Brookings scholar on China, Taiwan, Asia. Sr Advisor at The Scowcroft Group, McLarty Associates. Husband to Meredith and father of four. Author of “Stronger.”
1/ This scoop provides important texture to meeting in Rome tomorrow. It feels like the US-China relationship is moving toward a pretty significant fork. If China materially contributes to Russia's war machine in Ukraine through provision of materiel or significant backfilling...
The US is preparing to tell its allies in Europe and Asia amid signs that China may be willing to help Putin.
Comes as US national security adviser Jake Sullivan is about to meet top Chinese foreign policy official Yang Jiechi in Rome on Monday. Alaskaesque fireworks?
When Japanese friends are saying this, US needs to listen and adjust: “we no longer see the US rally allies around values — we fear that they are using countries as pawns, as bargaining chips. This kind of insecurity is very new and very disconcerting.”
1/ As Xi and Putin prepare to meet in Beijing in the coming hours, I expect there will be a new wave of commentary about how Beijing might see benefits from a Russia-Ukraine conflict. I would advise interrogating those arguments a bit. Here's why:
1/ Whether you are a Cold War historian or a casual observer of the news, I commend this written debate to you. In a series of crisp exchanges, four leading experts make their case for whether the US and China are in a cold war. (Short thread)
1/ I applaud President Biden's diplomacy with Xi. This is critical moment. Will be important for both sides in coming days to maintain discipline in avoiding actions that could set the US-China relationship on a sharply adversarial course. via
@whitehouse
1/ Debates over the US-China-Russia triangle are likely to intensify in the coming weeks. Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine will provide the spark, but lingering US frustration at the current strategic geometry – 50 years after Nixon’s visit to China – will add fuel to debates.
1/ I do not begrudge military leaders working internally to build urgency to bolster deterrence in Taiwan Strait. That is their contribution to US national strategy. I do have qualms about a deeper issue of undisciplined public messaging, though. Thread.
1/
@SecBlinken
delivered China speech May 26. Chinese media did not give much coverage to speech. Chinese censors blocked its circulation. There was not much discussion of speech inside China. 3 weeks later, China released an official 25,000 word, 80-page rebuttal. Why? A thread.
Truly honored to steward
@BrookingsChina
through its next phase alongside such a talented team. Looking forward to championing our team's efforts to develop original recommendations for navigating challenges and deepening understanding of China in US.
1/ There are a lot of false binaries for evaluating China's approach to Russia/Ukraine (e.g., are China and Russia allies, will China mediate, is it possible to drive a wedge between China and Russia...) The answer to all of these questions is no. These are the wrong questions.
1/ Against the backdrop of
@SpeakerPelosi
's arrival in Taipei, there are several events in motion. Proximately, Beijing appears to have begun responding through economic measures against Taiwan. There also are reports of cyber operations directed against Taiwan. (Thread).
1/ Beijing's response to international pressure over its posture on Russia's invasion of Ukraine is instructive. Key elements seem to include reaching out to Global South, staying close with Gulf countries, standing by Russia, and seeking some solidarity with BRICS countries.
2/...then China's actions will accelerate the cleavage of the world in direction of adversarial blocs. It's wise for US to speak directly and privately w/ Chinese at authoritative level now to clarify the lasting strategic ramifications of China's decisions in this moment...
Encouraged to see US defense leaders decline opportunity to speculate on timelines for war in Taiwan Strait. Much better for US to project determination to uphold peace and stability than anxiety about hypothetical future dates of conflict.
3/ I do not expect there will be fireworks at meeting or any breakthroughs coming out of it. The results may take weeks or longer to come into focus. Neither side likely to provide other w/ satisfaction. Outcomes may need to be measured in degrees, not black/white binaries. END.
11.6 million Chinese college graduates this year will flood into an economy with 19.6% youth unemployment rate.
I hope the US finds ways to encourage bright Chinese students to come to US for graduate study, work; would generate windfall dividends.
1/ The Biden administration's announcement last Friday of new export controls on semiconductor chips and tools to China was a significant event and a calculated gamble. It reflected a judgment that US leverage is a depreciating asset and that bold action is needed now. (Thread)
The fact that China's borders remain pretty closed and Xi hasn't left China since January 2020 feels like an underappreciated variable in understanding events inside China these days.
