Journalist, Fact checker,
Ukraine war analysis with
@black_birdgroup
Political history @ University of Helsinki
📞 +358413106215
✉️ John.jhelin
@gmail
.com
Our constanty updated situational map of the Russo-Ukrainian war can be found at:
However, to improve performance we've recently moved everything pre-Kherson offensive to our map-archive. It can be found at:
Some have called the Russian efforts to take Bakhmut senseless, but I don't necessarily agree.
Why does Bakhmut matter and why are both Ukraine and Russia willing to throw so many men into the meatgrinder it has become?
As promised: why Bakhmut? A thread.
1/
If you're laughing at videos of Russian mobiks and conscripts being literally raped you should probably re-evaluate your life choices.
And yes, partially that applies to combat footage too.
The amount of dehumanization going around is pretty fucked.
Velyka Novosilka, a thread.
I've been asked about this enough and considering the developments of today on the Tokmak axis, it's good to get it out of the way.
Information presented here is mostly based on satellite data from monday as well as Russian video and reports.
1/
Three out of the six Leopard 2R mine-clearing vehicles Finland donated to Ukraine have been lost in the same field.
With other engineering vehicles in the field as well, this is a massive loss for the brigade, no matter what.
The discourse on Ukraine's counter-offensive often oversimplifies Soviet doctrine as rigid mass warfare and NATO- as flexible maneuver warfare.
The truth is far more nuanced, and needed for future discussions.
Thus: Soviet tactical and operational doctrine, a thread.
1/
A quick example of the minor mistakes in narratives having large implications.
I'm currently reading "The Battle for Kyiv" by Christopher Lawrence. It's an excellent book. There's however a minor mistake that seems to find its way into every story of the battle.
Ivankiv.
1/
I saw someone mapping the Ukrainian supply routes into Avdiivka in a rather lacklustre way. So I decided to do my own, more informative, map.
To talk about the logistics of Avdiivka we also need to talk about the terrain west of it.
So Avdiivka, a thread:
1/
A lot has happened today around Popasna and the Severodonetsk kessel.
@emilkastehelmi
talked about it in finnish, and now I'll do it in english.
It's time for another look at topographic maps, this time at the entire Kramatorsk - Severodonetsk bulge.
A thread 1/?
I think the correct response to this for Ukraine is saying "thank you for your feedback, we'll take it into consideration", and immediately launching the next wave of strikes on Russian energy infrastructure.
Scoop: The US has urged Ukraine to halt attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure, warning senior SBU and GUR officials that drone strikes risk driving up global oil prices and provoking retaliation.
w/
@hallbenjamin
@felschwartz
@mylesmccormick_
via
@FT
According to Rybar the Ukrainains have managed to break through Kostromka and are now attacking towards the Davydiv Brid - Nova Kakhovka road. We assess that the Ukrainian advance might well be wider than shown by Rybar, and they might be moving for the road on a wider axis.
Reports of first F-16's in Ukraine.
Not surprising, considering the Estonian Defence Ministry idea paper mentioned that the first F-16's would reach Ukraine before the end of the year.
Our
@emilkastehelmi
and
@EerikMatero
went and mapped all the Russian fortifications in Luhansk and Northern Donetsk they could find on Sentinel images.
The Russian defensive lines are getting extensive, and breaching them is going to be costly, if absolutely doable, for Ukraine.
I've waited over the weekend for more information to make hard statements about the Avdiivka withdrawal.
By now it's safe to say that the worst case scenario of encirclement was avoided. Ukraine clearly managed to pull its formations out of the city bit by bit during the nights.
In short:
1) It controls the Ukrainian logistics of a vast area and is a significant transport hub
2) It allows Russia to threaten other contact line fortifications.
3) Capturing it and pushing past the contact line. gives Russia better terrain for future offensives.
2/
Tehtiin
@emilkastehelmi
@EerikMatero
ja
@sakkesarjakoski
kanssa päätös, että luovutaan termeistä "geolokaatio" ja "kronolokaatio", ja yritetään niiden sijaan käyttää termejä "paikannus" ja "ajannus".
Pidetään kotikieli rikkaampana vähemmän kömpelöillä termeillä!
1)
The city of Bakhmut is an important crossroad and the major arteries of northern Donetsk run through it, most importantly the M03 towards Slovyansk.
In addition, a railroad runs from the city towards the south through Maiorsk to Luhansk and Russia. 3/
While I do agree that Ukraine's ultimate victory is dependent on continued and increased Western support, I still think that the hyperfocus on technology and equipment is problematic.
Ukraine has a lot of training and command issues that hamper the effective use of material.
