1/I am going to try to explain the irrational Russian Armed Forces behavior towards strategy, common thought, or even the chances repatriated SSO that are now POW try to murder a bunch of men with stars.
10/This didn't seem that crazy in the Kremlin because the prevailing thought in the higher echelons and Putin's inner circle and the FSB was one highly dismissive of Ukraine highly hyped up by Russian army propaganda reporting. They missed that they were buying their own bullshit
3/Secondly it seems the decision making structrues have low opinion in general of Ukraine and their fighting abilities and sort of an ideal that there's a willing subservience in Ukranians if they get to be part of Russia. Pure racism informing their decision making process.
6/And there's a lot of hidden corruption and misreporting that gets baked in into calculations but the higher you go up the chain as in a corporation, the more dimissive management is that it will be an issue. AKA Putin doesn't even remotely grasp how bad it is.
28/ So the spineless bunch decided to throw away 18-19 year old conscripts and veterans and pray they get lucky. Also that Putin hasn't noticed how nuts this is shows that he's either delusional or is completely inept when it comes to military affairs.
2/Here's where I will start from. The Russian armed forces have never attempted anything like this. This isn't about what kind of war they're fighting it's about what they're capable of mustering.
11/The release of the information paralyzed them in terms of decision making. But the inherent bias remained and UA delayed mobilising so it didn't dissuade them. For 7 days they ate away supplies rather than actively trying to build them further, they were waiting a go order.
1) I am going to push back on the idea that what we see is that the Russian Armed Forces are merely having severe supply and readiness issues and that we should consider it to be overall modern.
Taking a cursory look at Russian losses two weeks into the war, it reads less as a general failure to modernize, and more as a failure to maintain and properly support the equipment. Abandonment rate exceedingly high.
8/We saw constant trains and movement over time moving Ru equipment and lots of aircraft being moved over to mustering points and at the end people. By then the supply was at its limit just keeping them warm and fed. They found out the hard way this was their logistical limit.
4/Thirdly battalion tactical groups are terrible units to support operations. They have overload the commander lack support and might not properly integrate with air or do adeqaute scouting as signals and recon are missing along with liasons with them.
27/Can it work? I don't know. Is it a good plan. Hell no. Could they execute anything else, without the entire structure confessing the army has corruption,which yes the boss expected, but it's such a rot it might cost him his throne, yeah not when he's in this mood.
9/What people sa wasn't that troops packed spare tanks for long drives. They were carying their fuel reserves on them. The few organic refueling trucks were not enough to make up an actual reserve or depot. They had one full compliment, some spares in one truck , thats it.
PS/ A lot of the commentary prior missed the readiness of the Russian forces and the poor state of affairs. Overreliance on official statements and major military pages missed tons of low level testimonials and regional investigative pieces on how big the rot was.
14/Now it's either confess the lies about readiness or be creative. Because the corruption had created such a rot, brigade commandes chose "creative" (criminal), conscripts were added to the build up. Ghosts soldiers on the roster were hidden. That meant BTGs were far greener.
5/Fourthly without standing down even if parts of the UA Nat Guard, Police, Border Guard, Territorials and Army are defeated, UA regional commands can be autonomous for days and are vast structures, short of ordering their demobilization their removal is way too costly for RuMoD.
7/Based on those 5 let me try to explain the situation now. Russian units aren't stopping fire or limiting use of their kalibrs and stand off strikes. This is all they could muster south. Kalibrs are limited by launch tubes, a bit over a hundred is what they had ready.
13/Were the Ru troops quality ones they'd do better with just surprise on their side. But they were mostly poorly trained as full units were never called up before. Usually a brigade would send only a company and could hand pick.
12/The limited supply meant it had to be a mad dash. BTGs were split into smaller sub units traveling on multiple roads to avoid congestion. When they met something they'd wait to coalesce or get into a fight. If the UA was suprised it would work.
15/When these hit a city or made contact they'd deploy in unideal formations of platoon to company size. Not their fault all that much, this is what they knew. Then if a UA unit knew in advance where they were and was careful, it would anihilate the BTG splinter formation.
