Confused about Euro Area's long-term macro? Overwhelmed by negative consensus and headlines? Well, it's time to consider the long-term bull case for Europe. Chart-heavy 🧵 1/
EU “deindustrialization” makes headlines.
High energy costs, China’s rivalry and rising protectionism are strong headwinds.
But structural factors cannot fully explain the ongoing industrial recession.
What about ECB-induced domestic demand suppression and housing collapse? 1/
Italian politics pulls the rug under the ECB.
Draghi is expected to resign tomorrow. The "anti-fragmentation" tool was always going to stand on shaky foundation and relatively quiet Italian politics was a prerequisite for it to work. Some market panic seems in order
After 13 hours of waiting, the deed is done 👇
#Italy
’s Five Star Movement refuses to back Mario
#Draghi
’s government in a confidence vote Thursday, raising the prospect of a chaotic crisis in the middle of a war and of an energy crisis
@chiaraalbanese
1/
Where's the Italian
#austerity
so many people rant on about?? So much for
#Conte
's nonsense about
#Italy
's politics being "enslaved by finance"??
Spesa corrente al netto degli interessi *in livelli* non scende mai!
Il grafico in %PIL l'ho messo solo per ridere piu' forte 1/2
EU productivity “doom & gloom” excite pundits.
ECB supply pessimists worry about structural deterioration. But what if recent soggy productivity is telling us more about EU cyclical demand stagnation than anything else?
What if overly tight policy is the main drag now?
1/
But that's a policy “short-circuit”! Ironically, the ECB ends up exacerbating EU “deindustrialization” by hindering supply repair. At this stage, overly tight policy undermines an EA industry rebound and worsens the growth-inflation trade-off. 5/
But in the end, amid all EU policy defeatism (don't get me started on fiscal!) and talks of imminent industrial desertification, it's crucial to give back to demand factors the place they deserve. Parts of the supply side can only rebuild if demand is there to lead the way. END
The worst part of this is that ECB officials embraced structural “deindustrialization” (overlooking monetary policy and demand effects) to justify their “supply pessimism”: supply damage deemed permanent requires policy to further suppress aggregate demand to lower inflation 4/
Questa invece è la crescita cumulata dei principali componenti della spesa corrente del governo centrale al netto degli interessi... Mannaggia! ma tutto questo
#neoliberismo
non ci farà mica male?!
First, the fall in German and EA intermediate goods orders (most relevant for energy-intensive output), has been steeper than for other foreign orders. And it has continued despite the drop in energy/input costs, and easing supply bottlenecks.
Second, EA housing collapsed. 2/
What about the adage “housing is the business cycle”? Unlike for manufacturing, there's no doubt that surging interest rates are the main driver of EU's housing crisis.
And energy-intensive products (ceramics, glassware, metals, rubber, plastics...) are key building materials 3/
Moreover, Central Europe (CE) is emerging as relative winner, eroding German and EA market shares. Unlike in the EA, CE manufacturing has been booming. Energy cost differentials cannot explain this, but overall cost delta including labor and German-CE industry integration can 7/
With the bank turmoil of the past weeks investors have reawakened to credit risk. So far, banks’ exposure to Commercial Real Estate (CRE) has attracted most of the attention. But CRE is just one example of rate-sensitive, illiquid, opaque asset class. Little thread 1/
All this is not to downplay structural factors. Retail industrial energy prices lag spot prices and remain above pre-shock averages, but strong import substitution has dissipated. Surely, China’s turn to industrial rival compounds its own weaker demand for EA goods 6/
Commercial real estate prices in Europe are taking a serious bath: ~20% down in the last 12 month alone!
Banks in the Nordics but also in Spain, France, NL and Germany are quite exposed to the sector.