US-PRC relations are off track. Risks of conflict are rising, while benefits from the relationship for American and Chinese citizens are receding. Ideological arguments don't carry answers. Evidence-based, interest-driven thinking is needed.
1/ A few quick reflections on diplomacy around the Chinese spy balloon incident:
The US has done a good job raising intl awareness of the systemic nature of PRC balloon operations around the world and building support for the principle of protecting sovereign airspace. (thread)
Former Treasury Sec. Paulson flags structural shortcomings in China's economy and suggests China needs to adjust course. This may be easier said than done. China's economic woes are an accumulation of years of choices under Xi to assert tighter control.
2/ I suspect China's leaders feel less isolated on world stage than many in West suspect. Saudi Arabia reportedly plans to host Xi for visit. No BRICS countries have condemned Russia's invasion. Wang Yi reportedly may visit India soon. Chinese outreach to Global South increasing.
1/ I expect
@SpeakerPelosi
will proceed with reported plans to visit Taiwan in August. Nobody can credibly argue Pelosi is soft in the face of PRC pressure. She has a long and clear record on China. (Thread)
1/ It has been striking to observe the amount of Kremlinology that has gone into decoding the protocol arrangements for
@SecBlinken
's visit to Beijing, and also how much of it has lacked context or accuracy.
1/ Chinese Politburo member Yang Jiechi delivered a speech last night to the Natl Committee on US-China Relations. Yang's presentation provides a cautionary example of ineffective diplomacy. The following observations are intended in a constructive spirit.
Beijing and Taipei joined APEC and WTO in tandem. It would be a major setback if Beijing moves down the path toward CPTPP ahead of Taipei. Will be important for Taipei to gain support from any member who expresses support for considering PRC accession.
While it’s hard to know precise numbers, it is clear COVID is tearing through China’s population. China’s capacity to manage this challenge well is in America’s and the world’s interest. Sending best wishes to Chinese people and friends living in China.
1/ I'm unpersuaded Beijing is launching any charm offensive. It is not altering policy positions or increasing incentives to others. Xi is returning to the world stage after several years at home for COVID control and consolidation of power. (short thread)
I encourage those who believe they are helping Taiwan by hyping the threat of war to read this op-Ed. Hyping the threat does Beijing’s work for it, including by making it harder for Taiwan to attract foreign capital it needs for sustained growth.
(1 of 2) Time will tell, but my expectation is that China's cautious response to Hamas's attack on Israel will expose the limits of PRC influence in the region. Beijing historically has been wary of being drawn into taking sides. I don't expect that will change now.
China's violation of US airspace with its spy balloon has sharpened the distinction between US leaders who are capable of addressing challenges with calm, poise, and strength versus anxiety and anger. We will face bigger challenges from China in the future. Leadership matters.
I am honored to have the opportunity to serve in the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies
@BrookingsFP
.
@RichardBushIII
has set a very high standard in his research on Taiwan that I will do my utmost to uphold.
via
@BrookingsInst
1/ I've received questions about how the USG should respond to China's lists of diplomatic demands. My suggestion - push the list back across the table, thank them for the effort of organizing their thinking on their priorities...(thread)
via
@politico
This is a troubling trend for America’s long-term competitiveness. The global competition for top Chinese talent is intensifying. America weakens its attractiveness to this talent at peril to its own long-term innovative capacity.
1/ Xi Jinping delivered a speech yesterday at the opening of the Boao Forum. It offers insight into some of the key messages the Chinese leadership appears to be trying to drive forward (a short summary analysis):
9/ In other words, China is in a diplomatic jam. It would face difficulties and unwelcome turbulence from a conflict in Ukraine, but at the same time it wants to preserve strong relations with Russia and it does not want to do the U.S. any favors. END.
1/ I have received several inquiries lately about Chinese MFA spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s rhetoric and tweets, mostly along the lines of what is driving his antics and whether they should be seen as an aberration or a new normal.
Even though it doesn’t have the sizzle of arguments about China’s coming domination or imminent collapse, I continue to stand by the view that China will be an enduring but constrained competitor for the US for the foreseeable future.
Commentary on China continuously cycles between "ah China is going to take over the world" and "China is a paper dragon and collapsing." We've clearly entered into the latter phase once again.
