Did Confucius reject discussions about war?
Was Sun Tzu's Art of War a direct repudiation of Confucian doctrine?
Why, exactly, did Confucius immediately depart Duke Ling of Wei's court when asked about warfare?
Let's parse the hell out of a verse from the Analects and find out
Almost all of the events which are described in China's oldest historical texts (Zuozhuan, Shiji etc.) take place within the area bounded by the yellow circle. When ancient Chinese texts refer to the "Central States" (中國), this is the geographical area they are describing.
Many people who only know Taiwan from political maps are often surprised to learn how mountainous it is. The central mountain range covers over half the island and has more than 200 peaks reaching 9,800-13,000 feet elevation. Taiwan’s eastern half is as formidable as the Rockies
HBO's The Wire is rightly lauded for its vivid & realistic depiction of urban decay. But you might not notice that under the surface it is also a subtle exposition on Mohist & Legalist challenges to Confucian orthodoxy as witnessed during China's turbulent Warring States era:
To all “independent” China analysts: please make sure your 1st take complies with all CCP terms & conditions to avoid the embarrassment of having your government minder publicly rebuke you and compel revision of your deviant and incorrect thinking. Let’s all work together on this
Most strategic and IR scholars know the term "salami slicing," in which states slowly aggrandize power & territory so as to not trigger a response before it is too late to counteract. Ancient Chinese writings had a similar term, "to nibble away like a silkworm" (蠶食) ...
There's been a lot of recent takes on China's ability to take Taiwan via amphibious invasion, much of it thought provoking. But one area I see most hand-waving over is the invader "throughput" dilemma. Even if your troops & equipment make it ashore, where do they go?
A Chinese text composed in 239 BC outlines the "eight examinations and six tests for evaluating [personnel]." 2,261 years later, it still provides a useful method to assess the true nature of the men and women who make up our own organizations:
The most egregious use of fake Sun Tzu quotes comes from a book written by prominent military professionals and designed to introduce junior officers to classic military texts. Astoundingly, they promote three false Sun Tzu quotes in their very brief section on the Art of War:
Chinese philosophy, unfortunately, is difficult to access in the West. For those who are looking to gain an introduction to the fascinating but complicated world of ancient Chinese thought, here is a short thread on my (completely subjective) suggestions for how to get started.
When I brief on the importance of context in correctly grasping Sun Tzu’s Art of War, I begin with a brief introduction to the Twilight Zone’s classic 1962 episode “To Serve Man” in which a race of advanced aliens tricks mankind into willingly becoming livestock.
Here’s why …
The king of Song said to his prime minister, Tang Yang, "I have executed a multitude, yet my officials fear me even less. Why is that?"
"Those whom your majesty condemned were all not good," Tang Yang replied. "Punishing those who are evil produces no fear ...
Feeling joyful, King Li of Zhou told the duke of Shao, “I have stopped people’s criticism. No one dares to oppose me anymore.” The duke of Shao said, “You are blocking the people’s mouths. In so doing, you will face consequences greater than blocking a river. 1/2
For those wondering where Chinese Ambassador Qin Gang’s claim that “Taiwan has been an inseparable part of China’s territory for 1,800 years,” here is what he is referring to:
For anyone interested in ancient Chinese military history but put off by its inaccessibility, I do have a database of all 584 military actions documented in the Zuozhuan. Note that I color code boxes of states involved in the actions (to better identify patterns of conflict) 1/2
“War is a subject of vital importance to the STATE”
This is the opening line of Sun Tzu’s Art of War.
But what did the STATE (國) actually mean in the context of a military work compiled during an era of declining Zhou authority?
If you need evidence of how poorly we generally understand Sun Tzu and Chinese strategic thinking & history in PME, consider the Army’s manual on Chinese Tactics:
“Sun Tzu and Mao together created the framework from which the PLA’s modern-day strategy and tactics are derived.”
Given the confusion and rampant misinformation over U.S. policy towards Taiwan, I have found this one of the best quick explainers for those who understandably remain perplexed on why this controversy refuses to go away:
read this. DO NOT look up anything about it. just read it. it's only like 2,000 pages & its fractured narratives & confusing cast of thousands of individuals will drive you insane. It will only take like one or two decades to get thru. do it right now i'm very extremely serious.
read this. DO NOT look up anything about it. just read it. it's only like 500 pages u can listen to it from your local bard it's only like fourteen hours. do it right now i'm very extremely serious.
How accurate/useful are these comparisons? I’ll let McNulty weigh in.