1/
The positional war is not the result of fundamental realities in modern warfare that can only be changed with a technological or tactical revolution. Neither does it rest on a permanent parity in military capacity between Russia & Ukraine regardless of Western support to Kyiv. 🧵
This means that capturing the city and the surrounding area, especially the Severodonetsk road, helps with Russian logistics in the area and makes the city a good staging point for future offensives towards Slovyansk.
We'll talk about this more in the third part. 4/
US officials have claimed that Ukraine has penetrated 5-10km into the Russian depth. This can be true according to Russian reports as well as satellite imagery from Monday.
Remember: Russians losing ground is often implied by glorious defensive successes moving south.
4/
Kostyantinivka - Bakhmut road bridge over the canal has been destroyed. This greatly impedes the Ukrainian ability to counterattack west of Bakhmut and limits the usefulness of such operations.
Bakhmut is now definitely reliant on a single road.
With things kicking up in Zaporizhzhia, it remains to be seen how important the Velyka Novosilka AO will be in the future or if it is just a fixing operation.
However, it's possible that the Ukrainians might see which axis achieves more and then reinforce success.
15/16
On a more local level the main supply route of Soledar, and Siversk further north, runs near the city and thus capturing Bakhmut makes the defence of the Siversk area more challenging.
The bridge over the Siverskiy Donets at Zakitne is still down.
(Sentinel, 4.12.22) 5/
Thus the logistics of the whole Siversk direction would need to be run through much smaller roads.
In addition, many feel that the Kreminna direction might be the best bet for Ukrainian advances in Luhansk. Russian gains near Siversk would put that effort in trouble 6/
However, with the capture of the height at Storozheve the Ukrainians are in a good place to continue offensive operations. It's also likely fixing the Russian 127th and 42nd Motorized Divisions
Even then it's still a long way to go to the Russian main defensive line.
14/15
Suomen lehdistössä on kutsuttu Hamasin väkivaltaa "summittaiseksi".
Yhden eliniän tarpeiksi materiaalia tilanteesta katsoneena on pakko kuitenkin todeta, ettei väkivallassa ole mitään umpimähkäistä.
Se sijaan se on kokonaisvaltaista, maksimalistista ja täysin suunniteltua
While Ukraine has been good at using smaller roads for logistics in the past, it's unclear how winter conditions will affect many of these minor routes. Snow and ice may at the very least slow down logistics over them. 7/
2)
However, Siversk isn't the only thing influenced by Bakhmut. While the city itself is deep behind the old contact line, its fall would allow Russia to flank other fortifications.
This is part of a larger Russian idea of encircling strong points on the contact line. 10/
Thus, in conclusion, I've seen the Russian operations in Bakhmut be called senseless, but I think Bakhmut isn't called "the key to Donetsk" for nothing. The Russians know the possibilities that controlling the city opens and Ukraine knows the challenges losing it will bring. 23/
Even if Siversk itself is properly supplied, the fall of Bakhmut would greatly affect the situation in Soledar, and give Russia better eyes upon the Bakhmutovka valley, meaning that Ukrainian defensive lines might have to be pulled further west 8/
Geolocated Russian footage of UA battalion level attack to be west of Velyka Novosilka.
47.8243, 36.7393
"Footage of the defeat of armored vehicles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the attacks on the Zaporozhye direction on June 4."
@GeoConfirmed
In the coming weeks we'll most likely see Ukrainian reconnaisance and probing of Russian defensive lines in multiple directions.
This means a lot of "the offensive has started" false alarms by both triggerhappy pro-UA and pro-RUS folks.
Remember:
Keep calm and RUMINT=SCUMINT.
Do note, all of this is at least two days old in terms of satellite imagery, and the rest is based on things the Russians themselves have published on various channels.
It's very unlikely that any of what I am going to say is new to the Russian forces in Ukraine.
3/
That's not to say that you should feel bad for every single soldier who dies in a genocidal war of aggression, but there are some lines being crossed here, especially when it comes to the aforementioned barracks rapes.
Goes doubly if you have no connections to Ukraine.
By looking at the rainbow gradient map of doom, we can see that the ridgeline on the SW side of Bakhmut (the light blue area top mid) is the dominating terrain feature of the area, and gives Russia the ability to support attacks southwest, towards the Toretsk supply routes. 11/
At the moment there's a lot of talk about Bakhmut being the right call, including from Ukrainian officials.
I'm still waiting to pass ultimate judgement due to multiple factors at play (and it might take years to know everything)
Let's talk about it.
