Tong ZHAO @zhaot2005 Twitter profile

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

1 month

Excited to share thoughts w/ @ForeignAffairs on the underlying drivers of China's nuclear expansion, the implications for US-China security & overall relations, and essential measures needed to address core issues in nuclear and broader bilateral ties. 1/2

The Real Motives for China’s Nuclear Expansion

Beijing seeks geopolitical leverage more than military advantage.

www.foreignaffairs.com

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

FWIW, a thread 🧵to share my preliminary thoughts on the impact of #UkraineRussiaWar on China’s future strategic orientation.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

1/ China likely failed to predict the war. Even many Russian senior intel & mil officials, as well as lots of top Russian experts didn't seem to foresee the war. Given deep distrust of US, China probably dismissed the intel shared by US as psychological warfare to drive wedge.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

7/ The biggest uncertainty is how China's small, closed, & opaque decisionmaking circle--with Paramount Leader Xi at the center--sees things & makes choice. The #UkraineWar highlights how Putin's small, closed, & frivolous inner circle ultimately determined war and peace.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

4/ Option 2 is to seize the opportunity to improve relations with the West (especially US), by making good use of Western countries' growing interest to prevent a China-Russia bloc. After all, China strongly desires stable relations with US/West but questions their commitment.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

13/ China is likely also shocked to watch Western countries butcher 🇷🇺's economy & isolate 🇷🇺government. It probably swears never to allow this happen on itself.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

5/ China's high profile commemoration of 50th anniversary of Nixon's visit to Beijing is the most recent display of such Chinese desire. It is widely understood that access to West's technologies and markets will remain essential for China's continuous rise in near- to mid-term.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

2/ China further failed to predict the strong international response or to fully appreciate its implications for China, thus the lack of rapid & effective readjustment of its publicly sympathetic position toward Russia.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

20/ But what choice Beijing will make at the end of this crisis is going to be very consequential. Hopefully thorough debates among Chinese experts and between Chinese and international experts now can help people think through these issues and thus help promote the right choice.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

9/ Observers have pointed out: in 🇨🇳, Great Firewall is much higher than 🇷🇺; also less civil society, tighter management of public thinking/perception, less open policy debate, less questioning of national narrative, no opposition. In other words, less internal checks & balances.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

6/ This could be a pivotal moment, as how China makes this strategic choice would have the most profound geopolitical consequences for China's future and international peace & stability.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

8/ The issue is more salient in China as power is more centralized under one leader. Besides KJU, there is probably no third person in the world that enjoys such absolute authority & overwhelming flattery for so many years. How that affects one's mindset/psychology? No one knows.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

3/ To simplify, China faces two strategic paths going forward. Option 1 is to continue & even double down on the current "no upper limits, no forbidden zone, no finishing line" close alignment with Russia to promote global order & stability as they envision.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

17/ #UkraineWar highlights how information & perception gap can be a fundamental threat to international peace, but this problem is only getting worse between China & the West too.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

10/ As such, despite the appealingness of Option 2 to some experts, Mr. Xi could well end up leaning to Option 1. As pointed out by observers, he shares Putin's worldview & believes the inevitable structural change of international balance of power determines China-West rivalry.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

18/ For scholars, a key lesson from all of this is: to develop deep understandings about the impact of domestic decisionmaking environment on an opaque superpower's security/foreign policymaking is hugely important for future research of international peace & strategic stability.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

19/ As for the #UkraineWar , China will likely take time to wait for the perceived total chaos to settle & for the new global geopolitical landscape to clarify, before making significant policy changes. Its public positions in the meantime will probably remain generic & abstract.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

14/ This could further strengthen Mr. Xi's long-standing preference of self-reliance & autarky, believing China must be able to prevent external strangulation. It may limit how much China-West can prevent decoupling & develop mutually beneficial & interdependent relations.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

15/ On top of these is the growing strategic perception gap at the societal level btw China & West. Longtime info bubble creates parallel universes where the two peoples disagree on basic factual issues. As Chinese experts believe #UkraineWar results from US abetting and

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

I am of the view that #UkraineWar generally reduces the risk of a near-term military conflict over the Taiwan Strait, but new uncertainties are rising too. We need to keep eyes wide open to avoid sleepwalking into a war over Taiwan. A thread🧵:

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

12/ The fact that Putin-Xi's personal bond has been a key driver of bilateral relationship behind which Mr. Xi reportedly has thrown his weight makes radical change of China's approach to Russia harder, as Chinese experts may not want to critique the wisdom of current policy.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

11/ His solution to deter a potentially violent eventual showdown is to prioritize material power buildup, including accelerated military modernization & nuclear expansion. His recent preaching of "fighting spirit" to young Party cadres shows no readjustment of such mindset.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

16/ as state media overwhelmingly adopt Russian narratives, it is kind of hard to expect strong advocacy for Option 2 from the experts community, public opinion leaders, or the general public.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

1/5 Why have so many Chinese diplomats become more aggressive recently? These are senior diplomats; it is unlikely they don't see the consequences of their aggressive words & deeds. They must know they are destroying China's international image, more than any foreigners can do.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

1 year

In this @ForeignAffairs paper, I examine how the internal feedback loop among China's leadership, policy elites, & the general public creates an underappreciated & unaddressed risk of war over Taiwan and what the international community can do to help.

The Real Motives for China’s Nuclear Expansion

Beijing seeks geopolitical leverage more than military advantage.

www.foreignaffairs.com

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

10 months

Japan’s decision to release #Fukushima water has dominated Chinese media and public attention for weeks, fueling a surge in anti-Japan sentiment & causing widespread salt hoarding. Another example of widening information & perception gaps between China and rest of the world. 1/7

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

Personal update: I have started a new position as visiting research scholar at @Princeton 's Program on Science & Global Security. My @CarnegieEndow affiliation won't change. Look forward to working w/ new colleagues & reconnecting w/ old friends! Excited to share office w/ Frank!

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

It is not just "nationalism" that prevented China from importing Western mRNA vaccines but the paranoid belief that to rely on Western vaccines constitutes a national security risk. A vivid example of massive humanitarian consequences of the securitization of non-security issues.

Jamie Metzl

@JamieMetzl

2 years

COVID-19 is a political pandemic because it would likely not have happened but for the pathology of the Chinese state. China’s COVID Zero crisis is also political. Blind nationalism prevented Beijing from purchasing Western mRNA vaccines that work far better than Chinese ones.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

11 months

After a memorable year at Princeton and with deep gratitude to colleagues at the Program on Science & Global Security for hosting me, I will be working at @CarnegieEndow 's DC office. Looking forward to meeting with old friends and making new connections in Washington!

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

Happy to share my new research paper on China's No First Use nuclear policy and its implications for the current international debate around the issue of NFU, published in the Asian Security. Link for 50 free online copies:

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

The silence in China was a little awkward after Kim Jong Un touted his determination at the recently concluded 8th party congress to push forward a full-fledged nuclear program and publicized impressive future nuclear development plans.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

Honored to be interviewed by @SCMPNews on @HuXijin_GT 's call for China to quickly build at least 1000 nukes. A short thread on China's domestic debate on nuclear expansion.

China ‘won’t win more respect if it adds nuclear weapons’

Editor of nationalistic tabloid wants Beijing to increase warheads to 1,000, including at least 100 ballistic missiles that can reach US mainland.

www.scmp.com

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

21/ Both sides need to understand the domestic perceptions underlying the increasing risk of US-China sleepwalking into conflict over Taiwan. Even an inadvertent Taiwan conflict could formally launch the world into two blocs & major power wars. It's hard to overstate the stakes.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

Glad to share my new research paper on China's Approach to Arms Control Verification: It analyzes China's position, thinking, & underlying causes, in the hope to promote more effective international engagement with China on arms control verification.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

2/5 It is more likely that they choose not to care, because their aggressive performance on the international stage would win themselves greater career success domestically, in a political system that has undergone dramatic change in recent years.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

1/ The most desirable outcome for China remains peaceful unification. To Beijing, this means to avoid war & use time to further build up material power, including military power. By the time China establishes clear military advantage, Taiwan and US would have to accept reality.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

10 months

Over time, however, as China unconsciously sinks deeper into its own universe of facts and truths, it develops a stronger conviction about its righteous role to challenge the false narratives and biased rules dominated by the “morally corrupt” West. 6/7

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

Would be useful to study how China reached this belief. At that time there were many warnings from Chinese analysts about US military attack. I laughed at such crazy analysis as it appeared paranoid & lacked evidence, only to find out I was wrong to dismiss its policy influence.

