Putin’s downfall may not come tomorrow or the day after, but his grip on power is certainly more tenuous than it was before he invaded Ukraine.
Here is a link to the piece without the paywall:
Russia is weaker as a result of its war on Ukraine. But it retains the capability & will to challenge the US and Europe. The US must remain prepared to confront RU however beleaguered by war it may be.
My new piece in
@nytopinion
w/
@KofmanMichael
.
Russian President Vladimir Putin found an opportunity to shift the blame for election meddling onto Ukraine, according to former Deputy National Intelligence Officer, Andrea Kendall-Taylor.
Russia's war effort in Ukraine has benefitted from China, Iran, and North Korean support. But their collaboration in Ukraine is just the tip of the iceberg.
Read our take (
@RHFontaine
) on the Axis of Upheaval. 1/
Paywall free link: .
It is not in Putin's interest to end the war in Ukraine. Fighting on makes sense for Putin personally for one fundamental reason: wartime autocrats rarely lose power.
My new piece in
@ForeignAffairs
w/ Erica Frantz.
1/
Biden team is prioritizing anti-corruption, viewing it as a national security imperative.
This should be near the top of the agenda for greater Transatlantic cooperation on addressing Russia and China.
Countering the Axis of Upheaval starts in Ukraine. Defeating Russia there is the most impactful way to thwart this rising challenge. Washington should not ignore Russian aggression in Europe to focus on rising Chinese power in Asia. They are linked.
With all the focus on China,
@KofmanMichael
and I urge Washington to avoid the temptation of looking past Russia to focus on China--Moscow will remain a persistent power and should be rightsized in US thinking and strategy.
"It would be imprudent for the US to adopt a formal policy of regime change, but Washington need not pull any punches in fear that what follows Putin would be worse." My latest w/ Erica Frantz.
The most likely path to a war w/ Russia is if Putin judges that NATO, & esp the US , lacks the resolve to fight. This could happen for political reasons, or if the US is engaged in a major conflict elsewhere, such as the Indo-Pacific 1/
@POLITICOEurope
I've been wondering why Putin pretended to debate the logic of recognition when he had clearly already made up his mind
It now looks like some sort of loyalty test – force his top allies, many of whom seemed reluctant, to pledge themselves to the cause.
protests across 53 russian cities, more than 1700 people detained tonight. the regime did not bother with counter-protests. I wonder if Putin underestimated just how unpopular this would be
Excited to say that I will be continuing my work at the wonderful
@CNASdc
—much to do to support the Administration's efforts to manage US-Russia relations and revitalize efforts to work w/ Europe on global challenges.
In our
@ForeignAffairs
piece we highlight the risk of insurgency to the Putin regime; 13% of autocrats like Putin are ousted this way. While this attempt is likely to fail, it highlights the risk of bottom up upheaval that plagues longtime personalist autocracies like Putin's.
This is yet another potential risk to watch; the implosion of Russia's economy will hurt Central Asian economies who are heavily dependent on Russia remittances. Young male workers returning home w/ no economic prospects raises risk of instability there too.
the potential for unrest beyond russia and ukraine is high. The region is linked and disturbances spread. E.g. central asia relies heavily on Rus. remittances. It would be ironic and sad if putin’s attempt to domesticate the region produces another revolutionary wave.
Russian power and influence may be diminished, but that does not mean Russia will become dramatically less threatening. My
@ForeignAffairs
piece with
@KofmanMichael
gauging the nature of the future Russian threat.
For the first time, the intelligence community's Annual Threat Assessment included a section on Russia-China relations--noting the deepening ties and expanding cooperation. This is an important shift that we need to address.
On Tuesday, February 26, the Committee will hold an open hearing on the Rise of Authoritarianism.
We will examine how the global rise of autocracy effects our national security.