1/21
The area of Dyliivka is not nearly as well fortified as the area near Bakhmut was, and should Russia manage to cross the canal west of Kurdyumivka and advance westwards with the help of the heights, they could eventually put the T0516 under fire control. 12/
According to Russian reports and videos, the Ukrainians have attacked the Velyka Novoselivka bulge from all sides with reports focused around the villages of Novodarivka in the east, Novodonetske in the west, and the ridgeline near Neskuchne and Storozheve in the middle.
6/
This looks like well executed and competent company-level mechanized attack into Russian positions west of the Siverskiy-Donets canal. A tank platoon supports two(?) mechanized infantry platoons in seizing a woodline.
Most likely filmed sometime between 8th and 15th of May.
According to Russian reports, after three days of fighting the Ukrainians have established positions on the dominant heights west of Storozheve.
This action protects the flank of the attack down the road toward Urozhaine.
9/
Such an offensive attempt would most likely be aimed at capturing the rest of the Donetsk oblast. For this to have any chance of success, Russia wants to be past the contact line fortifications. The Popasna offensive taught them dearly how hard it is to push past them. 17/
In fact, the heaviest offensive action has likely taken place on both sides of the Mokri Yaly River. At Urozhaine and Neskuchne-Storozheve. These attacks support each other.
8/
Of course, the chances of such an offensive succeeding are slim in the best of conditions and are reliant on Ukraine running low on artillery ammunition and other equipment.
However, that doesn't really matter as long as the Russian political leadership demands it. 18/
As always, me,
@emilkastehelmi
@EerikMatero
and the rest of our team are working on a constantly updating situational map of the war. It can be found here:
The Finnish audience can also catch me at
@hsfi
doing fact checking and in Ukraine Studio.
26/26
This analysis was done in cooperation with other members of
@Black_BirdGroup
. We have a logo now and perhaps soon something more formal.
You can find our constantly updated situation map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine at
16/16
This brings us to 3)
Russia may believe that with the mobilization producing up to 300 000 troops, and giving it a chance to rest and refit other units, it's in a position to take the initiative and launch a major offensive attempt come spring. 16/
The official's claims seem to be credible both according to the Russian reports as well as Sentinel imagery from Monday morning but don't necessarily mean that Ukraine has achieved a breakthrough yet.
Let's examine what is being reported and what we know.
5/
As with other Russian advancements, this would hardly be a lighting strike towards the southwest, but it would nevertheless make supplying Toretsk and Pivnichne a lot more challenging, and Russia hopes that it could force Ukraine to withdraw from those cities. 13/
Any future advance from Bakhmut onwards will also be a slow slog, just as Bakhmut itself has been, and the situation on the ground may change many times before any of the possibilities can actually be realised, but without Bakhmut Russia can't realise them at all. 25/
Outside of these 3 points, there is the Siverskiy Donetsk - Donetsk canal which is essential for getting water to the areas that Russia has occupied since 2015. Donetsk is suffering from lack of water and controlling the canal is very important for Russian political goals. 19/
So what's the assessment based on this?
The Russian defensive victories haven't moved much further south yet, so I'll assume that fighting is taking place roughly along these lines.
If that is true, then the situation is "not great, not terrible"
12/
This would, again, open up the contact line and let Russia advance westwards from the Maiorsk railway station without urban combat in Pivnichne and Toretsk. This is in line with other Russian attempts to threaten encirclement and have Ukraine withdraw from cities. 14/
If Toretsk falls, Niu-Yorks supply lines start being under threat.
As said, these advances would most likely not be fast. Nothing like we saw in Popasna, and a long slog, but Russia may believe that it could breach the contact line in multiple places before spring
15/
Even if Bakhmut falls the Ukrainians will put up a significant fight against any future Russian advances. Of course, Bakhmut with its urban terrain and relatively covered supply line to the west has presented itself as an exceptionally defensible area. 22/
This also highlights the importance of Bakhmut once again. The M03 towards Slovyansk is a natural attack vector for Russian troops, and the railway line means, that should Russia manage to take significant ground, Bakhmut can act as a supply hub. 18/
The Ukrainian offensive started in earnest on Monday the 5th of June. According to Russian reports, the offensive was conducted by 3 brigades, with Ukrainians attacking in company team- or battalion size.
Satellite data generally supports these claims.
6/
With the challenges that both sides have had with offensive action against determined defenders, I'm not sure it's worth it, but there is at least a reason why both sides are willing to expend such large amounts of men and material in the Bakhmut meatgrinder. 24/
Fighting is still largely taking place in the forward positions of the Russian defenses. Losses have been taken especially from mines and artillery. The overall casualty rate and condition of the UA force is unknown.