PPPS/ We saw lots of evidence for that and even then a part of the community of analysts dismissed it assuming once it's about having a war footing RU structures will take it serious. But that's not how bad habits work.
25) In the words of Blackadder :
It started badly, it tailed off a little in the middle and the less said about the end the better — but apart from that it was excellent.
16/Because the timetable had to be kept, supplies were already short with the delay Ru troops would go a step further. They'd keep one sub unit to block and redirect subsequent units, the rest would continue on parallel roads. Again timetable meant usually more major roads.
25/So the air assault fails, part of the pincer moves fail, you can't budge most of the UA troops what do you do? You go for broke, hope you win the race between entrechment in Kyiv and you just throwing all you have and hope if you decapitate UA, regional commands lose faith.
17/After a couple of road blocks, BTG'd be diluted, lost a bunch of units and fighting to standstill. You'd expect that there would be air or artiller support. But BTGs aren't suited for that, when they move in chunks in parallel the artillery spotters could be in another group.
21/This works on day 1 when you know where your guys start & can track where they are easily and you know beyond that point it's all enemy. Once you land and refuel, it's less easy especially because as we mentioned, a BTG splitinter lacks a signals unit, just has a few officers.
18/As we said also there was a problem stocking supplies but still CAS should probably not be as limited? Yes but Russian SSO more used to directing it had other tasks and Russia doesn't have a platform like the US surveilance planes and drones that can operate in contested air.
19/And the air was contested because of the limited early strikes due to the small build up + limited recon of where UA AF & AD were prior to this. Satelites take pics at known times, moving equipment often can dissuede strikes as it's uncertain anything will be in place.
The Russian MoD said it had 640 000 professional soldiers. This tells us two things, one Medvedev's numbers are a work of fiction and the Ru irrecoverable losses are in the hundreds of thousands. Let me break it down.
PPS/ Aggregation of Zvezda and VK mil informing pages and MAKS show sales pitches should be tempered by what we can find on the ground and regional and smaller outlets, forums and blogs were servicemembers were pissed were abundant to the point they shouldn't have been dismissed.
26/Otherwise becuase what remains of your force is split in small groups moving on main roads UA can mobilize move via back roads and just recapture most of the towns as you have few troops for actual 24/7 duties and to even spot them moving back into the town.
20/What then was struck were major stationary objects, depots in main areas, radars, major command and control but again limited by number of reloads. So then Ru MoD started rolling the columns with heavy support of helicopters and planes ahead.
24/You still have to try to take the airport fast and get guys in because if the operation takes too long and you haven't kept them(the UA) on the back foot your green troops are still moving piecemeal on roads, don't have much with them, any small village could be their end.
22/Then comes the air asault. Becuase you have to be quick you also have to do risky stuff. The problem of course is that because your helicopters are parked in fields, ready for one load with some trucks and one set of ammo, you can do it once a day with each group.
23/That's why you wait till the end of the assualt attempt to see if it works. If you have to refuel and prep for a second go, your trucks have to go to a depot and reload and then come back. And only then try again.
PPPPS/ And in the minds of the Kremlin they have been continuously on a war footing. So if during that time they left arms companies bankrupt sometimes even more than once, the habit was not going to break most likely.
To quote Nemtsov here:
<<Он ёбнутый... чтоб вы поняли?>>
These tanks might be from the 467th guard training school ( в/ч 30616 ). If the Russian armed forces are pulling tanks and troops from the training schools they're beyond spent.
Also to remind people when stuck along the road at near 0 degrees Celsius in a column for days you continue to have heavy fuel consumption. Engines will be running at regular intervals. Same applies for a forrest near the border.
New light commercial vehicle sales in Russia are down 78,5% in April. This is for the folks who look at the mostly artificial exchange rate thinking the Russian economy's fine.
Russian gasoline production the week of 1st-7th of April declined again to 754 400 tons and diesel production dropped further than before to 1 585 100 tons. In 2023 during the week of 3rd-9th of April gasoline production was 833 200 tons and diesel production was 1 769 000 tons.