Witnesses:
@madeleine
,
@andersfoghr
,
@tengbiao
&
@AKendallTaylor
Details:
One development, however, could spark more substantive change in Russia: a Ukrainian victory. Kyiv’s triumph in the war raises the possibility, even if only slightly, that Putin could be forced out of office, creating an opening for a new style of Russian government.
A Russian defeat in the war could galvanize the kind of bottom-up pressure that is needed to upend Putin’s regime. Such a development carries risks—of violence, chaos, and even the chance of a more hard-line government emerging in the Kremlin—but it also opens opportunities.
I don't find the US-RU talks today esp. diagnostic or helpful for understanding the trajectory of the crisis. It seems Ryabkov has maintained maximum flexibility for Putin to ultimately decide.
Could Russia's relations w/ the West improve after Putin departs? The track record of political transitions that follow the exits of longtime authoritarian leaders offers little room for optimism.
Congress passing the supplemental aid bill for Ukraine was an important step. But we have a long way to go. The new axis has already changed the picture of geopolitics—but Washington and its partners can still prevent the world of upheaval the axis hopes to usher in.
First, the West will likely have to deal w/ Putin for awhile. The historical track-record of long-time personalist autocrats suggests that that once these leaders make it to 20 years in power—and Putin has been there for 23—they tend to make it to about 36 years.
What is likely to happen in Russia wants Putin departs?
In this
@TWQgw
article Erica Frantz and I examine the transitions of leaders most like Putin (highly personalist, in power >20yrs) to find out. 1/
Coups are unlikely in longtime autocracies. Among post–Cold War authoritarian leaders in power for 20 years or more, only ten percent have been ousted in a coup. And when the do happen, the same elite tends to remain in place.
In the post-Cold War era, authoritarian regimes have outlasted 89% of the longtime leaders who died in office. Even in personalist autocracies, where the question of succession is considerably fraught, the same regime has survived the leader’s death 83% of the time.
Putin's invasion of Ukraine has done little to change that outlook. Authoritarian leaders rarely lose power while still waging a war they initiated. As long as the war continues, Putin’s position is more secure, making positive change less likely.
What is more, authoritarian regimes (incl. the same group of regime insiders) most often survive in the wake of the departure of longtime leaders such as Putin; were Putin to die in office or be removed by insiders, the regime would most likely endure intact.
In these cases (death in office or coup), the contours of Russian foreign policy would stay largely the same, with the Kremlin locked in a period of protracted confrontation with the West.
My colleague Erica Frantz and I have done some thinking on leadership transitions in autocracies. A short thread on what events in Kazakhstan might mean for Russia (1)
I am excited to announce our new
@CNASdc
Transatlantic Forum on Russia. It's time for the US and Europe to coordinate and move out on new approaches to addressing Russia.
New
@ChicagoCouncil
poll w/ interesting insights on deepening RU-CH partnership:
-74% of Russians hold favorable view of China
-57% of Russians believe Russia & China will grow closer
-56% say respect for CH has grown
-55% say RU's ties to CH strengthen RU's position in the world
Is Russia a declining power? Is it declining in all ways? If it is in decline, what does it mean for the Kremlin's ability to sustain its aggression?
Register now to hear our take
@CNASdc
's annual conference
@KofmanMichael
@RitaKonaev
@edwardfishman
Early protests, celebrities and athletes speaking out, small signs of elite dissent. How Putin's war on Ukraine could be the beginning of the end of his rule. My latest with Erica Frantz.
When personalists leaders are forced out of power, they are often exiled, imprisoned, or killed: Since WW2, 69% of such leaders faced a harsh fate after their ousting. Putin likely to fight bitterly to avoid such a fate.
“In contrast to what technology optimists envisioned at the dawn of the millennium, autocracies are benefiting from the Internet & other new technologies, not falling victim to them.”
Check out my latest w/
@EricaFrantz
and Joe Wright.
@ForeignAffairs
.
Big news: my textbook is finished and off to the publisher! A 2-year labor of love as I contemplated how I could play a role in pushing back against so many troubling changes at home and abroad. Coming to you Summer 2019!
