Extraordinary how for months Germany has been having this fraught debate about sending Leopard II to Ukraine and then the UK decides to send Challenger II with almost no debate at all.
The German political establishment’s position seems to be not so much that what is happening in Palestine is not apartheid and genocide but that it cannot be. It focuses on the effect of the claims - which “delegitimate” and “demonise” Israel - rather than their truth.
Do Germans who think of themselves as progressive and are trying to police criticism of Israel, including by people who are themselves Jewish, just not realise how aligned they are with the American and Israeli right? Or do they not care?
If Russia is surprised at how tough and united we have been in response to the invasion, as many people claim, that is not a success but a failure. It means deterrence didn’t work because we failed to convince Russia that we would be that tough and united.
3 reasons why I think the concept of "populism" is unhelpful and has confused us rather than clarifying developments in European politics in the last decade, as discussed in this podcast yesterday. 1/5
🚨 New Ep!
"Europe’s Civilisational Turn?"
@TomMcTague
and
@HelenHet20
sit down with
@hanskundnani
discuss the domestic politics of European countries and the reshaping of Europe's collective future...
Listen below👇🎧
Very good
@washingtonpost
column by
@ishaantharoor
on the emerging far-right EU - especially the flawed idea that countries with fascist pasts like Germany, Italy and Spain had some kind of “immunity” to the far right.
In a major new interview with The Economist, five years after he told us about the “brain death” of NATO, Emmanuel Macron explains why he thinks Europe is in mortal danger, and what it can do about this
In
@TheEconomist
Great op-ed by
@broderly
on what is really happening in Italy. A lot of people seem to want to believe that Meloni and other far-right parties are becoming more moderate. If they are, it is in a very selective way (e.g. moderating their Euroscepticism).
It’s amazing to me how, in the last two years, the German political establishment has suddenly and completely abandoned the idea of peace, which until then was so central to its sense of what Germany stood for as a country.
The silence of the European Blob about the Pylos migrant boat tragedy is deafening. It’s almost two weeks since it happened and most European foreign policy analysts, even those who were very vocal about Ukrainian refugees, have had nothing to say about it.
Whatever you think about Scholz’s approach to the question of sending Leopard 2 to Ukraine, I suspect he is closer to the German public on this than the Berlin Blob is.
Here’s the piece I wrote in August about the possibility of a far-right EU. The point is not that the rise of the far right in places like Netherlands will lead to the end of the EU. It’s that it will take it further in the direction it is already going.
“Like the conquistadors, we must invent a new world,”
@JosepBorrellF
said to Latin American officials.
European colonisation exterminated 90% of the South American population—perhaps history’s largest genocide—and replaced the dead with African slaves.
Current events are really revealing how a lot of people think some lives (Israelis, Ukrainians) are more valuable than others (Palestinians, Africans).
I always find it puzzling that so many foreign policy analysts, especially in Europe, pore over the details of strategy documents, and take them at face value, as if they represented the essence of a country’s foreign policy. In reality, they are largely PR.
Great comments here by
@CasMudde
on how, although Giorgia Meloni "has lived her whole life in a truly fascist subculture", people deny she is on the far right because she supports Ukraine, which has now become the proxy for being liberal democratic."
@RugeBoris
I understand that. I’m just saying we haven’t had a big public debate in the UK like you have in Germany. It wasn’t even meant as a criticism! I’m just struck by the contrast.
This is such a rich interview with
@samuelmoyn
on Cold War liberalism (great questions as well as answers). Read it and then listen to his Carlyle lectures, which I think are even more relevant now than when he delivered them in Oxford last year.
Cologne University cancels two planned lectures by Nancy Fraser because of her support for Palestine, which it says questions Israel’s right to exist and “relativises” the 7 October attacks by Hamas.
2. It is not a neutral, analytical term – rather, it is used by the centre right and “radical” centrists to imply that there is a clear line between the centre right and the far right (and thus obscures the convergence between the two in Europe during the last decade). 3/5
It’s not just that Biden’s position on Gaza has alienated specific groups like Arab-Americans. It’s that all the arguments that Democrats made in 2016 and 2020 about why people needed to vote for them to save the liberal international order etc. no longer have any credibility.
The obsession with the idea of "populism" makes it seem as if, if you drop this style or “thin” ideology, far-right ideas are no longer a problem – which, again, is in the interest of the centre right, so it can cooperate with the far right or just copy these ideas. 5/5
I see a lot of people praising the smoothness of the transition from Merkel to Scholz. But it’s hardly surprising since he was was vice-chancellor in Merkel government! The problem with German democracy is the opposite of that in the US - not polarization but coziness.
The madness of this war: Ukraine is using up so much ammunition that NATO countries, including the United States, can’t collectively produce enough to meet their needs - and now we need to give them cluster munitions to fill the gap.
Leggeri - who resigned as director of
@Frontex
after revelations about illegal pushbacks of asylum seekers - joins Le Pen. A perfect illustration of the arguments I have been making about the fluid relationship between the European far right and the EU.
It seems to me that the basic neoconservative position, i.e. that there can be no peaceful coexistence with authoritarian states, is now closer to being the conventional wisdom than ever before.