I don't think people appreciate how expensive Russian logistics are becoming. 24% interest on a truck lease has made it impossible to replace a mid sized company's fleet. Chinese & Ru trucks are expensive less fuel efficient and this is the entire margin.
Russian companies are canceling truck leases due to costs of 24% interest and outsourcing transportation. Only companies with very large fleets can continue operating. Also Chinese trucks are as expensive as EU ones but of lower quality.
I will do a breakdown of the recent collapse in Russia's winter coping measures and why it happened in 2024 for those who don't follow Russian news. There's a combination of reasons which led to this event.
A thread on how Russian aircraft manufacturers are doing when it comes to staffing. It's far from the image being cultivated that everything is running smoothly. Many of these entities shed thousands of workers prior to 2022. Salaries are quite low with lots of offers < 50 000.
2)Here's the first problem, SEAD. It's failing to suppress UA air defences, but that's more a feature of procurement planning rather than a bug. The VKS lacks a significant number of modern ELINT platforms.
1) This is a thread on the state of Russian infantry squads and platoons in the ground forces and naval infantry and VDV and how these rank comparatively. The VDV have been addressed and considered light infantry but the data suggests they are on the heavier side.
4)Now to explain the practical implications. Without those platforms in the air the Ru VKS rarely has an idea when a UA radar is being turned on unless they are almost on top of it in practical terms ( closer than 50 kms ). They just get notified when they get acquired.
Ru trade with Turkey is coming to a halt. Turkish firms can't receive payments and are closing their export bank accounts. The Turkish Ministry of Trade called the situation force majeure as banks are stopping transactions en masse due to fear of sanctions
My two cents on the "Moskva". While it was the flagship of the VMF's Black Sea fleet and it won awards it was in a pitiful state. Broader modernisation was cancelled in 2015 and what was done was mostly servicing and extension of power plant's life.
24)The manpower isn't there to hold even 4 larger towns. As UA reserves are brought forth South and East I don't think Ru keeping thousands in the towns and a bunch advance columns trying to move out is tenable. Mass warcriming doesn't degrade mil power in 2 weeks.
5)The second issue is the collapse of communications and the lack of interoperable real time data links with the same standards. In practice the VDV, Army and VKS sort of have different systems. These get fed and combined at the army HQ usually during drills.
6)Firing anti radar missiles in a battle space you can't deconflict and is filled with your own AD is a bad idea, even if you think there's a caricature level casual carelessness among Ru officers (I don't think it's the case). You just lose missiles without achieving their aim.
Ru's Ministry of Energy has made fuel production statistics a state secret and they are no longer included in the weekly fuel data from Rosstat. I can no longer provide updates on that. Assume the damage on the fuel infrastructure has a significant effect
7)The next issue is what modern means for ground forces and air forces. It is supposed to mean All Weather forces. But at the very least night operations, but the issue is the bulk of the Russian ground equipment has 70s IR illuminators for its commanders.
More secondary evidence to support the argument that the logistics are really not there and this is how the Russian armed forces will fight against any foe. Expired Russian MoD rations from the era they grew in renown over the world (2013-2015):
19)Finally, to reiterate when you're not picking just a company or three from a brigade to send, you get to see how unprepared the service is. That shouldn't be news at this point, tanks without motor oil, dead batteries, drivers who can't handle ditches with tracked vehicles...
8)We have also seen Russian troops use flares during their attack of the nuclear powerplant in Energodar and lacking more sophisticated night fighting equipment. Even recent tank upgrades omitted that, like the T-80BVM.
18)As a whole while the Russian armed forces don't have the ability to act as a modern force at this scope. If we're talking about a subset across most branches of a combined total of 40-50 k . Maybe. But a ground component of 200k with backing, as we have seen is a problem.
10)Even though the Ru MoD considers most of its tanks as modern, in practice by the above standard only a small subset are. To tie it to experience from recent combat showcases that even the thermals on the Strykers can be used to avoid and counter ambushes.
13)The inversion of that paradigm suggest that procurement is driven by Almaz-Antey and Rostech's funding needs and desires, rather than actual modern AF doctrine. The DoD Procurement slideshows may cause migraines, they don't cause inferiority by design to this degree.