@EricaFrantz
I agree with
@carlbildt
and
@KoriSchake
. And that is precisely what the Biden Administration understands--there is no reset with Russia. This will be the first post-Soviet U.S. administration that has not come into office not looking to reset relations with Russia.
This is so disturbing. This is what populist-fuelled authoritarianism looks like. When vocal critics emerge, aspiring authoritarians frame them as “fifth columnists,” “agents of the establishment,” or other provocateurs seeking to destabilize the system.
Asked whether the summary firing of LTC Alexander Vindman was justified Graham says Vindman was part of broader plot against President Trump by FBI Agents, CIA Agents and DOJ Lawyers.
It was Putin’s own self-interest that started this war, and it will be his own self-interest that will end it. For now, he has no incentive to stop fighting. That means that the US and West must help Ukraine end it for him.
Join me tomorrow for a look ahead at the G7, NATO, EU and Geneva Summits w/ the Biden Administration's National Security Council officials
@A_Sloat
, Daleep Singh, and Eric Green.
@CNASdc
You don't want to miss this one. Register here:
Very excited to share that I have resigned from the USG and am starting a new chapter at
@CNASdc
as Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program!
Working together, they enhance one another’s military capabilities; dilute the efficacy of U.S. foreign policy tools, including sanctions; and hinder the ability of Washington and its partners to rally coalitions that can stand against their destabilizing actions
"The president has sought to portray himself as singularly in charge — except for when things go wrong. In those instances, he has labored to blame others & avoid accountability."
This could have been taken from an article on Putin...or any other highly personalist autocrat.
Already, since Russia's invasion of Ukraine: Hamas’s attack on Israel threatens a wider war; Azerbaijan forcibly took control of Nagorno-Karabakh; tensions flared between Serbia and Kosovo; & Venezuela threatened to seize territory in neighboring Guyana. Coups are on the rise.
Today we protested. For George Floyd. For others before him. To end system racism. To defend our democracy. And to teach the next generation that democracy is not a spectator sport.
US policy will need to address the destabilizing effects of revisionist countries’ acting in concert, and it should try to disrupt their coordinated efforts to subvert important international rules and institutions.
Moscow has been the main instigator of this axis. The more the Kremlin relies on these countries, the more it must give away in return, increasing the military capabilities of U.S. adversaries and eroding key U.S. advantages.
Their convergence is creating an increasingly viable alternative to the US-led order...creating a new center of gravity that other countries dissatisfied with the existing order can turn to. Global orders characterized by 2 competing orders have historically invited conflict.
Does Russia pose a threat to NATO?
The answer is yes: "especially if the Kremlin comes to underestimate Western, and most importantly U.S., resolve to fight."
@POLITICOEurope
My new piece with
@DaveShullman
on Russia/China --their foreign policy tactics are different, but they are converging in new and synergistic ways that are having a more corrosive effect on democracy than either would have single-handedly.
@ForeignAffairs
To paraphrase the Congressional testimony of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mike Milley, while it’s expensive to do what’s necessary to deter major aggression, it would be far more expensive to fight a major war if deterrence fails.
Not only does Putin think that the West will tire in its support, but he derives benefits from the continuation of the war: the execution of wars creates dynamics that make it more difficult to orchestrate a dictator’s removal.
My latest piece in
@USATODAY
on why Trump's efforts to discredit the whistleblower and the intelligence community more broadly are wrong and dangerous.
@usatodayopinion
@CNASdc
Dictators who lose wars become more vulnerable to ouster. Although personalist leaders like Putin are more resilient to defeat, his expectations of what happen if he is ousted--likely jailed, exiled, or killed—means he may be especially sensitive to even small increases in risk.
Putin has just passed constitutional changes that allow him to remain president until 2036. Join us on Wednesday for a "live"
#BrusselsSproutspodcast
dicussion with
@McFaul
and
@vkaramurza
to discuss what it means for Russia and US-Russia relations.