Taiwan had been working to Elon-proof their security for considerable time. They recognize they cannot afford to depend upon Musk or Starlink in event of crisis. Musk’s interests are not the same as Taiwan’s.
Rep. Mike Gallagher writes to Elon Musk, following meetings in Taiwan: “I understand that SpaceX is possibly withholding broadband internet services in and around Taiwan — possibly in breach of SpaceX’s contractual obligations with the U.S. government."
Had an opportunity to catch up and compare notes with the most discerning and careful reader of my work, my soon-to-be 99 year old grandmother. She is my inspiration. Happy birthday, Grandma!
1/ China's dispatch of 150 warplanes through Taiwan's ADIZ in recent days has attracted a fair bit of attention. A key question for policymakers going forward will be how best to respond to Beijing's deliberately visible pressure on Taiwan. A few quick thoughts...
5/ US and EU should not offer concessions to China to compel caution and prudence on Russia/Ukraine, but should make clear in a matter-of-fact way that PRC's decisions now will determine what range of trajectories for China's relations with West will be available in the future.
I'm old enough to remember when a PRC leader said China should strive to create a credible, lovable, and respectable image and improve how it tells its story in order to make friends.
I guess when China is digging its own hole, we shouldn't fight it for the shovel.
1/ There are times when the pendulum of national power swings decisively. The collapse of the Soviet Union would be the clearest example. As an analytic matter, I'm skeptical that China is experiencing - or soon will - a similarly dramatic pendulum swing. (brief thread)...
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen responding to PRC live-fire military exercises near Taiwan: "We are calm and will not act in haste. We are rational and will not act to provoke. But we will absolutely not back down."
1/ I've received several inquiries asking why Beijing has not sent a congratulatory message to President-elect Biden. My take: First, Beijing recognizes Trump will be president for two more months. Beijing has incentive to try to avoid being in Trump's political crosshairs.
These statements and warnings by top US intelligence officials are important.
They also are distinct from the pundit parlor game of predicting dates or anniversaries when China plans to employ force. Conditions, not dates, will drive decisions.
From bad to worse in Hong Kong. Deeply troubling development. Beijing doesn’t even seem to be pretending to care about “one country, two systems” anymore, based on the MFA spokesperson’s comment.
9/ If China’s leaders demonstrate deafness to these requests, then their inaction would have more impact on China’s standing in West than any efforts to lump China and Russia together as common foes would. We should be sharpening China's choices, not making them easier. END.
Key takeaway - US-China trade war tariffs resulted in collateral damage to the U.S. economy without pressuring China to change its economic policies. US consumers absorbed increased costs. MNCs did not depart China…
It would be good for US officials to get out of business of speculating publicly on China’s timelines on Taiwan and speak instead to America’s enduring interests and its resolute, steady determination to uphold those interests in Taiwan Strait.
5/ Chinese officials also recognize that Beijing will be found guilty by association if Russia invades Ukraine after Putin's meeting with Xi. China will suffer significant reputational damage, especially in Europe and the US, for being seen as Russia's enabler.
1/ Given President Biden's statement on Taiwan yesterday, there seems to be interest today in what the "one-China policy" is, how it differs from China's "one-China principle," and why the distinction matters. In that spirit, here are a few useful resources (short thread).
6/ A Russian invasion likely would not do Beijing any favors on Taiwan.
Conversely, it could cause the US to show greater strength in the Pacific so that China doesn’t draw any wrong lessons from Putin’s incursion, perhaps a bit akin to events at start of Korean War.
3/ If Russia starts war and PRC allows itself to become seen as a witting enabler, Beijing risks finding itself aligned with weakest other major power and hastening the process of hedging by other key actors (EU, UK, India, Japan, Australia, etc.). See:
This profile of Raimondo’s recent trip to China will generate discussion. It raises the question of whether a China under distress will be more or less amenable to cooling tensions with US and West.
1/ President Biden made headlines last night over comments in a CNN town hall that the United States would come to Taiwan's defense if it is attacked.
A few quick thoughts on what Biden's comments may mean and what they likely do not.
Delighted to welcome Director
@ryanl_hass
back to Taiwan. I’m confident that under the guidance of Director Hass & his delegation – all leading scholars – the
@BrookingsInst
will further enhance its expertise on Taiwan & help to deepen the
#Taiwan
-
#US
friendship.