But it’s worth recognizing that the debates amongst these ancient thinkers get to the heart of issues we still wrestle with today, even on the mean streets of Charm City.
That’s it, now adjourn your asses.
An obvious exception would be several chapters in the Shiji which also describe the tribes and regions touching the edges of the circle, such as those detailing the Xiongnu and Chosun, although the focus is still on how they impacted the Central States.
Again, Sun Tzu never said this. In fact, no ancient Chinese text clearly distinguished “tactics” from “strategy.”
The origin of this fake quote is found in a breezy 2002 inspirational business quote book titled, “Ready, Aim, Inspire!”
As Sun Tzu warned, “Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.”
Ever since George HW Bush mocked the “vision thing” in 1988, America’s distaste for strategy has only grown. Not so in China. See my latest Project Syndicate piece.
Meet Xia Ji, one of Chinese history's most notorious femme fatales. Corruptor of men; Destroyer of states. She is credited in historical texts as the catalyst for the reconfiguration of the political chessboard in 6th century BC China. Let's see how this (might have) happened 🧵
My main critique of Sun Tzu studies in the West is that we should stop reading it divorced from the historical context in which it was originally written and propagated. It too often leads us to facile conclusions about its intended message. The Zuozhuan is vital to grasping this
Wounded, Duke Zhuang of Wey entered the Ji household saying, “If you save my life, I will give you this jade disk.” The Ji men said, “And what happens to the jade disk if we kill you?” So they killed him and took his disk.
— Zuozhuan, Duke Ai, Year 17 (478 BC)
Machiavelli: "It is desirable to be both loved and feared; but it is difficult to achieve both and, if one of them has to be lacking, it is much safer to be feared than loved"
Zichan of Zheng: "Only one who has virtue is capable of controlling the people by means of leniency ...
A reminder that the “historical” Sun Tzu never actually “won without fighting.” He launched a 6-year military campaign where his soldiers fought & died every year, then culminated by marching his entire army deep into enemy territory where they fought a series of bloody battles…
While a third biography of Chiang Kai-shek is probably superfluous, I’m enjoying this latest version by Alexander Pantsov. Where Fenby’s version is highly critical of him and Taylor goes to the opposite extreme in trying to restore his reputation, this one seems more balanced.
Is your war going poorly because the opposing general is stubbornly comptent?
Have you thought about swapping him out so a military novice can now be your adversary?
This is how Qin defeated Zhao at the Battle of Changping in 260 BC, turning a stalemate into a bloody massacre.
We often misread Mao Zedong's military theory. Fighting a prolonged guerrilla campaign is only a liminal stage. You won't DEFEAT the enemy thru guerrilla war alone. At some point according to Mao, you MUST transition from irregular to regular war, something the IW primacists miss
This new narrative history of the Assyrian empire is excellent, which reached the apex of its power and decline in 7th cent BC
But still can’t understand why a comparable treatment of the same era in Chinese history doesn’t yet exist. Why do we still lack good secondary sources?
An interesting fact in Sima Qian's Shiji: His chapter titled "Biographies of Cruel Officials" is 6x longer than his chapter titled "Biographies of Upright Officials." Sima Qian ends the chapter lamenting: "why bother to describe all of them? Why bother to describe all of them?"
Many people might not realize that which Sun Tzu translation they consult might alter how they view the text.
Translators often arrive at vastly different interpretations of the verses.
Here is one example where contextualization can help adjudicate these discrepancies …
“Opportunities multiply as they are seized”; “Can you imagine what I would do if I could do all I can?”; and “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer.”
If that last quote sounds familiar, it comes from Godfather II, not Sun Tzu.
As sinologist A.C. Graham noted, for the Chinese philosophers of the era the crucial question for all of them was not What is the truth? but instead Where is the Way?—the way to provide order and conduct one's personal life. In the Wire, the Way (道) is referred to as “THE GAME”
The Mozi, a Warring States era text, contains a lengthy and fascinating section on city defenses. The level of detail it describes is noteworthy, including the construction of special geophone pots (罌) designed to locate when and where the enemy attempts to tunnel under the city
Influential Chinese theorist Yan Xuetong, in a book arguing that China should proactively seek to replace the current international system, uses examples such as the 651 BC Kuiqui covenant and 546 BC “bi-polar configuration of Jin and Chu” to make his case for this shift.
Mao Zedong famously compared the PRC's relationship to North Korea as being "close as lips and teeth." By this, he means they are interdependent--if one were to fall, the other would be immediately placed in a perilous position. But what is the origin of the phrase?
