Thrilled to have
@ciamac
join
@paradigm
as a Research Advisor!
@ciamac
is a Columbia finance professor and quant who is one of the sharpest and most practical researchers I've met
He coauthored the LVR papers, which set the gold standard for influential academic DeFi research
New paper alert!
We propose a novel AMM design that seeks to address two interrelated questions (1) how should an AMM set the trading fee? (2) How can an AMM mitigate LVR / liquidity provided losses to arbs.
It's a sad time to be a
@Columbia
faculty member.
Abandoning principles of academic free expression, our administration has decided to double down on censorship and McCarthyism under a pretext of "safety".
@NadiaAbuElHaj1
explains:
Longer block times lead to less CEX/DEX MEV per second but more atomic MEV per second.
I’m aware that the profit formulae imply otherwise, but looking at just the math misses the sequential nature of the availability of information.
1/5
New version of our paper on the economics of liquidity provision in automated market marking, clearer conceptual presentation along with some empirical results 👇🏼
So
@jason_of_cs
,
@ciamac
,
@Tim_Roughgarden
and I posted an update to our paper on automated market makers and loss-versus-rebalancing! Here's the abstract and link!
Diving deeper into data gives us the bigger picture.
Tomorrow, our data researchers,
@xin__wan
&
@austinadams10
will sit down with Columbia Professor
@ciamac
to discuss is work at Columbia, dark pools, impermanent loss, and more 👀
🚀 Optimal Dynamic Fees for Blockchain Resources: Introducing a new framework for designing dynamic fee mechanisms for multiple network resources. (Codename: Endgame 1559)
Joint work with
@ciamac
and
@Qiaoqiao2001
from the DRO division at Columbia GSB.
TL;DR & link in 🧵👇
Why not show users loss-versus-rebalancing? Fees-LVR accurately estimates (delta-hedged) liquidity provider P&L. It's actually not difficult to account for.
3/ Today, historic price, volume, and token info are scattered across different sources, and it's difficult to account for liquidity depth and divergence loss.
That changes today.
Inspired by a trading terminal, the Liquidity Terminal places data LPs need at their fingertips.
2/ The goal is to understand the impact of fees on arbitrage trading against AMMs, and use this as quantitative guidance to understand how to set fees and how to design AMMs to minimize the MEV extracted by arbs and tradeoffs therein.
13/ This is consistent with the observations of many (e.g.,
@0x94305
@MaxResnick1
) that faster blocks are an easy way to mitigate DEX MEV, perhaps at the cost of reducing decentralization.
800K doses delivered, 337K used, leaves 463K doses remaining. Of these, 253K are needed for dose 2. That leaves 210K remaining. NYC is doing 25K/day of dose 1.That leaves about 8 days of supply. OTOH If they are proactively holding back dose 2, that leaves about 4 days of supply.
5/ Under the assumption of Poisson block generation, our first result is to solve for the steady state distribution of the DEX-CEX mispricing, which follows a jump diffusion process. This allows us to quantify the probability of the no-trade region.
This is an interesting question! My intuition is that arb profits/LVR in an AMM can be viewed as a (liquidity weighted) continuously sampled realized variance. Some geometric intuition for that below.
Let me try to settle the question of block times and profits of CEX-DEX arbitrageurs. Arbs' profits are LOWER but LESS volatile with shorter block times. LPs' losses to arbs thus are also lower but more certain when blocks are produced faster... [1/n]
6/ We show that, if fees are gamma and mean interblock time is Delta t, the probability that a block contains a trade (the probability of being outside the no trade region) takes a simple form:
3/ The starting point is LVR, i.e., how much do DEX LPs lose to DEX-CEX arb in an idealized setting, trading in continuous time (no discrete blocks) and with no trading fees
@paulg
Yes, you are following noise. PredictIt prices didn't even satisfy basic arbitrage relationships. There are too many fees/restrictions and basically no professionals in this market, pure noise trading.
@lpachter
@lexfridman
And how can he interview Joscha Bach
@Plinz
with no mention or discussion of his long term funding and support from pedophile Jeffrey Epstein?
4/ What happens when we incorporate discrete block generation and trading fees? Both are frictions that impact arbitrage trade. Fees create a “no-trade” region, where although the DEX and CEX prices differ, the mispricing does not exceed the fee and hence arbs don’t trade.
@MarketUrbanism
Tourists are a big problem in NYC, IMO. They impose congestion and other externalities. Maybe fewer tourists would be better, the city should optimize for it's residents.