Sharing a thought-provoking piece by
@yuenyuenang
arguing that the crux of US-China competition is over which country's political system will better be able to address it domestic shortcomings to unlock the potential of its people.
@NoemaMag
1/ This feels like an issue that deserves more attention.
The last time we ran the experiment of understanding China from afar in 1950s-60s, it didn't serve us well. (Short thread)
3/ If past is prologue, such efforts by Beijing may help demonstrate to a domestic audience that PRC is "teaching Taiwan a lesson," but they likely will further sour public opinion in TW toward China. PRC cost-imposition efforts toward TW reliably undermine PRC's appeal in Taiwan
2/ Importantly, the PRC response will not be measurable in the moment, but will be counted by an accumulation of actions over period of time. Beijing will seek to show TW people that there are risks and consequences for relying on US instead of working with Beijing.
1/ The Biden administration has been smart to keep expectations low for
@SecBlinken
's upcoming trip to Beijing. I do not anticipate there will be any breakthroughs, big deliverables, or dramatic gestures. That is not the purpose of the visit. (short thread)
4/ At the same time, China’s focus this year is on Olympics and Party Congress. Beijing wants stability and predictability. They will not welcome foreign turbulence.
Unsurprisingly, Chinese officials are calling for steps to lower tensions and implement the Minsk agreement.
5/ The Chinese system is not agile when caught off guard and pushed into a defensive posture. PRC diplomats are sensitive to perceptions of weakness in defense of national honor. This sometimes feeds cycles of reactive assertiveness that undermines their broader strategic goals.
How serious is risk of war over Taiwan? What is most important variable for Taiwan's future? How will Taiwan's elections play out? Is US policy toward Taiwan changing?
Thanks
@davidrdollar
for hosting Richard Bush and me to discuss. via
@BrookingsInst
A benefit of Biden's and his team's experience with China is that they will be able to skip both the early "I think I can charm China's leaders" phase and the phase of reflexive alarm about the pace of China's rise. They know what they're dealing with from PRC, both good and bad.
China is seeking a meeting of its top diplomat with senior Biden aides to explore a Xi/Biden summit. It plans to align discussions with Biden priorities such as pandemic and climate change. No more "we will buy more soybeans." With
@bobdavis187
via
@WSJ
1/ Recommend pairing this important piece by
@ChuBailiang
with the slew of recent pieces by other Chinese scholars, such as Fu Ying, Jie Dalei, Huang Jing, etc., to get a feel for a core tension that Chinese policymakers are grappling with.
David’s brilliance as a scholar was only surpassed by his kindness, warmth, curiosity, love for family, and generosity to friends. He was such a wonderful friend and colleague. His memory will be a blessing for everyone lucky enough to have spent time with him.
Brookings is deeply saddened by the passing of Senior Fellow David Dollar. David was exceptional in every way—a world-renowned expert, and tremendous friend and colleague.
Our thoughts are with his loved ones. He will be deeply missed.
1/ In recent days, the odds of a bilateral meeting between President Biden and President Xi on the margins of the APEC leaders' meeting in November appear to be rising. (short thread)
Are the United States and China “destined” for Cold War-like rivalry? Join us to debate the merits and drawbacks of such framing. Featuring
@jessicacweiss
,
@Joe_Nye
,
@patricia_m_kim
, Matt Turpin, and
@Dimi
moderating. This will be a rich discussion.
8/ China also maintains good relations with Ukraine. Xi sent congratulatory letter to Zelensky in January. Ukraine is an important supplier of foodstuffs and other equipment to China, and China is Ukraine's top trading partner.
I really hope
@statedeptspox
cleans up this egregious statement, shuts down any hint that U.S. policy animated by racial theories of strategic competition. Focus on differences with CCP leadership, not with non-Caucasian nature of Chinese people.
1/ I am puzzled by NSC’s decision to declassify the USG strategic framework for the Indo-Pacific. In so doing, they treat the document as their own intellectual property, rather than as an enduring USG framework for the Biden administration to build on.
10/ Xi isn’t going to change Putin’s calculus on Ukraine. The test will be how Beijing responds to events there. In the coming weeks, we likely will learn a lot about U.S.-China relations, and China’s view of its role in the world, for the coming years. END.