3)Let's do a head count, 2 Tu-214Rs and 3 modernised Il-20 derivatives have been received in the last 20+ years. The A-100 projects is still being delayed and the reports from KAZ suggest further Tu-214 orders will not be forthcoming.
9)When defining a modern tank we usually consider modern ammo (discrepancy in crew experience could negate it via outmanoeuvring) modern sights for the gunner, thermal equipped 360 periscope for the commander (hunter killer capability) and a battlefield information system.
The cheering of tankies of the FAB-3000 is weird. There's no guidance kit for it. It's not aerodynamic enough to glide as far as other variants & it's doubtful that the pylons of Su-34s can even take a FAB-3000 + a guidence kit even now UMPK FABs drop often due to weight issues.
Russian gasoline production last week declined to a new low of 815 300 tons and diesel production to 1638 800 tons. I have data for March 2023 20-26 Mar, gasoline production was 880 000 and diesel production was 1769 100.
Or much more likely heading for the announced drill in Romania from the 25th of May to the 11th of June named by the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence as "Wet Gap Crossing" involving a pontoon bridge company from the 55th engineering regiment.
14)And the other remaining problem is the issue with the continuous lack of JDAM equivalents. JDAM kits are cost effective, Russia just doesn't have a comparable program that has delivered kits at anywhere the same rate even if we account for a smaller fleet.
Over the last several years a large part of the perishable goods contracts for the Russian armed forces have been given to firms connected to Prigozhin and it's a lucrative business for him.
20)My assessment of the current fighting is also different. I presume that the Ruforces in the South met more success due it being easier to support them Ru VKS(as I mentioned in a previous thread + UA
AD focus on Kyiv). That pushed battered UA forces back behind the rivers.
22)The constant fear of a landing in Odessa seems to have forced a lot more UA troops to be kept there than necessary. Again consistent with a less aggressive (in terms eagerness to go on the offensive of military action) civil government which got spooked at the start.
11)The next bit is the VKS&AD procurement priorities, they are dominated by people with influence over the Kremlin, we see SHORAD development funding & some procurement funding and S-400 purchases. The issue is that this funding is greater or comparable to aircraft procurement.
12)This is an anomaly when it comes to modern air forces. As priority should go to various types of surveillance platforms, manned but also possible high endurance unmanned platforms , then strike and multiroles, then an operational budget for high training rates and then AD.
23)But overall we're seeing some mauled UA units still mounting an effective defence and a more conservative posture by UA and a southern Ru advance that captured a few bigger towns and stores, and thus doesn't have as a dire of a supply a situation, but it's facing problem 2.
21)The panic in Kyiv from days 1&2 has also led to more newly formed units being sent around the capitol. But because the Russian forces are so limited for their tasks in the South we just see small prongues which the remaining UA units are being able to check.
15)What I think
@KofmanMichael
might have been influenced by if I may paraphrase a document the Chieftain quoted in one of his talks, "The tendency to view the battlefield as a test agency". The use of Su-57, Mig-31 with Kinzhal, UGVs in Syria and so on.
A story that questions the assumption that Russian defence insdustry is working 24/7 and keeps growing. Il's Aviastar subsidiary in Ulyanovsk has 780 vacancies, UAZ has 368. Russian industry is certainly hitting limits be it machinery or labor shortages.
17)Armata is still in trials, Kh-31 was adopted but then the Tu-22M3M that was to carry it was cancelled, Project 855 sub never being adopted but becoming a test bed for Project 855M. Even the Su-57 is being accepted with a planned re-engining amongst other systems being pending.
In all seriousness military history has plenty of examples how after being stuck in such a situation the following process of untangling and forming cohesive assault groups isn't easy. And that's even without there being opposing fire directed at the columns.
16)But if we then go back to Ru MoD's overall experience with pre-production models we see that it's not really an indication for adoption or that these systems are anywhere as mature as the promotion materials suggest.