Unfortunately we won't have time to delve into the Daoist aspects of the Wire, including such deep ontological questions as whether or not this was Bunk dreaming he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was Bunk in a pink robe locked in a stranger's bathroom ...
We tend to embody the origin of Chinese military thinking in the figure of Sun Tzu, which is a mistake.
Counterintuitively, I suggest we look to a minor 8th century BC nobleman from the state of Zheng, Zhu Dan, who makes only two brief appearances in the Zuozhuan.
Hear me out
As the internet Sun Tzu long ago warned us:
"Even the unstoppable power of the waterfall quickly dissipates when it is forced to flow through a straw."
Trying to find the origin of this fake Sun Tzu quote was the start of my own reassessment of the text, eventually leading to a view that we need to completely rethink use of it as “strategic canon” within our own PME institutions.
But how did this fake quote propagate so widely?
Nothing about this has any bearing on contemporary PRC territorial claims. For anyone who thinks what ancient Chinese texts either claimed or don’t claim bolsters or refutes the legitimacy any modern PRC borders (other than the “ancientness” of these borders), you are mistaken.
As Strategy, IR, and Diplomatic History professors finalize their Fall semester syllabi, I’ll make my periodic recommendation to consider adding the Zuozhuan as a way to bring a non-Western perspective in discussing the foundations of international order.
One thing that’s important to point out is that which translation of Sun Tzu’s Art of War you rely on can have a significant impact on how you understand the text. Here are a few examples where three popular translations vary widely in their interpretations of this seminal work…
“The Art of War promises a way out of the Clausewitzian interaction between two forces locked in hard fighting, each determined to impose its will on the other.”
It really doesn’t. This is a long-standing false assumption that we need to expunge from the Western PME curriculum.
The Game, like the Way, does not have a codified set of rules & regulations, yet it permeates all facets of life as they perceive it. For many the game is never-changing, for some it is constantly in flux, for others its nature remains immutable but its character rapidly evolves.
Know Your Ancient Chinese Battles, Part 1:
The Battle of Changshao (684 BC)
Why is it important for Westerners to become familiar with this particular battle? Because Mao Zedong held it up as the paradigmatic example of “Strategic Retreat” in his own military writings.
“When the word [strategy] first entered the vernacular in 1771, it expressed a view of generalship that admired ruses and maneuvers to avoid pitched battles.”
— Lawrence Freedman “Strategy: The History of an Idea”
So when wargames claim that the PLA can successfully deploy 30 battalions on the island within 3 weeks is that taking into account the logistical challenges, or are we simply assuming these difficulties away?
And while the PLA won't face the hedgerow issue, once they do get off the beachhead, they will immediately run into Taiwan's version--urban sprawl. This is the type of terrain the PLA forces must maneuver through almost immediately after leaving the post-stamp sized landing beach
Chinese historical dramas portray an ancient world filled with lithe & beautiful people. But Xunzi, the 3rd century BC Confucian scholar reminds us that not everyone in ancient China was ready for their closeup. Here is how he describes some of the most famous historical figures:
John Boyd's argument in "Patterns of Conflict" that Genghis Khan conducted warfare based on the tenets of Sun Tzu illustrates neatly Clausewitz's admonition that reliance on ancient military history to clarify contemporary theory is too often driven by "vanity and quackery."
A Confucian view is best represented by Avon Barksdale. He longs to return to a golden age of the Game, when all of its players harmoniously conformed to its dictates. He tries to instill in his organization a discipline and ethos based on strict hierachy and conforming rituals.
In the “Six Secret Teachings of Jiang Ziya” (one of the 7 Military Classics of ancient China) King Wu asks Jiang Ziya how others can assist the ruler in developing & implementing strategy. His answer is an interesting early conceptualization of the modern general staff system:
This is quickly becoming the new popular fake Sun Tzu quote. It does not come from Sun Tzu and nothing in the original text comes close to this sentiment. As far as I can tell, it seems to be a slight variation of a line Lord Varys says about Littlefinger on “Game of Thrones.”
“But the us is not comfortable with China becoming a tiger. America wants China to be a cat, maybe a fat cat. And it wants to pull out our teeth, like AI or high-end semiconductors which can empower China’s industrial development and military capability.”
The philosopher Mozi (and Stringer Bell) rejects much of Confucian reliance on strict hierarchy, ritualized norms, and privileged traditions. To Bell, Avon's answers to the problem of the Game did not lead to greater profit & stability, but rather fueled resentment & backlash.