3/ This raises the premium for Western unity in addressing China on its approach to Russia/Ukraine. Planned April 1 EU-China Summit will be an important event. Would be helpful for Beijing to hear a message from EU leaders that rhymes with what Biden conveyed to Xi last week.
Good to see General Brown speak with such precision and clarity on Taiwan at Brookings — Chinese attack on Taiwan not ‘imminent’ or ‘inevitable’ and predicting it unhelpful to Pentagon readiness: US general | South China Morning Post
1/ President Biden generated headlines with comments that the US has a commitment to come to Taiwan's defense in event of attack. He also said there is no change to America's policy. I take him at face value that he believes both of these things to be true. A couple of thoughts:
6/ Beijing’s aspiration to become a geo-economic power requires functional relations with West. Beijing has its own incentives to avoid full rupture with West over Russia/Ukraine. Self-sufficiency and deepening ties with developing world are important, but not a substitute. END.
Evan Medeiros exposes weaknesses in arguments about China as a peaking power and warns of the risks of basing policy on concepts that lack understanding of Beijing’s self-perception of its own situation.
7/ A Russian invasion also could generate negative consequences for Chinese hi-tech companies, particularly if Russia gets designated with foreign direct product rule and Chinese firms are swept up in US secondary sanctions and lose access to Western equipment and investment.
2/ China clearly has chosen to tilt toward Russia following Russia's invasion and in spite of Moscow's barbarism in Ukraine. Chinese spokespeople's justifications for Russian behavior and Chinese official media's amplification of Russian disinformation has been notable.
1/ The core premise of this piece by
@IanPrasad
is that public opinion on China is bad, so therefore political leaders are becoming locked into a hostile policy. I think the premise is wrong and the narrative undergirding it is out of date. (short thread)
6/ US and Chinese officials remain in direct communication. Ditto for US and Taiwan officials. That is a good thing. The odds of uncontrolled escalation diminish when both sides are able to have candid private conversations and clarify the intentions of other side's actions.
7/ The coming period may be bumpy. It will be important for officials to remain in direct contact, for each side to exercise discipline, and focus on preserving peace and stability in Taiwan Strait. Smarts, not flexes of strength, will be needed to navigate this period. END
Sharing a few brief thoughts on how the US might be able to use Beijing's overreaction to Speaker Pelosi's visit to strengthen Taiwan, bolster US-Taiwan relations, and work to add stability over time to cross-Strait relations. via
@ForeignAffairs
1/ Passing along a short piece making the case for America to approach competition with China from a position of confidence that is borne of awareness of US advantages and of China’s own strengths and vulnerabilities. via
@ForeignAffairs
I am not a fan of Huawei, but I recognize it isn't going away. Neither is China.
US policies aren't going to "kill Huawei" or hasten regime collapse in China. We need a smarter, reality-based approach for dealing w/ PRC.
via
@YahooFinance
5/ Now is the time for sharpening Beijing’s choices. This does not mean concessions or softening approach to PRC. Rather, it requires Beijing seeing a path remaining open for less hostile relations with West, and significant risks for being linked to Russia’s recklessness.
9/ The Biden administration has been wise not to take the bait and get locked into insult contest with Beijing. They have instead focused on more productive pursuits, e.g., tightening unity with allies and partners on PRC. Latest examples - G7 statement, NATO strategic concept.
4/ Some may argue Beijing already made this choice. I would caution against assuming such pre-destiny. It's not in US interest for China to conclude it has no alternative but to tether itself fully to Russia. China-Russia relations now are unnaturally close by historic standards.
Young Chinese citizens demonstrating bravery in calling for reforms inside China. I hope US government maintains discipline to keep the story on events inside China. USG outspokenness would give PRC leadership opportunity to deflect anger away from them.
7/ The stakes are too high for undisciplined public messaging on Taiwan. This scattershot of statements and clarifications is confidence-deflating at a time when it is imperative for the US to be projecting steady, confident determination to uphold peace and stability. END.
2/ Fixating on US-China-Russia triangle may be the wrong lens for examining events. If there is war in Ukraine, and if China actively attempts to shield Russia from global condemnation, then China may spur a self-harming solidification of blocs.