It's clear that some battalions have suffered greatly
13/
I'm not sure why people seem to be misunderstanding, or wilfully taking, the phrase "Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed" to mean something like "Ukraine can never go on the offensive again and has lost the war".
It doesn't mean that. We are talking about an operation.
Russians claim these units are the 23rd, 31st, and 37th brigades. Only 37th can be confirmed with moderate confidence through OSINT due to the presence of AMX-10 RC's and Mastiff MRAP's on Russian videos.
7/
The opinions of some of the Western commentators regarding the counteroffensive bear a striking similarity to the Russian narratives that we've seen after every major failure.
Getting on that cope train is not a great look when we've been laughing at Vatniks for 1,5 years.
Ukraine's counter-offensive has been panned as a failure
The truth is more complex
Some thoughts on the successes and failures of Ukraine's counter-offensive /1
It's also true that the significance of Bakhmut was much, much higher back when Russia still was in Izium and Slovyansk would've been advanced upon from two sides.
In a similar vein, Siversk was in a bad situation already during the summer with Russians north of the river 20/
Russians only sparsely talk about the push towards Urozhaine though. According to terrain, this is an important attack vector. Sentinel imagery shows signs of fighting.
The edge of Urozhane is almost 10km from Velyka Novosilka.
🙂
7/
The announcements of military aid to Ukraine over the past few days are significant and give Ukraine much-needed offensive power for the battles of spring and summer.
Further east there has been fighting for the village of Novodonetske, with destroyed equipment from the village shown on Russian telegram channels. The T-64 is old news, but the mastiffs are new.
It's unclear who controls the village as of now.
10/
However, there was mention of Ukrainians bypassing Novodonetske for Kermenchyk on Monday. However, the settlement hasn't been really mentioned since and Russians claim they threw the Ukrainians backs.
That is around 5-8km from the Ukrainian start line
11/
@emilkastehelmi
With the talk of a Russian breakthrough at Soledar and the T1302 in danger of being cut off it's important to look at the topography of the Bakhmut - Lysychansk are and why these developments are important.
A short thread on the Russian advance 1/
I am so tired of saying this, but Avdiivka is getting worse by the day.
If the Russians manage to move southwards from current positions they will effectively cut the road to Sieverne as well. They can already most likely fire ATGM's on it.
This can easily become a disaster.
Russian gains do not mean that the Siversk area will certainly fall into Russian hands, nor that the Toretsk - Niu York - Pivnichne triangle will fall. It just makes future Russian operations to take these areas easier, or even possible at all in the case of the latter. 21/
RUMINT = SCUMINT.
I'm too tired to track down where this map originated, but even if the Russians do fall back (uncertain), I don't understand why they would give up such large swathes of area, including Enerhodar, when the enemy presence is a couple of companies in Krynky.
Evidence points that Russia is putting a lot of resources in to encircling the city, using these frontal attacks to fix defenders.
In general a lot of the narratives coming out of Bakhmut are weird. For example the "WW1 style human wave attacks".
So, Bakhmut, a thread. 1/
Instead of trying to encircle Bakhmut and slowly taking it, the Russian High command seems to have decided to launch a frontal attack on the city itself, proving my suspicion that Putin wants the city as fast as possible even when this means highest rate of own casualties. 1/8
Western and Ukrainian officials are saying that the counteroffensive is going slower than was hoped.
Ukraine is not perfect, and there are critiques to be made about the offensive. Claiming that everything is great no matter what happens, does not help Ukraine.
Why is the Ukrainian counteroffensive going exactly as planned and definitely not moving slowly, but rather moving better than many expected? However, the devil is in the details, which I intend to expose here, according to my humble opinion:
1. Before presenting my arguments, I
In my opinion, the situation in Avdiivka has reached the point where Ukraine should consider withdrawal, especially if counterattacks to push back the northern incursion into the city fail.
Stubbornly holding onto the city runs the risk of making it another Bakhmut.
@redbirdsglory
@LovelyLad_
Approximate frontline right now and current Russian attempts to move forward.
Russia is about a kilometre from the MSR south of the coke plant. Maybe even less considering todays rumours.
It's really not good.
@minna_alander
Also, if someone wonders what is done with nuke-proof civil shelters in times of peace: they are community spaces and everyone knows their purpose as a bomb shelter.
Many are used as sports halls etc. Picture from Kannusillanmäki in Espoo.
"Ukraine has advanced 5km from their June-startline" doesn't hit quite as hard as a headline.
Reaching Robotyne is nice, but it's not "significant" considering Ukraine has tried to reach it for 10 weeks, and it's not even the last village before the Russian main line.
⚡ISW: Ukrainian forces significantly advance in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast amid continued counteroffensive.