But what they all agree on is that the game can only be ignored at one's peril. What assumptions one makes about the game, and how one devises a code that aligns one's personal and organizational conduct in relationship to it, lays the foundation for enduring order or disorder.
I am not particularly focused on how the PLA thinks about Sun Tzu. My sense is that both the PLA and Taiwan military respect the text, but don’t necessarily revere it.
Meanwhile, Western PME elevates it to a strategic canon taught to every military officer & this is problematic.
In a PLA amphibious invasion, though, the Chinese will not have the benefit of the favorable Normandy beaches for landing & staging their equipment. Suitable landing beaches are small and not conducive to large-scale marshaling of forces. They will quickly get jammed up.
After Xerxes crossed the Hellespont on pontoon bridges in advance of his invasion of Greece in 480 BC, he stopped the entire Persian army for a headcount and arrived at a total 1.7 million-man invading force.
How did he calculate this figure?
There is a Chinese masterpiece
which has gained legions of fans overseas. Some people read it over and over again, while some take notes page after page. Read this book, to understand China in the New Era.
There is a Chinese masterpiece
which has gained legions of fans overseas.
Some people read it over and over again,
while some take notes page after page.
Read this book, to understand China in the New Era.
So the Sunday Truce must be strictly adhered to, even when a sworn enemy is in one's cross-hairs. A corner should never be relinquised—even if it is too costly to maintain—because its symbolism of the organization's capacity to maintain order & stability gives it higher value.
Stringer Bell, like Mozi, was a consequentalist. Whatever brought the greatest benefit to the whole enterprise should be adopted by the organization, even if these bucked longstanding traditions and norms. His "New Day Co-op" reflected Mozi's idea of exalting the worthy (尚賢).
Tradition and blood (family ties) are honored above all, and the moment you turn your back on the game as it was played before, you quickly lose your bearings. As Confucius said: "To pursue strange theories or to get sidetracked in your studies can only bring harm."
One fascinating characteristic of the Zuozhuan is that in its year-by-year chronicle of major historical events occurring within the Zhou realm and its near environs from 722-468 BC (a 255-year timeframe), there is a not a single maritime issue either identified or discussed ...
Martin van Creveld:
“Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, like similar Chinese texts, was never meant for publication. It was kept secret in the archives where only a selected few had access to it.”
Han Feizi:
EVERYBODY has a copy of Sun Tzu's Art of War in their homes:
Like Mozi's condemnation of warfare (非攻) as a mutually destructive activity, Stringer Bell resists the pressure to “beef over corners,” noting that it is the violence inherent in holding & gaining territory which brings the attention of police, and thus halts chances to profit.
When rivers are blocked, they will burst the banks and kill a lot of people. The same is true with blocking people’s mouths."
--Discourses of the States (Zhou I)
A podcast on Sun Tzu by a Cornell classics professor attempts to identify the key difference in Eastern and Western views on war by making this dubious claim:
“In the West war is glorious, in the East, war is distasteful”
This trope needs to be retired.
If his majesty desires that all his officials fear him, it would be best to condemn good and not-good alike. Then all his officials would certainly fear him."
A short time later the lord of Song executed Tang Yang ...
But even this photo belies how difficult a task the Allies had ahead of them. They quickly ran into the Normandy "hedgerows" which bottled up their forces, and allowed the German defenders to blunt the numerical, logistical & maneuver advantage of the Allied force.
This is a good example of how little we often know/care about early Chinese history. Michael Grant’s “The Founders of the Western World” (1991) provides a timeline to compare Greek/Roman history with other regions. And he can find nothing of significance happening in 7th cent BC?
“Xi Jinping Thought views Chinese history not as an academic subject but as a useful tool to shape the thinking of Chinese people. He sees facts in history as incidental; interpretation is what matters, and only one correct interpretation is allowed.”
The stern & taciturn Marlo leads his organization in a manner reminiscent of Han Fei’s vision of an ideal ruler: “So still he seems to dwell nowhere at all; so empty no one can seek him out. The ruler reposes in nonaction above, and below his ministers tremble with fear.”
The Legalist challenge to both orthodoxies as represented by the later Warring States philosophers Shang Yang & Han Fei, arrives on the streets of West Baltimore in the form of Marlo Stanfield. For him the game remains the same, but the rules by which it should be played differ.
Much like Qin eventually unified the Warring States through its brutal legalist doctrine, Marlo similarly unified East & West Baltimore, creating his own empire. Both empires were short lived. Once the dynamic ruler is removed from the game few are willing or able to maintain it.
