to deliver a (clearly unconvincing) parental sermon about how the rules are for everyone’s benefit & my first priority is keeping everyone safe
Me: “So, what’s my number one job?”
Child 1: “Um, making money to buy us presents?”
🤦♂️
That glorious feeling when you’re flying for work as a parent and you’re seated next to children who are going a bit wild and watching Paw Patrol.
But they’re not your children.
There but for the grace of God go I.
Washington's diplomatic support is welcomed by Canberra, but 🇨🇳's economic coercion against 🇦🇺 creates commercial opportunities for 🇺🇸. The Biden admin will need to explore other avenues to provide tangible support to 🇦🇺.
@j_laurenceson
offers some policy options.
NEW: In
@SCMPNews
I show that as China unleashes trade punishment on Australia, the US is 0/6 in standing with 🇦🇺 if it involves actions that incur a cost. This is not reason for 🇦🇺 Australia to panic. But let's be clear who is paying the price.
@UTSEngage
My latest for
@ReviewPacific
with the always sharp + incisive
@VictorAFerguson
&
@limdarrenj
: "Between market and state: the evolution of 🇦🇺’s economic statecraft"
It's available open access here:
My (perhaps slightly cheeky) take on 🇨🇳’s reaction to the AUKUS announcement:
“To paraphrase [former 🇦🇺 Prime Minister] Keating, 🇨🇳’s criticisms of Aukus are likely to be all tip and no iceberg when it comes to the broader 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 relationship.”
My advice to newly appointed
@TaiwanAustralia
rep, Douglas Yu-tien Hsu was that sport is the key to understanding Australia. He graciously celebrated
@AussieDiamonds
win & supported
@TheMatildas
for tonight’s match. Looking forward to working with him. Welcome to Australia.
AUKUS divisions on show at the 🇦🇺 Labor national conference.
MINDEF Richard Marles "jeered" by Labor anti-AUKUS activists.
Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy: “If you’re pro-human rights, you need to be pro-AUKUS, if you’re pro-peace, you need to be pro-AUKUS.”
🇨🇳's anti-AUKUS diplomatic campaign continues apace.
Regardless of how legally plausible/implausible 🇨🇳's proliferation objections might be, 🇦🇺 (& 🇺🇸+🇬🇧) will need to do much more in coming years to win the international diplomatic & political argument.
Surging Australian wine exports to UK and EU in 2020 (driven by COVID). Unclear if trend continues as additional duties imposed by China in Nov 2020 bite this year, but encouraging for Aus wine industry nonetheless.
I know I’m late to the party, but this is utterly compelling. Gripping storytelling & sharp analysis. Can’t stop listening (ideal esp. for a 1-day Sydney↔️Canberra return drive…). Kudos to
@suelinwong
&
@TheEconomist
China team! 👏👏👏
Beijing to Canberra and Back (fortnight of 1 to 14 August):
1️⃣ Should Canberra directly correct Beijing’s disinformation efforts on 🇦🇺’s one-🇨🇳 policy?
2️⃣ Face-to-face leader-level 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 meetings since 1972
3️⃣ New & enduring sources of bilateral tensions
The DSR doesn't mention the 🇦🇺-🇳🇿 dimension of ANZUS.
A deliberate nod to changed strategic circumstances & the primacy of the 🇦🇺-🇺🇸 Alliance? Or an unintentional gap? Or something else?
🇺🇸="our Ally & principal strategic partner" Vs. 🇳🇿="a key partner".
The Global Times quoting an academic who spins 🇨🇳’s invitation as reward for 🇦🇺’s good behaviour:
“But now, we found Australia's attitude has further changed, so we can see the visit is at Wang's invitation, which shows China's recognition for Australia's laudable attitude.”
This: "US claims to upholding the rules-based order don’t square with its silence on Mauritian sovereignty in the Chagos." Same goes for Australia. Canberra's vote in the UN in 2019 and subsequent silence are inconsistent with Australian commitments.
Rowan Callick on Australia-Taiwan ties:
"Within Australia’s top 10 export partners, Canberra lacks a free-trade agreement with Taiwan alone.
...
Casting around the region, few places so clearly share as many public-life values with Australia as Taiwan."
Coral Bell concluding her 2007 Lowy paper, The end of the Vasco da Gama era:
''As middle powers go, 🇦🇺 is exceptionally well endowed w/ both economic & strategic assets. ... There is no need to mourn the end of the unipolar world."
A move by 🇨🇳 to take 🇹🇼 by force would likely precipitate a severe 🇦🇺 foreign policy crisis.
🇦🇺 should explore economic deterrence measures & Albanese should warn Xi of the potential trade consequences for 🇨🇳.
My latest for the SMH & other Nine papers:
Beijing to Canberra and Back (fortnight of 9 to 22 May):
1⃣ The forest of rhetorical olive branches that 🇨🇳 has offered 🇦🇺
2⃣ A high-level 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 meeting seems increasingly likely in 2022
3⃣ Emerging issues that will keep bilat rels broadly frosty
My latest for
@The_ChinaStory
on the role of policy compromise & tactical caution in the Albanese government's approach to managing the 🇦🇺-🇨🇳 relationship:
Beijing to Canberra and Back (fortnight of 19 September to 2 October):
1⃣ 🇦🇺 starts calling out economic coercion again (readout of meeting w/🇪🇸)
2⃣ The costs/benefits of explicitly criticising 🇨🇳's economic coercion
3⃣ 🇦🇺 offers 🇨🇳 diplomatic compliments
Beijing to Canberra and Back (weeks of 29 August to 18 September):
1⃣ 🇦🇺's high stakes (& probable?) targeted sanctions against 🇨🇳
2⃣ 🇦🇺's strategy for minimising the fallout of such sanctions
3⃣ A likely leader-level meeting between 🇦🇺 & 🇨🇳 in November
A beautifully written and devastating essay:
"Unfortunately for the Hui and many other minority groups, little seems to stand in the way of Xi and his bid to bulldoze a new China into being."
“Allan described foreign policy as ‘much of the work of my life.’ … His work, and his life, set an example to which we would do well to aspire.”
“He is gone now, and we mourn his loss. But, for all of us, the work remains.”
A Chinese translation of 🇨🇳 Ambassador to 🇦🇺 Xiao Qian’s recent op-ed in the AFR is featured on the landing page of the MFA website.
Another little datapoint that again seems to highlight the appetite for relationship repair in Beijing.
A cracker of an
@NSC_ANU
event tomorrow (6pm AEST) on the future of the Indo-Pacific & geopolitical + geoeconomic competition. All-star cast of
@NMenonRao
, Prof Akio Takahara &
@ANUCrawford
's own
@Rory_Medcalf
. Register here:
Working-level 🇦🇺-🇹🇼 engagement continues apace...
"including exchanges between Safe Work Australia and Taiwan’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Ministry of Labor, and the Civil Service Protection and Training Commission ... ."