Central Banks can backstop liquidity issues, but can't do much about this
In sum, beyond a cyclical slowdown, the glass is half full for the EA economy and asset prices. Yield normalization, higher geopolitical risk in China and EMs and the new policy mix warrant a rebalancing in long-term asset allocation towards EA assets. END
Second, more active fiscal policy targeting productive investment areas is a seachange compared to pre-Covid decade-long public and private capex dearth 9/
Finally, higher rates increase the opportunity cost of ‘zombie lending’, reducing capital misallocation. Zombie firms have been a large source of aggregate productivity underperformance on the EA, especially vs the US 12/
No doubt, the old export-led EA growth model is dead. The EA is losing competitiveness. First, China is turning from key export market into industrial rival. A big problem for overexposed EA economies and firms 2/
Fourth, a high-pressure economy creates a macro environment conducive to higher productivity. In a nutshell, scarce labour pushes firms to become more efficient, while higher wages are an incentive for worker performance 11/
But crucially the end of the old EA/German export-led model based on domestic demand compression is good news! In fact, the big shift in EA policy mix since Covid is underappreciated, and it can even revive productivity 8/
China’s competitiveness gains in those very markets so far dominated by the EA have become a top policy objective (see “dual circulation” and “Made in China 2025”). The Green Transition has accelerated these developments 3/
First, the robust recovery of labor markets from the pandemic and the prospect of more frequent labor supply shortages are likely to push up average wage growth even after the current phase of inflation. This would provide a more solid backdrop for real incomes and consumption 9/
That said, current market narratives about EA long-term growth seem way too pessimistic. For starters, the EA is going to benefit from some “friendshoring” 7/
Ofc, there are risks: EU fiscal rules will improve vs pre-Covid, but they may still be too rigid in the long term; EA gov’ts have poor track record in spending structural funds; and unproductive but necessary spending (eg. military and pension expenditure) will grow, too 13/
This (quite long) thread is
#my2cents
on the output gap campaign
#CANOO
started by
@RobinBrooksIIF
and supported, among many others, by
@alan_tooze
and
@MESandbu
. Pls read it till the end. I don't want to be polemic. I'm just looking for answers (1/x)
Campaign against Nonsense Output Gaps (CANOO): all our
#CANOO
pieces are now freely available, thanks to
@MESandbu
for the push!
1/
#CANOO
overview:
2/ IMF, EC, OECD vs IIF gaps:
3/ Phillips curves & NAIRU:
This is it. In the short term there's no other viable approach and no stronger balance sheet than that of the sovereign. If the crisis extends, though, we need a credible lender of last resort for the EA to coordinate with.
#ECB
#Lagarde
#COVID
ー19
#coronavirus
Indeed -- also surprising how hawks mistrusted
#ECB
forecasts as inflation was rising, but liked them when they pointed to slow disinflation...🤔🤣
[snippet from last Thursday's note]
@TS_Lombard
P.S. all is not lost. At least someone at the ECB is paying attention:
”If we hold them [high interest rates] for too long, we might put the recovery at risk and delay the associated cyclical rebound in productivity growth” (Piero Cipollone, 27 March)
EA’s dependency on raw materials for clean tech puts the bloc at a structural disadvantage vs China. While a further widening in energy costs across the Atlantic and easy-to-access IRA tax credits increase incentives for firms to shift new capex overseas 5/
Since 2022, the profit-led hiring boom met energy crisis and policy tightening, that stalled growth.
Covid shortages worsened labour hoarding, also encouraged by falling real cost of labour relative to capital as ECB hiked.
Output per hour worked dropped… 3/
Finally, adverse demographics is starting to bite and cliff effects from the baby boomers retiring are now firmly within standard investment horizons 6/
Hahaha love
#WhateverTheF
! But on substance: 1) this is an outrageous mistake from Lagarde and a stain on her already not immaculate track record; but 2) it will be rectified soon, and 3) EU is more politically united than when Merkel & Sarko smiled at each other in pressers...
Biggest one-day jump in the 10Y Italian BTP yield *ever*.
From a very low level, I know, but for those who survived 2011, it does mean something.
#WhateverTheF
Composition issues are key too. Labour hoarding is strongest in construction, while post-Covid public sector hiring sapped average hours worked (AHW). At country level, 🇫🇷 apprenticeships explain ~50% of productivity fall by late 2022.
EU productivity is better than it looks. 4/
A crucial policy question atm: are higher inflation expectations now accelerating the inflation process or is that all only in the minds of central bankers?
Currently on hols in 🇨🇵 , just stopped by at Saint Rémy de Provence to pay homage to the patron and father of all macro forecasters 🔮🤣🙏🏻
#Nostradamus
#macroforecasterlife
Just as in the EA “deindustrialization” debate, the ECB overlooks the outsized impact of its own domestic demand suppression on productivity measures amid the post-Covid job market adjustment.
This further undermines a productivity revival. 2/
EU “deindustrialization” makes headlines.
High energy costs, China’s rivalry and rising protectionism are strong headwinds.
But structural factors cannot fully explain the ongoing industrial recession.
What about ECB-induced domestic demand suppression and housing collapse? 1/
China capital outflows and CNY (RMB) weakness are in the news again.
In early February I wrote about the structural forces that will continue to drive medium-term capital outflows and CNY weakness.