M. Taylor Fravel

@fravel

3 years

“the Chinese believed that Mr. Trump planned to launch a military strike to create an international crisis that he could claim to solve as a last-ditch effort to beat Joseph R. Biden Jr.”

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

4/5 In future crises, if PLA officers, like some Chinese diplomats, also calculate that it is in their personal interests to act extra tough, even if they know their aggression could cause war and cost China dearly, they might still feel incentivized to do so.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

4/ More important, China increasingly believes that even though China wants to avoid conflict, the US is becoming more desperate to undermine China by playing the Taiwan card. US efforts to strengthen ties with Taiwan are viewed as indisputable evidence of US strategic hostility.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

13/ As for Chinese experts, they watch #UkraineWar as a real-world simulation of a future US-China conflict. There is growing optimism that Russia is not losing despite fighting the entire West.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

2/ #UkraineWar puts pressure on this thinking in several ways: Believing the US-led West is using the war to destroy Russia, Beijing becomes more convinced an eventual showdown with the West may only be avoidable if China could change balance of power to its favor quickly enough.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

6/ The mutual perception that "ball is in the other's court" is the reason for concern. US believes China is challenging status quo; China believes it faces growing US aggression, has less choice, and may sooner or later be forced to act.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

China’s nuclear development goal continues changing, according to the 20th Party Congress report, which declares China will build a “powerful/strong strategic deterrent capability system (强大战略威慑力量体系). 1/2

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

🧵An important technical driver of China's reported FOBS+glider development is probably the perceived threat from US missile defense. But a more complex question is: could the US readjust its missile defense policy to influence China's calculation behind its nuclear buildup?

Demetri

@Dimi

3 years

SCOOP – #China has stunned US intelligence and military officials by testing a #nuclear capable #hypersonic missile that traveled through low orbit in space, making a full circle around the globe before speeding towards its target.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

3/5 If true, I worry what this new trend would mean for a future US-China military incident/clash/conflict, which is becoming less unimaginable given how quickly mutual animosity is building.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

7 months

The anticipated US-China statement against AI decision-making in nuclear weapons use would symbolize a shared, commonsense principle, but not a real contention point for either country, similar to the P5 statement on "nuclear wars cannot be won and should never be fought." 1/3

Finbarr Bermingham

@fbermingham

7 months

Biden and Xi set to pledge a ban on use of AI in autonomous weaponry, such as drones, and in the control and deployment of nuclear warheads, sources confirmed to the Post. Important scoop by colleagues @ipatrickbr @markmagnier , Amber Wang in DC

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

No evidence the new silos are intended as a bargaining chip. They demonstrate China's firm determination to enhance nuclear capability, in face of perceived US strategic hostility, and consistent with Mr. Xi's public order to accelerate strategic deterrent capability buildup. 1/3

Matt Korda

@mattkorda

3 years

🚨 Big China news 🚨 I found China's 2nd nuclear silo field, in Eastern Xinjiang. @nukestrat + I estimate that it could eventually house 110 silos. In total, China seems to be building ~250 new silos––the largest expansion of China's nuclear force ever.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

3/ However, #UkraineWar resuscitates the US/West. US may remain somewhat distracted, but China cannot be as confident as before about its projected surpassing of US in foreseeable future. A less sanguine projection promotes "long-term pain worse than short-term pain" thinking.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

5/ Convinced of US' salami slicing strategy to erode China's leverage over Taiwan, Chinese experts argue a resolute response to implement China's red line before it gets further infringed would be necessary, otherwise US provocation would only be emboldened.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

5/5 This presents a growing challenge for preventing crisis and managing escalation. Decision-makers, and Chinese leaders in particular, need to understand the potential risks of this trend.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

11/ Chinese leadership may also be relieved to see Putin's war decision did not cause serious domestic instability in Russia. Rather, Russian people mostly rally around the flag and Putin becomes more popular.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

7 months

Today's US-China arms control & nonproliferation consultation is a positive but limited first step. At @ForeignPolicy , I argue that exploring credible No First Use models can lead to more substantive nuclear, arms control, & strategic risk reduction talks.