1/ I promised a while ago a thread on how the losses of Uniswap LPs to arbs depend on fees, volatility and block times. But then got distracted - first with markouts, then Curve stablecoin, then FBAs, and then a Twitter space on AMMs.
Time to return to the topic eternal...
17/ One way to think about the choice of fee is through the framing of
@rithvikra0
and
@theshah39
: fees create a tradeoff between losing money to arbs and the accuracy of the pool prices.
The second talk from the Digital Finance Seminar Series
@Columbia_Biz
has been posted.
Watch
@ObadiaAlex
and
@0xQuintus
from Flashbots talk about "Why You Should Care About Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)":
7/ This probability depends on the fee measured in units of typical return (stdev) over half the interblock time. When fees are high or the interblock time is low, it becomes less likely that arbs can profit on any given block. For example:
Apparently too few citations in the work of
@timnitGebru
is a fireable offense at
@GoogleAI
. Why was she not allowed to see the review? Why not just admit she was fired? This statement makes no sense because it is PRed+lawyered nonsense.
I understand the concern over Timnit’s resignation from Google. She’s done a great deal to move the field forward with her research. I wanted to share the email I sent to Google Research and some thoughts on our research process.
11/ Note that there is an interesting discontinuity here: when fees are zero, arb profits are basically LVR — they do not vary much with the interblock time.
15/ Though LVR was developed assuming no fees and continuous trading, even with fees and discrete blocks, LVR is roughly the profit gross of fees of arbing the pool. Introducing fees simply changes how LVR is split and who earns it (arbs or pool LPs).
9/ The formulas simplify when fees are low and blocks are frequent (the “fast block” regime), in this case arb profits are simply LVR scaled down by the probability of trade.
@benedictevans
FB is not under any obligation to sue these specific academics in this instance. They are choosing to do so and the most likely explanation is not that they suddenly care about privacy.
@bertcmiller
Indeed a fun challenge! How about this: draw a graph with bundles as vertices, and an edge between bundles that share a transaction. Each "permutation" is an independent set:
I had a great chat with super-smart
@ciamac
on quant investing, the pros and cons of machine learning and how to think about trading frameworks from time horizons to costs. Oh and we talk bitcoin too :)
@ConorMcMenamin9
@0xEzon
@danrobinson
I'm not sure this answers the question, but if there are no fees, LVR (per unit time) is (to a first order) independent of the block time. If there are fees, LVR scales with sqrt(block time), and faster chains experience less LVR.
Crafting the Crypto Economy is hosted by
@CBER_Forum
members Fahad Saleh, a Professor of Finance at Wake Forest University, and Andreas Park (
@financeutm
), a Professor of Finance at the University of Toronto.
However, because there are many arbs competing, each arb cannot afford to wait and will trade on even the smallest profitable discrepancy, because if not others will trade and the opportunity will disappear.
The model in our paper is written as if the arb hedges on the CEX after each DEX trade. That said, I suspect it's optimal not to hedge on the CEX per trade at all. Instead, the CEX price is viewed as a "signal" for when to trade on the DEX and how much.
Three Columbia students sued the school in housing court saying they were illegally locked out of their dorms after being arrested or issued a citation at pro-Palestine protests
Story by
@ramseykhalifeh
for
@Gothamist
-
@WNYC
Insightful conmentary on the current situation at
@Columbia
from Prof. Michael Thaddeus (who first exposed
@Columbia
administration fraud in college rankings).
Bwog interviewed Columbia Professor Michael Thaddeus, whistleblower for the Columbia US News Scandal. Thaddeus spoke to us about his opinions regarding recent student protests and arrests. Read more.
The first talk from our Digital Finance Seminar Series
@Columbia_Biz
is up!
Watch
@ebudish
talk about "The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and Anonymous, Decentralized Trust on the Blockchain":
2. In our model, we get a specific sqrt(block time) dependence. I think that is tightly intertwined with our assumption of geometric Brownian motion, and does not factor in jumps. I believe the same story (DEX-CEX MEV per unit time decreasing with faster blocks) would hold ...
@stevecuozzo
@nypost
Hudson Yards is a mall that belongs in New Jersey. Terrible food (including the TAK room) and stores you can find in 20 other places in nyc. It is precisely what the city does not need. You have neither good taste nor good sense. I guess that’s why you write for the post.