Here are a few key points 1/
🇨🇳 China - Foreign direct investment into China collapsed by 26.1% y/y in January to March 2024 highlighting the challenges it faces competing for funds with cheaper rivals in a sluggish global growth environment.
The debate over China’s currency policies is to some extent
No German recession in Q3! OK, so what? To anyone interested in German (and EU) *long-run* growth the important question is: can Germany ride the wave of the next technology revolution?
Required reading by
@johnauthers
:
Follows chart-heavy thread 1/n
B.Asset quality: main area of concern is US CRE book. It’s 17bn, well flagged with avg 60% LTV, diversified. SSM imposed addt’l cap requirements recently to mitigate risk. There’s also the lev lending book ofc.
Tutti a chiedersi del potenziale danno in capo ad Atlantia, che è ancora da accertare. Nessuno a evidenziare il danno immediato, reale e irreversibile alla credibilità delle istituzioni repubblicane generato da processi sommari e arbitrari, in spregio alla legge e alla giustizia.
Reaccelerating *dis*inflation momentum in Euro Area.
I'm a broken record, but EA inflation and ECB policy have scope to diverge from the US for a bit this year.
Yesterday Nagel, today Knot. The tone of
#ECB
hawks is changing. Don't expect the hawkish rhetoric to disappear completely yet, but what matters now is restrictive rates' persistency and excess liquidity reduction - not a higher terminal rate.
@OGiannino
"Dopo 5 anni..." è sempre sui tempi dilatati di una giustizia da terzo mondo che gli oppressori e i soverchiatori di ogni risma fanno affidamento nel nostro Paese. La libertà e la dignità di un individuo sono strutturalmente a rischio in Italia
But beyond CRE risk, which is now well monitored, a decade of ZIRP has forced investors, especially nonbanks, to buy riskier, hard to mark-to-market, illiquid assets. Take insurers, for example. 4/
It’s hard to quantify the impact of such factors on productivity, but it’s likely much smaller than that of output compression.
And, in any event, it cannot justify keeping ECB rates ~200bps above any reasonable estimate of nominal r* with continued disinflation. 6/
Third, new digital technology such as cheap, open-source AI increase leapfrogging potential for productivity laggards. The inability to embrace the computer revolution has been a key factor constraining the productivity of EA firms for decades. This can change 10/
In EU, banks’ credit risk via CRE concentrates in the Nordics and Central Europe. Sweden tops the table, but, in the EZ, fixed-rate mortgages make Germany, the Netherlands and France less exposed (although more exposed in terms of loan profitability!) than Austria and Finland 2/
The surge in no. of firms citing 'equipment' as a factor limiting production in EZ is wild, but unlike in normal times, this reflects input shortages rather than greater capex needs. EU surveys don't separate input shortages, but a similar
@InseeFr
survey does. 1/2
Even the wider US-EA productivity gap since Covid boils down to growth differentials.
[Of course, long-run underperformance is structural: missed IT revolution, poor mgmt, prevalence of micro firms, incomplete Single Mkt and CMU, policy hesitancy vs US & China, you name it] 7/
Most of the above is cyclical, but there are also signs of potentially structural deterioration:
- Hard-to-reverse public sector hiring
- Higher woman activity rate (lower hours worked)
- Frequent sick leaves
- Falling self-employed AHW (changing attitude to labour supply?) 5/
But it’s not only banks: a downturn in CRE can spark feedback-loops with nonbanks (investment funds, insurers etc). True, CRE exposure in EZ is largely borne by banks, but nonbanks account for 60% of all CRE transaction value and funds’ leverage can amplify banks’ credit risk 3/
ECB hawks are back to warning against wage negotiations and second-round effects on inflation. Well, according to IMF analysis in the latest WEO, the impact of labour tightness on the EZ core HICP has been virtually null... 1/
All this doesn’t mean Doomsday is upon us, but with the return to higher yields/volatility and slower global growth, investors’ larger holdings of illiquid assets that are hard to mark-to-market are now increasingly exposed to repricing risk. Expect more “things” to “break”. END
In 2020, as Covid was about to hit Europe and Chinese factory closures disrupted global supply chains, I used Kremer's O-ring theory to explain that many production processes are *multiplicative* in inputs, ie shortages have non-linear impact on output 1/
Shadow banks have also been the greatest sponsors of private markets’ exponential growth. Private equity and credit tend to be highly leveraged and show strong interconnectedness, not to mention tech exposure… 5/
The good news is that with an EA growth rebound in sight, productivity will recover too.
Policymakers should better get out of the way rather than worsening the supply issue they want to alleviate. END
cc:
@TS_Lombard
Little victory lap🥳Not only the
#ECB
stepped down to 25bp hikes, but more importantly it did so for the reasons we highlighted - it's risk management, as rates rise further into restrictive territory, credit contracts and core HICP gives some glimmers of hope... 1/4
This
#EconomicBulletin
article shows that price increases became much more frequent in 2021 and 2022 but their frequency is coming back down to pre-pandemic levels.
Read more to find out what this means for inflation and monetary policy transmission
Surely, different job market adjustment mechanisms during Covid (e.g. EU furlough schemes preserving employment over hours worked) partly explain US-EA productivity divergence. But employment and hours worked trends have recoupled and cumulative changes since 2019 are similar 8/
If you still need more convincing that inflation is about *power* and that CBs are always too keen on cutting the wage cycle short (last bulwark of neoliberalism), you should to read this.
cc
@darioperkins
who taught me this years ago &
@freyabeamish
😉
@FerdiGiugliano
That's because even illiterate folks like Salvini and Di Maio can make back-of-the-envelope calculations. No threat for €/EU. The real threat is the slow but continuous erosion of govt finances and, more worringly, of the rule of law in our country (eg statute of limitations)
In general, shadow banks have increased the overall riskiness of credit allocation in major DMs since 2016. In Europe, the nonbank segment of the leveraged loan market is a prime example. While covenant protection has declined. 6/
Research still to be peer-reviewed seems to suggest that the Sahm rule is good at screening recession false positives, but Perkins rule pins down the recessionary dynamics *earlier* when historically a real recession takes place. Give a Nobel to this man!
#ANobel4Perkins
The Sahm rule never signals a recession before the Perkins rule (yes now a real thing 😉). So for the unemployment rate to hit that threshold without payrolls contracting, that would be sign the labour market is behaving in unusual ways - and not necessarily a recession marker
@ErikFossing
Many see it as the first step to create a parallel currency. It's fartched for now, especially given the motion voted is not law. But the message is twofold 1. Most MPs didn't read what they voted; 2. Ppl are desperate to pay creditors, but they'd rather use cash for handouts
He did it again! 🚀🚀🚀
Another blockbuster guide by Dario - the "Ringhio Gattuso of Macroeconomics", as he likes to be called these days - on how to avoid being fooled by this "fake cycle".
Read it and share it!
🔥🟥⬛️🔥
#GlobalMarkets
#ForzaMilan
NEW BLOG: Why the macro consensus has been getting everything wrong, and what comes next. Q&A guide to the weird business cycle that keeps fooling investors.
(no paywall. Please share)
Crucial comment that shouldn't be taken lightly:
1) Meloni is saying what many EU politicians think
2) it shows a key flaw in our democracies: "leadership" turned on its head. Forming visions based on sound analysis of reality and promoting it *before vote* IS good politics 1/2
Meloni «Draghi is authoritative. I’m happy an Italian is talked about highly. But I insist: this whole debate is…philosophical. It’s good for newspaper headlines…and good for campaigning. But I don’t like talking about who does what before people vote.» 1/
This was the way I understand most investors thought about it and how I think we should read the latest ECB/EBA/SRB statement about EZ banks. Admittedly, Swiss AT1s were always a bit different --now everybody knows-- but well ...
TBH my opinion always was an AT1 would never get converted in a going concern situation due to banks dropping below req'd capital levels because either the bank would have the capacity to repair its capital before the trigger was hit - or it would be rapidly going into resolution
It's working! Bloomberg picked this up🤣
By the bye
@CraigStirling
, I did all the heavy lifting to put up a huge
#FOGF
marketing campaign and you only mention
@patrick_saner
and
@darioperkins
?! Wasn't there enough space for me too on the bandwagon??🤣
Here you go. He said he would have done so, after all. I guess it was a necessary step at this stage. Let's see if Mattarella sends him back and he accepts to carry on until 2023 with a different, more fragile majority or not...
With
#ECB
hawks' tone changing a bit and doves finally out of their nest this week, I'll re-up this.
Inflation data will remain key over summer to determine the September outcome and what the Fed does will matter too, but the ECB tightening has entered a new phase
No rush, indeed! The ECB has done a better job than the Fed at convincing markets that their hawkishness is still credible, but I would not get too excited. This hawkishness looks 'tactical' and still consistent with a pause in Sep. That said, overtightening risk has increased
Agree with the tweet, but dislike the chart for the implicit point it makes. Too short time axis.
EZ's lowflation of the 2010s is gone. Macro conditions for a moderately higher CPI regime are now maturing. The reference period is *pre* GFC. Good for both EZ economy and the ECB!