Every day I seem to hear about yet another case of someone being persecuted (threatened, fired, uninvited, etc.) in Germany for expressing or having expressed sympathy with, or support for, the Palestinian people.
"Didn't I tell you we were going to die? Didn't I tell you we were already dead?"
The complete story of hundreds of preventable deaths in the Mediterranean.
Major
@nytimes
team effort across countries & teams.
Die angekündigte Freilassung einer ersten größeren Gruppe von
#Geiseln
ist ein Durchbruch - auch wenn nichts auf der Welt ihr Leid ungeschehen machen kann. Die humanitäre Pause muss genutzt werden, um lebensnotwendige Hilfe zu den Menschen in
#Gaza
zu bringen.
We tried military deterrence (but made it clear weren’t prepared to put boots on the ground) and economic deterrence (but made it clear we weren’t prepared to cut off Russian energy). Putin just called our bluff.
Very good piece by
@jonhenley
on the rise of the far right across Europe. The part that I think is slightly missing, though, is around how this is changing the EU itself. It is no longer the bulwark against the far right that we imagined it was.
This excellent review of Serhii Plokhy's book The Russo-Ukrainian War by
@mkimmage
in
@ForeignAffairs
raises important questions about Ukranian nationalism - and its compatibility with the EU's post-nationalism - that few people seem to want to discuss.
@daniel_dsj2110
Reminds me of the scene in American Fiction where Lisa tells Monk that his book changed her life because her table was wobbly and his book was the perfect size to fix it.
It seems to me that, during the last decade since the euro crisis began in 2010, there has been a troubling transformation of the EU. I have tried to describe this transformation in four essays I have written over the years since then. 1/7
1. It obscures the heterogeneity among all the figures, movements and parties (and, in the case of Brexit, a decision!) that are categorised as "populist" and implies they are all the same. In particular, it implies that the far left and the far right are the same. 2/5
3. It misses the point – the problem with the far right is not its style or “thin” ideology (i.e. talking about a pure people vs a corrupt elite etc.), or at least that is not the main problem with it. Rather, the problem is its “thick” ideology, i.e. its actual ideas. 4/5
Has anyone written about the metaphor of “turning” in German history? It’s obviously relevant now with the so-called Zeitenwende, but there is also the Wende of 1989 and A.J.P. Taylor’s idea that Germany “failed to turn” in 1848. Why do people keep talking about Germany turning?
Brilliant (and funny) by
@JyShapiro
on how things work in Washington: think tankers pretend to have influence on policy and policymakers pretend to be influenced by them.
Excellent
@NewYorker
interview with Stephen Kotkin, who is very clear headed, especially on our lack of clarity about what “victory” means in the war in Ukraine.
A brilliant essay on my book
#Eurowhiteness
by Mike Wilkinson of
@LSELaw
for
@jacobin
. I think this is the most challenging and perceptive review of the book so far.
This is my impression too - that support for Ukraine and opposition to Russia has become our new central moral reference point. It doesn’t seem to matter anymore if you’re on the far right, as long as you’re pro-Ukrainian/anti-Russian.
My sense, fwiw, is that no one in Europe wants Germany to “lead” anymore, they just want it to follow (i.e. stop getting in the way). That’s the big change, e.g. in Poland since Sikorski’s famous speech in 2011.
NEW on the IPQ website:
Who wants to be led by Germany?
The coalition parties in Berlin have no doubt: The country is destined to lead, certainly in Europe. Sadly, they have no comprehension of what that involves, argues
@DrStefanieBabst
It seems to me that the crucial question on SWIFT is not whether Russia is excluded from it or not, but whether it actually stops energy transactions. If we go ahead but only after finding a workaround for energy transactions - where we seem to be heading - it’s pretty pointless.
Zur Kritik an der Karikatur, die in der Feiertagsausgabe der SZ erschienen ist: Diese Karikatur ist die zeichnerische Umsetzung der Fernsehbilder vom Montag: (1/2)
Whether because they share Borrell’s views, they are too scared to speak out, or they just don’t care, very few European foreign policy think tankers have publicly criticised Borrell for this speech.
@Shahinvallee
, quoted in this article, is one of the few exceptions.
The top EU diplomat, Josep Borrell Fontelles, called Europe "a garden" and the world "a jungle," leading to charges of neocolonialism and racism as the EU tries to drum up support in the developing world.
The innocence with which people in Europe and the United States are now talking about the "West" - as if it were a simple and totally unproblematic concept whose meaning is obvious - is quite extraordinary.
European NATO countries seem to me to have conflated their own security with the liberation of Ukraine to such an extent that they are now completely unable to think clearly and realistically about how to deal with a second Trump presidency.
What makes Germany’s unconditional support for Israel so striking is that, in general, Germany loves using tough conditionality, including against EU member states and eurozone countries.
In the past, the default German position in any conflict was to say there was no military solution to it. Now, Germany opposes ceasefires in both Gaza and Ukraine and says war must continue until the enemy has been defeated.
As someone who has studied German foreign policy for over a decade and written two books on it, I don’t care about whether it is changing right now. What I care about is (a) the fate of the Ukrainian people and (b) whether and how this conflict might escalate.
Die Kampagne gegen die Wissenschaft geht weiter.
Zwei Autor*innen des Netzwerks W verbreiten Stammtischthesen über postkoloniale Theorie und frönen ihren Feindbildern.
Wissenschaft ist das nicht, und Debatte versteht
@faznet
ja auch eher einseitig
Charles Michel’s op-ed the other day is typical of the new conventional wisdom among “pro-Europeans” that the EU must “prepare for war". But in calling for the EU to change, they idealise its history as a “peace project”. 1/12
I don't understand why so many centrists in Europe and the United States seem completely unable to see, or at least to say publicly, that this is a far-right government in Israel - even as they bang on about far-right populists elsewhere (Orbán etc.) all the time.
Catching up on some of the analyses of the "Zeitenwende". Most of them are so binary and simplistic - Berlin used to think x and now thinks y. The reality is that it's much more complicated - both in terms of what Germans thought before and what they think now.
It seems to me that “pro-Europeans” are tying themselves in knots to respond to the Polish constitutional tribunal ruling two weeks ago - or rather to respond to the response to it. (1/8)
I have generally been sceptical about the EU’s aspiration to be “geopolitical”. But in this moment, to paraphrase Sikorski, I am as worried about EU recklessness as I am about EU inertia and technocracy.
Excellent piece by
@ShivshankaMenon
challenging both Eurocentric assumptions about the significance of the war in Ukraine and Anglo-American hopes that it will unite the “free world” against authoritarian states.
I very much agree with Wolfgang Münchau's point here about "the poverty of pro-European discourse". We need to expand the definition of what it means to be "pro-European" beyond uncritical support for the actually existing EU.
Interesting article on Meloni by
@broderly
for
@jacobin
. But what I think she really points to is something slightly different: the compatibility of the far right not just with neoliberalism but also with the EU.
Interesting coincidence of Holocaust Remembrance Day and criticism of Merkel and VW over China. I think the parallels between Auschwitz and Xinjiang are going to become an increasing problem for Germany and especially VW, given its own history going back to Nazism.
The whole debate about Ukrainian membership of the EU seems to me to illustrate the structural impossibility of a “geopolitical” EU. It was designed to depoliticise - and you can’t change that without disintegrating.
The attitude of the Biden administration, and NATO broadly, seems to be: there is a real risk of “nuclear armageddon”, as Biden put it, but there is nothing we can do about it and we can’t let it influence our approach to the war in Ukraine.
My
@chathamhouse
colleagues and I have a written a research paper on Europe after the coronavirus. It’s a little different from most analysis that has focused on divergence and debt mutualization in the eurozone (“coronabonds” etc.). 1/8
New Paper
The Future of Democracy in Europe
Whatever its political system, no country in Europe seems to be immune from the current crisis of liberal democracy.
@hanskundnani
investigates the nature of the problem, and asks what part, if any, digital technology plays in it
I am not sure that power within the EU is really shifting to the east as many think. But if it is, what this means is a (further) political shift of the EU to the right.
Will this cause tension between France and Germany - or it is exactly what Germany wants because it can use French nuclear power and at the same time think of itself as post-nuclear?
French President Emmanuel Macron has announced the construction of six new nuclear reactors — a long-anticipated move to ramp up the country's long-term energy-production capacity.
My challenge to speechwriters, leaders speaking at next week's UN general assembly – & to all of us. To defeat nationalist populism, we need a language that speaks to the heart and not just to the head:
@BJMbraun
I’ve said for a long time that the Greens (or at least a current within the Greens) are the closest thing in German politics to neocons. This has become even clearer since 7 October.
We are delighted to publish this paper by Philip Manow today. Developing the work of
@rodrikdani
, it explains the heterogeneity of populism in Europe as a function of different political economy models and the shocks produced by "hyper-globalization".
It never ceases to amaze me how so many foreign policy analysts on both sides of the Atlantic casually refer to “Europe” without further explanation as if it was a clearly defined unitary actor and it was obvious what they meant by it.
Very good article by
@AmitavAcharya
in the new issue of
@IAJournal_CH
on the racist origins of the “liberal international order” - should be read especially by those in the American and European Blobs who idealize it.
"The word 'Europeans' seems to appear for the first time in an eighth-century reference to Charles Martel's victory [over Islamic forces] at Tours." Roberts, The Triumph of the West (1985), cited in Gieben/Hall, Formations of Modernity (1992)
Especially important point that seems to get lost in the current debate: Russia may escalate not because we have crossed some red line by providing Ukraine with a particular weapons system but rather because of the progress that the Ukrainians are making on the ground.
@JeremyCliffe
@TimothyDSnyder
It’s simply not true that it’s a “post-empire” project. European integration did not take place “after the imperial war was over”. Rather, they coincided - and European integration was initially a colonial project.
Here are a few thoughts on the term “pro-European”, which I have been criticised (by “pro-Europeans”) for using, even in quotes. It seems to me that the term is unproblematic – and by objecting to its use, “pro-Europeans” are trying to shut down debates about the EU. 1/10