@malleshpai
@akbarpour_
Here's a more subtle variation: accept the exploding offer from X. Once you have the offer from Y, go back to X saying "I accepted and I will stick to my word, but I am only coming for a year and then going to Y". I guarantee they will let you out of the commitment.
because of the convexity of the arb's payoff of waiting: if you wait longer and the mispricing increases, profits will be quadratic in the mispricing. If the mispricing decreases, the payoff is always bounded below by zero. Hence, there can be positive expected value to wait.
@benedictevans
Your argument makes no sense. All users consented to having their ads scraped by the extension. No data from other users was scraped. Because it was theoretically possible for the extension to violate other users privacy we should let facebook ads escape scrutiny?
@_charlienoyes
@paradigm
3/ Since the hedging strategy of (A) is clearly not the same as (B), for any fee you are better in the log-optimal constant proportion strategy than uniswap.
What am I missing? Thanks! END
@ChainsightLabs
@jason_of_cs
@Tim_Roughgarden
@AnthonyLeeZhang
It's also a way to consistently a universe of related instruments (e.g., different CFMM pools or liquidity products on the same or related assets) consistently ("no-arbitrage pricing" in finance parlance). 3/3
@benedictevans
You confirm exactly what I said. The app has theoretical access but actually does not do what you say. Check the source code if you disagree.
@0x94305
@MartinTassy
@danrobinson
Cool intuition, but I think you have to be careful with a continuous time model here, they can be misleading with fees ;)
@MartinTassy
@0x94305
@danrobinson
I think the logic is that when the pools coincide, it will only be one side of the market (eg the price to buy would be the same) so only half the flow would be on the coinciding direction, that flow would subsequently be split 50-50 between the two pools.
So, the question of "how does LVR depend on block time" is very similar to "how does discretely sampled realized variance depend on the time discretization"? This is a phenomena that's been studied in the microstructure/volatity literature.
@tarunchitra
Maybe a failure of all markets then. Perhaps it's just not worth it for sophisticated investors to invest a lot in realtime prediction to detect an election mispricing that can happen at best once every 4 years. Limits of arbitrage, etc.
The intuition from our model is that faster blocktimes increase the intensity of competition between arbs. If there was only a single monopolistic arb, and there was DEX-CEX price discrepancy exceeding the fee, that arb might wait for a larger DEX-CEX mispricing ...
@SebVentures
Note that the rebalancing strategy buys low and sells high. If prices go down and return to the same point, it makes money. If prices go up and return to the same point, it makes money also.
@_charlienoyes
@paradigm
1/ Sorry if this is a dumb question, but with respect to "can a uniswap portfolio do better than buy or hold", isn't it the case that under your assumptions:
@SebVentures
In the absence of fees,
LVR = rebalancing P&L - pool P&L
In your example, LVR >= 0 even if pool P&L is zero, since rebalancing P&L >= 0 if you return to the same price.
@bertcmiller
Unfortunately independent set problems (e.g., generating maximal independent sets, counting the number of independent sets, etc.) seem pretty hard in general.
@DaftaryNeel
@danrobinson
1. If there are external arbs competing, then the manager can outbid them, but will have to pay the value of the external arb to validators. So one way or the other the manager won't get the value of the external arb.
@GZuckerman
@RobinHoodNYC
Their business never made sense. Quant is a winner take all game with enormous increasing returns to scale. It’s not a good domain for “democratization”.
@SebVentures
Hi! You are right that the tracking error is small, but it does add up. In your example, if you start and end at the same price (and assuming no fees), you are right that the pool makes no money. However, in that scenario, the rebalancing strategy makes money.
@fleupold_
@0x94305
@hasufl
@CoWSwap
Cool idea! How do you prevent the solver from putting in private fake/wash transactions not available to other solvers to artificially inflate surplus?
@HashCurveKris
@AnthonyLeeZhang
@jason_of_cs
@Tim_Roughgarden
The idea is if you had run the "rebalancing strategy" instead of LPing, you would have made money in that scenario. In fact, in the absence of fees, rebalancing would dominate in any scenario. Appendix B.1 of the paper illustrates this in a binomial tree.
@_charlienoyes
@paradigm
(A) there is a dynamic hedging strategy that replicates the payoff of uniswap with a given fee (B) the optimal dynamic strategy for log utility is to hold a constant fraction in the risky asset (Merton problem)
@NicNiedermowwe
@AnthonyLeeZhang
@jason_of_cs
@Tim_Roughgarden
Absolutely correct! However, wouldn't it be better if the pool automatically adjusted and the LPs didn't have to do anything? Also current fee levels seem very coarse, and having different fee pool fragments liquidity and the end users now have to worry about routing.