It’s Time to Talk About No First Use

Long a nonstarter in Washington, it may now be the best source of common ground with Beijing.

foreignpolicy.com

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

14/ From this perspective, Russia turns out not really internationally isolated and its economy may survive sanctions; thus a much more powerful China would have a better chance to endure the consequences of a conflict and emerge victorious.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

7/ Believing the US is emboldened by its perceived success in crippling Russia over Ukraine, Chinese experts see a greater danger of US going rogue and attempting more radical moves against China to similarly destabilize/destroy China.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

10/ Some public opinion leaders’ recent calls for the Chinese public to be psychologically prepared for a war over Taiwan may or may not be directed from the top, but it aligns with Mr. Xi's guidance that "it is unrealistic to always want to live in peace and not want to fight."

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

China's changing geopolitical perspectives are behind its accelerated nuclear modernization. To understand the Chinese rationale is important for thinking about future solutions. In my new @CarnegieEndow commentary:

What’s Driving China’s Nuclear Buildup?

Satellite data has revealed the construction of new nuclear missile silos in Gansu and Xinjiang in western China. How U.S. and Chinese experts interpret the buildup and the motivations behind it...

carnegieendowment.org

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

15/ There's also the popular belief that a rising power needs to take a decisive move at the right historical juncture to effectively assert itself and establish international respect & status; in fact, this might be the only way to shock the hegemonic West into reconciliation.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

In a Chinese op-ed I rebutted the main arguments by @HuXijin_GT & his followers, and explained why it is in China's interest not to massively expand its nuclear forces. Thanks to @ChinaUSFocus for translating it into English & publishing it:

No Magic in Nuclear Buildup

A popular view in China is that more nuclear weapons would garner respect from the international community. But it may only inspire fear, which would be counterproductive.

www.chinausfocus.com

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

18/ As more people embrace the dominant view with no thorough debate of its defects and consequences, a self-reinforcing echo chamber can already set the collective machine of the state down a path not necessarily strategically planned or carefully scrutinized by anyone.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

12/ This is important to the Chinese leadership whose top priority is to maintain domestic stability and popularity but faces growing pressure as more people raise questions about government competence in handling Covid, economy, and other pressing domestic problems.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

8/ The reported (now postponed) @SpeakerPelosi visit to Taiwan stimulates unprecedentedly tense Chinese discussion of need for very strong response. Many want a much tougher military reaction than before. If it led to war it is not up to us, is the increasingly popular sentiment.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

9/ Under this siege mentality, although China would prefer to have more time to develop better military preparedness, it believes it would have to do with what it has when push comes to shove.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

10 months

The expanding information and perception gaps, both in general and within these specific instances, demand significant attention from international media, foreign policy research institutes, as well as peace and anti-war communities. 7/7

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

16/ Admittedly, the top leader's view is what matters most but is never clear. Yet, the pressure to resolve the Taiwan issue comes from him. He links it to his goal of national rejuvenation & has displayed interest in developing the capability to resolve the issue forcefully.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

20/ This happens against the broader background where China as a nation is at a critical juncture struggling about if its future rests with seeking to work with the West or more openly countering the West. A military spark over Taiwan could immediately end any remaining debate.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

17/ As a result, hawkish views easily set the public narrative by dominating discussion and getting little pushback. As domestic public narrative becomes more unitary, debates are rarely about the wisdom of coercive unification but how. Little room remains for different thinking.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

I wonder if the idea is exactly to keep China's enemies guessing. It would force its enemies to take all new silos seriously and bolster China's image as a much stronger nuclear power than before. Whether China will actually fill each silo with an ICBM is a different matter. 1/6

(((James Acton)))

@james_acton32

3 years

China is building more than 100 new ICBM silos--a major discovery by @ArmsControlWonk and @dex_eve and reported by @JobyWarrick . My working hypothesis (as mentioned in article) is that China will deploy much fewer than 100 new missiles. (1/n)

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

My report "Narrowing the U.S.-China Gap on Missile Defense: How to Help Forestall a Nuclear Arms Race" will be launched at the @carnegie event. Pls join discussion w/ @suea_thornton , @osmastro , @BethanyAllenEbr & me on nuclear, BMD, & US-China competition!

Can Cooperation on Missile Defense Avoid a U.S.-China Nuclear Arms Race?