I agree with
@McFaul
. This crosses Biden's red line---this is a Russian move across the border and should trigger the first round of "start high stay high" sanctions.
Let's be clear, this act is an invasion of the sovereign country of Ukraine.
The West has to react forcefully, not "proportionally," and implement the full range of sanctions they have been promising.
Fantastic piece by
@CNASdc
Visiting Fellow
@heli_hautala
.
She helps makes sense of renewed Swedish and Finnish debates about NATO membership amid further Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Re-upping this piece on Putin's succession conundrum & how succession plays out in authoritarian regimes like Russia. Option 2: "change the constitution to strengthen the legislature or other governing body and then change his job title."
@EricaFrantz
Great piece by
@john_sipher
et al. CT is always on the list of shared interests and potential areas of cooperation between the US and Russia-- yet it rarely works in practice.
I hope the Biden Administration does indeed move to reinforce the Eastern flank--it is critical to ensure that any conflict is contained and that there are no doubts about alliance resolve.
The risks of a long war are not being adequately weighed. The longer the war continues, the more likely it becomes that Western support will wane, leading to the worst possible outcome: one in which Russia is able to expand its territorial control over Ukraine.
Check out this great episode of our podcast Brussels Sprouts w/ Russian opposition politician
@v_milov
. We discuss Russian opposition politics, the US 2020 elections, and the prospects for change in Russia.
@jteuropen
@CNASdc
Or if Ukraine decides it cannot fully expel Russian forces from its borders, Putin will be unlikely to agree to a settlement—and forgo the stability-enhancing benefits of war—until he confronts the kind of clear defeat that could threaten his hold on power.
NATO, therefore, needs to build a shared understanding of the threat that opportunistic aggression poses to NATO, and as allies increase defense expenditures, ensure they are investing in the capabilities the US wouldn’t be able to provide if engaged militarily elsewhere.
So, Ryabkov's comments could have been crafted to buy time for RU's military buildup & reduce US & European response & unity (no major pushback if chance for de-escalation remains). Or they could have been crafted to maintain leverage in a future negotiation. Hope it's the latter
To effectively deter Putin from opportunistically attacking NATO if the US were to be engaged in conflict elsewhere, the alliance must be able to credibly demonstrate it would still retain conventional superiority.
Looking forward to testifying tomorrow on the evolving Russia-China relationship. This is such an important topic and glad to see it getting more attention.
@USCC_GOV
The USCC is holding a public hearing entitled: “An Emerging China-Russia Axis? Implications for the United States in an Era of Strategic Competition” on Thursday, March 21, 2019 in Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 419. More info:
#China
#Russia
Though authoritarianism typically continues when authoritarian leaders exit, one positive note is that repressive conditions tend to ease in the five-year period afterwards. 8/
If Kyiv can hold Crimea at risk, for example, Putin could see it as in his interest to avoid the domestic risks that come with a decisive defeat and negotiate an end that falls well short of his war aims.
"Europe remains convinced they can uphold the values and norms they share w/ Washington while benefitting economically from engagement w/ China. This stance is short-sighted and dangerous—putting liberal democracy in peril." My new piece w/
@RachelRizzo
Protests in Moscow underscore rising discontent in Russia. Data from
@ACLEDINFO
show that there were 851 protests in Russia from Jan-Jun this year---an increase of 43% from the same period last year (594).
The problems Russia and China pose are distinct, but the convergence of their interests and the complementarity of their capabilities make their combined challenge to U.S. power greater than the sum of its parts. Check out my new piece w/
@DaveShullman
I don't typically subscribe to the idea that domestic factors drive Russian foreign policy, but this time I think domestic factors do play a role in Russian military activity on Ukraine's border.
Alexei Navalny said Monday he was suffering from a heavy cough and fever but would continue a hunger strike he launched last week demanding adequate medical treatment