Geolocated footage published on Aug. 11 and analyzed by the Institute for the Study of War confirms that Ukrainian forces reached the northern outskirts of Robotyne,
Current situation in Kherson:
No verification of yesterdays rumours of battle in the city.
No verification for UAF troops entering the city.
No verification of the status of Russian forces north of the river.
Rumours could be true, but currently everything is unclear
The Balakliya situation seems to be escalating rapidly and I don't have much to say about it as of yet.
However, in the first time in a long while I feel hopeful about the war.
"Robotyne was our objective for the first day, and you know how it went."
"Due to failures in planning, we were three hours late..."
"[Our Leopard 2 crews] trained on T-72s the whole time and were sent to the south with different tanks."
✍️Robotyne was our objective for the first day. The enemy was ready for us, some companies were finished in 15 minutes. Company commander of 47th Mechanized Brigade about the training and counter-offensive in the south. Read more ↓↓
I hope I'm only going to say this once this summer, but if the information is circulating on Russian channels and there are statement made by Ukrainian generals and ministry of defence, there are no operational security concerns in posting about it on twitter.
With the Russians building a fortified line with dragons teeth, anti tank ditches and trenches around Hirske, I decided to take a walk near the WW1 era trenches surrounding Helsinki.
It's amazing how little the basics of trench building have changed in over 100 years
Remember last year 'round this time when people were saying that the Russians would freeze and starve in the winter?
Remember how that didn't happen?
I'd be wary of believing those same people when they now claim that it's totally gonna happen this winter, for realsies.
Sentinel imagery from the 7th of February shows the alternate supply routes that Ukraine has used to supply Avdiivka so far. One from Lastokychne and one from Sieverne, with both converging and terminating north of the Khimik microdistrict.
After these, it's over the fields.
A pretty good thread on the S-300 as a ground-to-ground system. It's also a good reminder that not everything the Russians do is automatically dumb, or desperate, and that it's probably not smart to underestimate the Russians.
News that Russia is firing S-300 surface-to-air missiles (Ukrainian example shown below) at ground targets is producing quite a lot of comments along the lines of 'OMG Russia is desperate'. I think that view is mistaken. A short 🧵. /1
Russia seems to be renewing offensive actions and making gains on multiple fronts.
It also seems that some pro-Russian channels are quite reliably reporting the Russian advance, with their claimed gains getting confirmed by DS the same or the next day.
This is never a good sign
Updated map showing Russian gains. Russian forces seized Soloviove and Semenivka, have seized most of Ocheretyne and Kyslivka near Kupiansk, and advanced near Novokalynove and in Ivanivske near Chasiv Yar.
Can't wait to read the latest theories on how the Ukrainians were also behind the Finnish-Estonian gas pipeline damage.
One might wonder how they have such a presence and freedom of action in the Baltic despite being a country on the Black Sea.
It's a good start, but we have to remember that a good chunk of Rheinmetal artillery production goes to European stocks and to third party buyers around the world.
It's not 700 000 rounds for Ukraine but, pessimistcally, around 300 000.
Less than Ukraine wants per month.
In a press release published today, Rheinmetall increases its forecast for the annual production of artillery shells for 2024.
The biggest German arms company is no longer talking about 600,000 artillery shells per year for 2024, but around 700,000 artillery shells per year!
This is very interesting. Video material from this kind of ballistic missile strikes on FOBs has been relatively limited lately.
This indicates that Russia has received enough missiles to supplement both operational and strategic strike capability.
In the recent days Ukraine has experienced Strikes on FOBs, by what I suspect to be North Korean KN-23 Ballistic Missiles. More below.
(1) FOB Containing alot of Trucks(Ural, Ural Tankers etc). The fact that the houses caught fire aswell indicates a resupply base in them.
@LivFaustDieJung
has a great thread on the challenges the Russian fortifications pose for the Ukrainians.
Even if Ukraine has the equipment and is training to overcome these lines, breaking through them is going not going to be an easy task.
For context here, these defensive lines are littered with AT mines in advance of the dragons teeth with shallow trenches that stop wheeled vehicles. Obstacle belts are not impenetrable defenses nor are they meant to be. They offer staggered obstacles that must be cleared one by
I just can't.
How to even explain the mindboggling insanity of this.
Is "faulty Russian equipment" the only reason we have avoided a larger incident between NATO and Russia so far?
With the rest of the headlines this and last week, I'm really in need of a holiday.
"the Russian pilot had misinterpreted what a radar operator on the ground was saying to him and thought he had permission to fire. The pilot, who had locked on the British aircraft, fired, but the missile did not launch properly."
@Tmgneff
@EricSchmittNYT