Join us for a conversation with Oriana Mastro, Susan Thornton, Tong Zhao, and Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian as they discuss the growing U.S.-Chinese military competition and whether potentially disastrous...

carnegieendowment.org

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

Narrowing the U.S.-China Gap on Missile Defense: How to Help Forestall a Nuclear Arms Race My new @CarnegieEndow report is now online and free to download👇 A short thread:

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

10 months

In a domestic environment that places “patriotism” above all else, reporters and analysts of news (and of the science behind it) spontaneously filter out politically unwelcome aspects of science. 4/7

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

1 month

Two leading Chinese nuclear policy experts have published an English article titled "U.S. strategy of damage limitation vis-à-vis China: long-term programs and effects":

U.S. strategy of damage limitation vis-à-vis China: long-term programs and effects

China International Strategy Review - A number of U.S. military programs, if successfully developed and deployed, could undermine China's nuclear retaliatory capabilities, thereby enhancing...

link.springer.com

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

19/ Somewhere down the path, the military option might start to appear appealing to decisionmakers. The machine of the state seems unconsciously drifting toward making the domestic public opinion environment conducive for the leadership to eventually make a consequential move.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

China's nuclear buildup reignites debates on US-China mutual vulnerability relationship. There're ways US can mitigate the risks of acknowledging mutual vulnerability & steer the bilateral relationship to a more constructive path. My analysis @nytopinion :

Opinion | Why Is China Building Up Its Nuclear Arsenal? (Published 2021)

Without U.S. and Chinese willingness to enter a clear dialogue, the results could be catastrophic.

www.nytimes.com

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

10 months

No one needs to lie; no one is explicitly told to lie; they just speak and receive half-truth (for example, by not putting this issue into context and comparing with other sources of radiological pollution, such as discharged water from normal nuclear plants). 5/7

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

My piece "Opportunities for Nuclear Arms Control Engagement With China," published by @ArmsControlNow , is now ungated and free to access:

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

1 year

My new essay looks into the dangerous perception gap dividing the US & China and its implications for the bilateral relationship & international security. Thanks to @APLNofficial for publishing it!

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

10 months

Unlike in ROK where public concern of #Fukishima water is also high (albeit less extreme & one-sided), the diversity of views and expert analysis in China is notably absent. 2/7

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

10 months

This is a deeper problem than deliberate government-driven propaganda, in the sense that most of Chinese officials, state media workers, policy elites, and the public genuinely don't think they are receiving and spreading misleading scientific information. 3/7

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

The message is so subtle. It will definitely work.

USArmsControl

@USArmsControl

4 years

China should talk to Russia who destroyed the INF Treaty, deploying battalions of medium range 9M729 missiles (they can’t reach US). Where are they deployed? Who are they aimed at? Join Vienna talks; get answers on things like this!

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

Pleased to share with @BulletinAtomic my speculation about possible military rationale behind China's nuclear expansion: the interest in escalation management capabilities could have significant implications for the U.S.-China nuclear relationship.

China’s silence on nuclear arms buildup fuels speculation on motives

China has not elaborated on its recent, rapid nuclear modernization efforts. To understand the security implications and prospects for future arms control cooperation with China, analysts speculate...

thebulletin.org

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 months

Many thanks to @ArmsControlNow for publishing my piece on "Underlying Challenges and Near-Term Opportunities for Engaging China" on nuclear arms control, in the most recent issue of #ArmsControlToday . It is now available for free access at

Arms Control Assoc

@ArmsControlNow

4 months

If China continues eschewing arms control with the United States, diplomatic engagement stands as one of the limited but crucial means to reduce the risk of conflict, writes @zhaot2005 in this month's cover story for #ArmsControlToday , available online at .

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

It is a great pleasure to review the excellent book "China’s Strategic Arsenal: Worldview, Doctrine, and Systems" edited by James Smith and Paul Bolt, in the newest issue of the Arms Control Today @ArmsControlNow :

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

I wrote a Chinese piece to analyze the security implications of DPRK's unchecked nuclear buildup. Nothing hostile against DPRK; nothing about China's North Korea policy; just tried to summarize facts, predict future trend, & explain the impact. But could not get it published.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

The China-India border clash will reshape their security relations. In a new @CarnegieEndow paper, @toby_dalton and I explore what the future of the 🇨🇳-🇮🇳 nuclear relationship may look like. It includes insight from senior Chinese experts we interviewed.