We often think of Sun Tzu as the master of intrigue and cunning, but his advice on deception is rather staid and non-descript. For those who really want to become well-versed in the dark arts of deceit, double-dealing, and chicanery, Jiang Ziya is a much better guide.
The Legalists had no interest in how things were done before: “Circumstances change,” Han Fei warns, “so the ways of dealing with them must alter too.” Fathers may hope that sons will grow up to respect tradition, but Han Fei reminds us that “children are not always well behaved”
If you do ever choose to tackle the complex Chinese historical narrative, Zuozhuan, one of the most difficult aspects is keeping track of who the various regional rulers were as you navigate their complicated familial, diplomatic & military relationships. This table might help.
The Barksdale-Bell (Confucian-Mohist) failure to agree to a common vision aligning the organization within the Game was catastrophic. Adherents flocked to both camps and further sects splintered, increasing the disorder. From this tumult a new challenger suddenly appeared...
The Uncertain Trumpet of Sun Tzu:
We often think of Sun Tzu’s military advice deriving from a supremely confident commander acting as a masterful manipulator of circumstances.
This assumption, though, makes us overlook a persistent thread running through the text …
FEAR
Marlo maintains tight control by leveraging Han Fei’s two handles of rulership: “The two handles are punishment and favor. What do I mean by punishment and favor? To inflict mutilation and death on men is called punishment; to bestow honor and reward is called favor.”
“Thus the gates of wealth and nobility lie exclusively within the realm of war. Those able to successfully wage war will pass through the gates of wealth and nobility”
— Book of Lord Shang
Chinese thought was more complex and varied than unwavering paeans to peace & harmony
"For more than 5,000 years, the history of Chinese civilization has taught us that the core concepts of Chinese culture are peace, harmony, and concord....[these values are] the genetic inheritance engraved in the bones of the Chinese people" - Yang Faxi, VP of Hongqi Press.
1/2
Given that we have so few good successful amphibious invasion historical examples, most seem to have in mind D-Day, where the seized beachheads allowed ample room to offload, marshal, and move out your units so newly arrived ones can quickly offload (as the previous photo shows).
And as this excellent article analyzing CCP primary documents clearly demonstrates, up until the 1943 Cairo Declaration, even Mao Zedong considered Taiwan a separate nation from China.
One of the best books explaining what happened over the last year in Ukraine and what the coming year will bring: “the grim reality is that victory is usually achieved by grinding attrition and mass slaughter,” not quick and decisive battles.
Finally got a copy of Lee Hsi-Ming’s (李喜明)—a retired Taiwan admiral and potential Defense Minister—new book on his controversial “Overall Defense Concept” (ODC). I will occasionally post on it as I (slowly) go through it, but hope a translated version soon gets published.
“It also turns out that the Sunzi, the revered Classical Chinese military theorist, offers much bad advice that Chiang Kai-shek carefully followed.”
An all too rare take rejecting the simplistic notion that simply following Sun Tzu will inevitably lead one to strategic success.
Many know the common Chinese idiom "point at deer and call it horse" as a phrase meaning "deliberate misrepresentation" and trace it to the duplicitous Qin minister, Zhao Gao, but fewer know that it has an even earlier parallel in the classic Legalist text, Han Feizi ...
“We should remember that, from the Han dynasty through the Tang dynasty, the world of ideas did not really have a sense of foreign states or of an international order. It was not until the Song dynasty that China found itself in a multistate international environment ...
“No one knows how many positions Chiang Kai-shek held during the war years. At one time his secretary said there were at least eighty-two; he imagined a complete list could be found somewhere, but he had never compiled one. The Ministry of Information made up an incomplete list,
Similar to Shang Yang's insistence that a ruler's subjects be devoted to only two full-time tasks: agriculture and warfare, Marlo views his own organization as an army and employs them as well in only two fundamental tasks: slinging dope & enforcing Marlo's writ on the street.
A 2nd century BC text, known as the Huainanzi, attempted to collect all the knowledge a Han dynasty ruler would need to successfully govern the Chinese state. In its 4th chapter "Terrestrial Forms," it identifies the "36 countries existing beyond the seas." Some are quite odd:
All three versions of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) authoritative strategic text, "The Science of Military Strategy" (2001, 2013, & 2020 editions) highlight this 1973 book as an example of outstanding Western strategic thought. Not sure why it's considered so influential.
One of the Seven Military Classics, Six Secret Teachings of Jiang Ziya lists all of the equipment an army of 10,000-men will need to assemble to go to war.
Its descriptions of the required chariot types read like they come straight out of Mad Max Fury Road rather than antiquity: