Despite his tight control over internal propaganda and the police-state apparatus, Xi faces strong challenges to retaining his near-absolutist power, by Willy Wo-Lap Lam,
Write for us! Please pitch short form analyses on
#China
economics, domestic politics, international relations, security and defense, society and culture, environment, and tech to cbeditor
@jamestown
.org or click here for more details:
With the decline in bilateral relations between India and China,
@jppjagannath1
argues that future scenarios for transboundary water resource cooperation look increasingly dim, even as lack of clarity and communication ramp up uncertainty.
More:
New article!
Admiral Hu Zhongming: The Chinese Navy’s ‘Multi-Faceted’ New Leader, by
@rdmartinson88
"Admiral Hu's expertise in undersea warfare is considered crucial as the PLAN prepares for potential conflicts in East Asia."
Beijing is unlikely to deploy the PLA against Hong Kong protesters because it has a better option: surreptitiously stationing in the SAR Chinese police officers from neighboring Guangdong Province.
Willy Wo-Lap Lam explains:
With Xi likely to rule through at least 2032, Willy Lam postulates the sixth generation could be skipped entirely. As a result the promotion of seventh generation rising stars born in the 1970s bears special attention. Who are these 7G rising stars?
China's new Defense White Paper is the first since 2015. This paper reveals Beijing’s intentions to reshape the current architecture of the global order to accord with Beijing's interests.
@EBKania
and
@PeterWood_PDW
explain:
"If we seek to understand the People’s Republic of China, we must first endeavor to understand the CCP, its institutions, its policies, and its political terms."
@Anne_MarieBrady
explains how to understand united front work:
New article!
Implications of new security law "Article 23" on Hong Kong, by
@laiyanhoeric
"The law could be arbitrarily enforced against foreign businesses who merely seek to comply with the due diligence requirements of their home jurisdictions."
The PLA has little recent combat experience, but how much does it matter?
@EBKania
analyzes how the PLA is using emerging technologies to improve war-gaming and complex simulations to bridge this gap:
Have you read
@rdmartinson88
's in-depth look at the
#PLAN
's
#arctic
strategy? As China seeks to become a
#neararctic
power, knowledge of its regional military aspirations will be key.
You've heard of Confucius Institutes, but what about the Luban Workshops? A look at China's vocational and education training programs in Africa by Conor McCutcheon, Savannah Billman, Johnsen Romero and Merle Kartscher.
Xi is "likely to support Putin until the bitter end, preferring to prop up an authoritarian Russia as a sort of zombie great power, rather than risking a shift towards a more pluralistic Russia that is oriented toward the West" contends John Van Oudenaren
The PRC is increasingly focused on the need to master domestic production of advanced tech to eliminate “choke points”(卡脖子).
@michael_laha
looks at the role of National Engineering Technology Research Centers in this quest for high tech self-reliance.
James Leibold (
@jleibold
) examines the role of Hu Lianhe in CCP policy toward Xinjiang “re-education” camps, describing the emergence of a new, more coercive ethnic policy under Xi Jinping’s “New Era” of Chinese power. Read his expert analysis here -
The global proliferation of increasingly contagious COVID-19 variants, first delta and now Omicron, has increased the cost and decreased the efficacy of China’s “dynamic clearance” epidemic prevention policy per John S. Van Oudenaren.
The PRC’s declared expenditures on public opinion influence activities (including lobbying, public relations and media support) expanded dramatically in the United States in 2019-2020 and reached over $63.78 million in 2020, by
@johnddotson
,
New Report!
WuXi AppTec's ties to the CCP, by
@SunnyCheungky
@Arranjnh
@PLMattis
"WuXi is a model of embedding state ambition with corporate success, showcasing how biotechnology enterprises are playing a pivotal role in advancing the PRC’s objectives."
Prioritizing Putonghua at the expense of local languages has long been the way that bilingual education often works, even though education in local languages is not prohibited, by Alexandra Grey and
@gegentuul
,
Xi has taken a political hit from China’s mounting economic woes including ballooning government debt and falling revenues, banks runs, and mass youth unemployment observes Willy Wo-Lap Lam. Will China change course or double down on its old playbook?
Two influence operations have recently come to light in
#CzechRepublic
, one targeting media, and the other academia that highlight links between PRC security services and its external propaganda efforts explain Martin Hala
@JirousFilip
@otkur009
As twitter cracks down on Chinese propaganda accounts, we take a look back at the fundamentals of the PRC's multi-pronged
#UnitedFrontWork
with
@Anne_MarieBrady
: .
The new China Brief is out (and
@boweconstrictr
, fastest tweet in the West, shared it first)! We're proud to share a special issue on PRC united front influence operations.
Read it all here:
How the CCP Mobilized a Cross-Border Disinformation Campaign Against the Czech Senate Speaker, by Martin Hála, Filip Jirouš, and Petra Ševčíková
@sinopsiscz
-
Some of the PLA's biotech experts have made troubling references to “ethnic genetic attacks.” Read
@EBKania
and
@VornDick
's important analysis of PLA research on military applications of
#CRISPR
: .
New article!
Taiwan's security challenges, by
@MPWangTingyu
"The development of asymmetric military capabilities, including indigenous weapons systems, is crucial for Taiwan’s defense and deterrence strategies against potential aggression from the PRC"
A new issue of China Brief is out! Read about Xi Jinping's summer foreign policy tour, Sino-Indian relations in
@narendramodi
's 2nd term,
@lcrhsiao
on influence ops in Singapore, Russia-China and the INF, and
@ToshiYoshihara
on China's nuclear strategy:
The PLA has little recent combat experience, but how much does it matter?
@EBKania
analyzes how the PLA is using emerging technologies to improve war-gaming and complex simulations to bridge this gap:
New piece on China’s evolving National Security Commission (NSC) system by
@jwuthnow
. Unlike US NSC which is a standalone body, China’s Central NSC is “the highest echelon in a nationwide system that includes subordinate NSCs down to the county level.”
Read: "Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang’s Coercive Labor Placement Systems” by
@adrianzenz
. Examines implications of shift from mobilizational to more institutionalized/monitored forms of labor placement in
#Xinjiang
The PLA’s enlisted force has evolved considerably over the decades. Ken Allen tracks the evolution of PLA conscription and recruitment, and considers the implications of recent changes for training and readiness.
TikTok: A Threat to US National Security
Details the company's:
> Ties to the party-army-state
> History of trying to manipulate narratives and info
> Capability to influence mass sentiment
> Potential illegal actions in handling user data
New article!
Cryptocurrency in China, by Matthew Fulco
//Chinese gangs are reportedly using cryptocurrency to launder profits from drug dealing – fentanyl in particular – and illicit gambling and often have been able to evade authorities.//
New today! In “As Rival Factions Gain Traction, Xi Seeks to Secure Support from the Military”, Willy Lam examines Xi’s recent PLA promotion spree in the context of CCP elite politics.
#China
#Politics
The PLA is developing, testing and deploying new missiles. Yuan-Chou Jing and Yi-Ren Lai examine the implications of China's increasingly large and diverse missile arsenal for
#Taiwan
and the broader region.
The PLA Navy has changed how it interacts w/US forces in the Western Pacific embracing an "approach that favors hostile encounters as preparation for future conflict" AKA "using the enemy to train the troops"(拿敌练兵) write
@rdmartinson88
@KennedyMaritime
Who will sit with Xi on the PRC's de facto top leadership body- the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC)? Willy Lam examines prospects for current members Li Keqiang and Zhao Leji to stay on, and assess top candidates' chances for promotion.
"The Day After Tiananmen". A special
@ChinaBriefJT
issue on human rights in the PRC, and why they matter more than ever for China, for the US, and for the rest of the world. With articles by Joseph YS Cheng,
@adrianzenz
,
@harvardian
, and
@ElliottZaagman
New Issue is out! We cover: PLA Diplomacy key institutions/ personnel; China’s Hidden Debt; The Long-Shadow of the China-India War; The Campaign to Study the 20th Party Congress; Taiwan’s Search for a Grand Strategy
Without term limits, Xi Jinping may lead China for decades. The next CCP leaders may not come from the next-in-line 6th generation but rather the 7th generation. Willy Wo-Lap Lam identifies some names to watch in the 7th gen CCP:
.
@EBKania
: the
#PLA
is trying to innovate in peacetime in spite of not having much combat experience. They are trying to learn without fighting through advanced wargaming, military science research, and simulations.
New Issue is out!- We cover- Xi accelerates China’s Drive for Self-Sufficiency; China’s Amplification of Russian Bioweapons Disinfo; Predicting the Next Central Military Commission; China’s Ukraine Dilemma; Coercive Labor in Xinjiang
Coming June 5th: "The Day After Tiananmen". A special
@ChinaBriefJT
issue looking at human rights in the PRC, and why they matter more than ever for China, for the US, and for the rest of the world.
A new wave of domestic criticism of "foreign aid" may signal China's ready to clip the wings of Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative.
@tombschrader
explains why.
ICYMI: Discussion on China-Russia strategic partnership this AM. We focus on three areas: leader/elite ties; security and arms sales; overlap in Africa and Central Asia. Thanks Pavel Baev
@MeiaNouwens
and
@sergeysukhankin
for sharing your insights!
What does 2022 have in store for relations between
#China
and
#India
and the boundary dispute?
@jppjagannath1
previews what could be a tempestuous year in the Himalayas.
Why have the CCP’s efforts to develop influence in the Czech Republic courted controversy? Read “Borrowed Boats Capsizing: State Security Ties to CCP Propaganda Laundering Rile Czech Public” by Martin Hala
@JirousFilip
&
@otkur009
to learn more
New Issue is out! We examine China's new Historic "Leap" Narrative; Bleak Views of US Society in Official PRC Accounts; Graft and Anti-Corruption in Yunnan Province; Gen-Z Wary of China in Kazakhstan; Beijing's Stake in DPRK Denuclearization
China's Orwellian surveillance programs in
#Xinjiang
,
#Tibet
, and
#HK
have their roots in anti-religion and population control policies that date far back. Read
@emiledirks
's article on the grassroots development of surveillance practices in the PRC.
Confucius Institutes have built overlooked ties with US businesses. Most links seem innocuous and may be beneficial, but cause new concern about growing CCP influence in schools, economies, and political systems. Read from
@Sarah_G_Cook
and Flora Yan:
The Chinese Communist Party believes it is engaged in a global struggle for China’s “image sovereignty," with the Internet being a central battleground.
@RyanFedasiuk
writes:
Look out for our new
@adrianzenz
report out this Friday, detailing ongoing forced labor in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and throughout the PRC in 2023-2024 👇
"Forced labor still haunts Xinjiang, report finds."
POLITICO reports in advance on new research I am publishing, demonstrating that Xinjiang's forced labor situation has continued to intensify, based on new evidence from early 2023 to early 2024: 🧵
The new China Brief is out! Read on Li Peng's legacy, the PLA threat in Hong Kong,
@Mr_JohnFoulkes
and
@howardgwang
on the Ream naval base in Cambodia,
@EBKania
on New Era military reforms, and
@ZiYangResearch
with part 2 of PLA mental health
James Leibold (
@jleibold
) examines the role of Hu Lianhe in CCP policy toward Xinjiang “re-education” camps, describing the emergence of a new, more coercive ethnic policy under Xi Jinping’s “New Era” of Chinese power. Read his expert analysis here:
United front work in the Xi Jinping era involves 1) controlling the Chinese diaspora, 2) co-opting foreigners to support CCP objectives, 3) promoting a pro-PRC message globally, and 4) supporting the BRI.
@Anne_MarieBrady
explains:
The Group of 7 may soon include South Korea, Australia and India. What does this mean for China on the world stage, given its continued exclusion from the group?
Read more by
@jppjagannath1
:
New China Brief is out! Feat
@matthew_brazil
on China's counterintel "trinity",
@andrewpolk81
on an important, overlooked new financial body,
@Johanv91
on why Belt and Road may not match the hype, and
@tombschrader
on the end of China's "Singapore model"
Samantha Hoffman (
@He_Shumei
) offers new insight into the CCP’s development of a social credit system to fuse social and political control and expand the global reach of China’s economy. Read more here -
New book alert! Willy Lam's "The Fight for China's Future" assesses Xi Jinping's leadership style and use of emerging technology to influence civil society. Important summer reading for China watchers
@ChinaBriefJT
Editor John Dotson: Hong Kong has shown that the “One Country, Two Systems” framework serves as a cover for the gradual subversion of any institutions that stand in the way of the CCP's exercise of untrammeled authority. Read more:
Other developing countries in Asia and Africa are likely to draw lessons from China's role in Sri Lanka's economic crisis. Read "China and Sri Lanka’s Debt Crisis: Belt and Road Initiative Blowback" by Sudha Ramachandran
The Chinese Communist Party denies the existence of reeducation camps for ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang.
@adrianzenz
’s explores the size and the origins of the camp network in
@ChinaBriefJT
's special issue on human rights in the PRC.
In addition to 2 million paid internet commentators, the CCP draws on more than 20 million part-time volunteers to engage in internet trolling.
@RyanFedasiuk
writes:
The PRC says its Uighur detainment camps are for “vocational training”. But PRC government budgets tell a different story. With
#UPR
on the horizon,
@adrianzenz
shows that Xinjiang is spending its money on prisons, not schools.