Con il riappiattimento della curva EONIA e aspettative che la BCE tenga i tassi negativi per molti altri mesi, i tassi sui mutui medi hanno smesso di aumentare ma questo non significa che le banche non possano ridurre l'offerta di credito. Ottimo
@Phastidio
as usual
Il presidente dell'Abi ci informa che i tassi sui prestiti praticati dalle banche italiane sono allineati alla media europea. Sicuri che sia una buona notizia?
@beniapiccone
@carloalberto
Vedo "improbabile" una spending review overnight. Per il resto, ci sono alcune difficoltà intrinseche a tagliare la spesa pubblica (chiedere M5S)
Glad this thread gave people some food for thoughts and an out-of-consensus view on Euro Area long-term growth and assets.
But what about the *short-term* macro view (say, 1 year)?
Spoiler: stagnation writ large. New chart-heavy🧵1/
Confused about Euro Area's long-term macro? Overwhelmed by negative consensus and headlines? Well, it's time to consider the long-term bull case for Europe. Chart-heavy 🧵 1/
📈 New data from the Indeed Wage Tracker 📉
🇪🇺 Eurozone - Downward trajectory resumed in March
🇬🇧 UK - Continued slowdown but wage growth remains high, a concern for monetary policymakers
🇺🇸 US - Wage growth is down to its 2019 average, a promising sign for the Fed
🇳🇱 is probably the only EU country that can seriously afford vetoing today's Franco-German proposal. So, it's good that
#Macron
&
#Merkel
have already set the ground for negotiations...🤭
@Phastidio
Diciamo che se il personaggio non fosse anche a capo del partito che ha fatto della chiusura delle centrali nucleari (anche durante un crisi energetica epocale) un manifesto, sarebbe molto meglio...
@DavideOneglia
Guardi, questa è la definizione oecd. Sebbene non vi sia uniformità nella valutazione di quali siano le misure precise, ciò che conta è l'effetto sul saldo.
Poi, mi scusi, un programma di aumento di imposte a spesa invariata non è forse austerity?
@davcarretta
Onestamente sto avendo qualche problema a riconciliare tutti questi numeri. In appendice a questo working paper (p.51) della Commissione () c'e' una tabella con l'allocation key ma i numeri non mi tornano. Potrei sapere come avete fatto il calcolo?
Good points.
#Draghi
is ramping up efforts to shake EU politics out of stupor and into action.
Beyond personal ambition, Draghi’s thought leadership can greatly influence EU decision making and markets/commentators seem too dismissive of potential upside EU policy surprises 1/
Mario Draghi claims the EU model had been to rely on US for defence, China for trade, Russia for energy -- and that now this model upon which Europe rested since WW2 is gone.
It sounds compelling but I think it is flawed both in terms of history and geography (1/3)
Following up on the thread below, here is some more detail about why repricing risk in illiquid, rate-sensitive, opaque markets should remain on top of investors’ mind beyond the current global slowdown plays out (yes, this is not just a short-term view) 1/5
With the bank turmoil of the past weeks investors have reawakened to credit risk. So far, banks’ exposure to Commercial Real Estate (CRE) has attracted most of the attention. But CRE is just one example of rate-sensitive, illiquid, opaque asset class. Little thread 1/
🇪🇺🇲🇹The governor of the central bank of Malta ladies and gentlemen. 🍿
*ECB'S SCICLUNA: CAN'T EXCLUDE APRIL RATE CUT
*ECB'S SCICLUNA: APRIL IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE OR EVEN IMPROBABLE
Plus, the US-EA gap in AHW since Covid may not be as big. In fact, EU data methodology more closely resembles US Current Population Survey than private sector payroll survey (CES).
In sum, most of US-EA productivity gap stems from growth differentials, esp. since mid-2022 9/
If you are watching out for tail risks to monitor: the risk of another energy shock in Europe, owing to the fallout from the Israel-Hamas war and the alleged sabotage of the Finland-Estonia gas pipeline should be on your list. Again, *tail risk*, not central case for policymakers
Ciò è tanto grave in quanto manca di minima logica. Alzare le tasse *non* è una misura di "austerity". È lo Stato che deve operare in un regime più austero (cioè controllando le *uscite*), non chi paga le imposte! END
Losers have large exposure to EU/Chinese tourists, likely absent due to vaccine delays and incentives to domestic travel
Winners have large domestic tourism industries but traditionally high levels of outbound tourists eg 🇺🇸, 🇬🇧🇩🇪... Or they're close to the US--go, Mexico! 2/2