Gazprom reported a net loss of 629,1 billion rubles in 2023 vs a net profit of 1,23 trillion rubles in 2022. Expectations were for 447 billion rubles in profit. Revenue decreased by 3 trillion rubles from 11,6 trillion to 8,6 trillion rubles.
I have issues with the statements that Russia is recruiting 30 000 for the war every month. If we looked at the unemployed statistics for 2022 and 2023 we see a decrease by almost 520 000 in 2022 and 560 000 in 2023. This is for all unemployed ages 15-72 with >50% being women.
If Kyiv holds for a few more days, has enough time for newly raised units to coalesce, disseminate tactics to units, augment the vehicle pool with civilian ones and coordinate with the growing local reporting network, he's not going to have an army.
Brest,
#Belarus
, a few kilometers from the border with Poland, the NATO country. All equipment is marked with the letter V. We are asking Belarusians to send us information🇷🇺 troops.
By deploying the troops on the border with Poland, Putin also wants to threaten NATO
It should have been retired ages ago, but the VMF has such a severe shortage of major surface combatants that these are kept. And I don't think the decision making structures understood how much of a liability it is to keep a 70s ship with limited upgrades in service.
We have data on the Ru weekly consumption of gasoline for March, it rose by 13 000 tons per day in March to 794 000 tons a week and currently Ru oil firms are supplying more to the market than they are producing with 13-19 of Mar supply of 779 400 tons.
In 2018 Flot Prom pointed to older Russian ships having severe issues with their fire suppression systems. Again something that's been postponed as most modernisation plans have been scrapped.
Russian gasoline production the week of 18-24th March declined significantly 754 600 tons and diesel production rose a bit to 1648 100 tons. March 2023 20-26 Mar, gasoline production was 880 000 and diesel production was 1769 100.
I want to add something today about the Russian armaments industry. UVZ currently employs a bit over 20 000 people and isn't paying bonuses in full that it brags about and workers are winning cases in court against it with the help of their union.
As a summary, the hope that their army would reach 1,5 million soon is a form of fiction. Medvedev's numbers are imaginary, Russia doesn't have a spare army or two to do anything and the irrecoverable losses are in the hundreds of thousands.
Here's what the data I gathered on the more recently missing Russian soldiers says about their age and composition, they're older, they're more likely to be ex-convicts and mobilised men and the intake of young volunteers is remarkably low:
Also I forgot to add that there are tens of thousands of LNR and DNR regulars and mobilised that were added to the contractee pool. Basically the contractee number has in fact declined somewhat compared to late 2021.
Now this is the new normal, things will not improve drastically without big investments which the budget for 2024 just doesn't have, we're talking trillions of roubles here. Russia can either be at war or sustain itself, not both.
We have data on Belarus' gasoline exports toRussia. They are 100-150 000 tons gasoline per month which if Russian production is between 750-770 000 will not be enough to cover the deficit.
More from my research. Back in late September Russia still had some notable reserves of mobilized troops. Here's how the MIAs from mobilized men were distributed over Russia's regions However some of the regions remaining shouldn't be expected to have raised full regiments:
By 2019-2020 it was deemed uneconomical to even attempt it. It had years left in it. I believe it was seen that by the mid 2020s it would need 3 years in servicing to extend the life by another 5 years.
We know that in 2021 the contractees were at least 435 000, but when they give that figure they omit officers. The story said 405 000 announced in march and 30 000 more added over 2020. It also aims for 500 000 soon, but I can't dig up a source on that.
Medvedev is off by at least a factor of 2. So the army has lost somewhere maybe 150 -200 000 contractees. Unknown number of Wagnerites pre-reintegration and a ton of mobilised men. Also FSB uniformed troops, police, Rosguard and so on.
The officer numbers I am used to working with are between 70 000 and 90 000. So already we have at least 505 000 at the start of 2021. Now let's add other thing that were added to the MoD payroll in 2022. Then the LNR/DNR regulars + mobilized. We're now looking at 555-575 000.
Here's how gasoline and diesel production has been going in Russia over the last 13 weeks. December was relatively stable but after that you had parts that couldn't be replaced breaking, long weekends and initially a few UA attacks.