At a Crossroads? China-India Nuclear Relations After the Border Clash

While both countries may think the situation is under control, dismissive attitudes and misperceptions could end up fueling a dangerous competition.

carnegieendowment.org

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

P.S. This is my effort, as a researcher, to understand & describe mainstream Chinese thinking & perception (not just what China says but also what it believes). Given the circumstances, however, I am not in a position to make judgement on the described views.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

I think it tells a lot about the future of this region and the future of a so-called nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

6 years

China & INF treaty: how China sees and may respond to the withdrawal by US; how this affects future US-China security relationship? My new @CarnegieEndow commentary on the demise of INF treaty & US-China strategic competition:

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

2 years

It is my pleasure to examine the potential implications of Russia's nuclear signaling during the Ukraine War for China's nuclear policy, in this joint @APLNofficial and @Nautilus_Inst policy brief:

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

5 years

If New START expires with no replacement, what are the implications for China's nuclear policy? How might China react? How would US-Russia-China trilateral nuclear competition look like? My new essay for @CNA_org , now available at @CarnegieEndow website:

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

1 month

Looking forward to discussing "Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Stability & the Future of US-China Relations" at @asianstudiesgu 's US-China Conference on Monday, April 29. Free registration link:

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

The media outlets I worked with before have all declined and said the content is too sensitive. One of them worried that the timing is not right to talk about DPRK's nukes, as bilateral relations are good & Xi just sent a message to congratulate DPRK's party congress.

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

6 years

How do China's growing SSBNs (strategic nuclear submarines) affect strategic stability? What to do to mitigate misunderstanding about this program & contribute to preserving US-China strategic stability? In my new @CarnegieEndow report (free download):

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

My colleagues at @CarnegieBeijing kindly summarized some of the key findings of my report on addressing the U.S.-China missile defense dispute in an easy to read graphic. Check it out! #CTCReadingNotes #ReadwithCTC

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

3 years

The international community needs to be alert against alarmism & threat inflation. However, to understand the risk of a new nuclear race is the first step toward gathering the political will to mitigate this danger that would affect us all. We need no 2nd Cuban Missile Crisis!

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

6 years

My new report on China's nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and implications for strategic stability will be launched at this event on Oct. 24 in DC:

Carnegie Nuclear Policy

@carnegienpp

6 years

Next week: Join us on Wednesday, October 24 at 1:00PM to discuss China’s nuclear ballistic missile submarine program and its implications for strategic stability. To register, click here:

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

5 years

China seems less shy than before to reveal & showcase its newest and most modern strategic weaponry. China believes it is a message of deterrence w/ a focus on self-defense, but others may feel intimidated. Such a perception gap continues to fuel distrust & rivalry.

Kristie Lu Stout✌🏽

@klustout

5 years

New and noteworthy Chinese firepower on display during today's #NationalDay show of force in #Beijing , including: * DF-41 ICBM * DF-17 hypersonic glider * H-6N bomber Here's @CarnegieBeijing Senior Fellow @zhaot2005 .

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

Managing the Sino-American Dispute Over Missile Defense Many thanks to @shaneamason @WarOnTheRocks and my @CarnegieEndow colleagues for very helpful edits and comments.

Managing the Sino-American Dispute Over Missile Defense - War on the Rocks

Despite the opacity and secrecy over China’s nuclear weapons, a public debate has broken out in China about the country’s nuclear arsenal. Hu Xijin, the

warontherocks.com

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

What the Five Nuclear Weapon States Can Do to Contain Nuclear Risks My contribution to new @Livermore_Lab report: Major Power Rivalry & Nuclear Risk Reduction: Perspectives from Russia, China, and the US. Together w/ Brad Roberts, @baklitskiy , Lewis Dunn

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Tong ZHAO

@zhaot2005

4 years

I explain what practical options can help promote effective arms control engagement between the United States and China, in a new @CarnegieEndow policy outlook: @CarnegieBeijing @carnegienpp

Practical Ways to Promote U.S.-China Arms Control Cooperation

The United States and China must cooperate on arms control. But to do so, the two countries need an innovative approach.

carnegieendowment.org

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