5/ The emerging compromise between the sides (mediated by US) seems to lean more towards the Lebanese “line 23” (which is geographically more correct). This is a compromise that took shape a long time ago (under the Netanyahu government) and was almost signed in early 2020.

6/ However, the negotiations stalled in late 2020 after Lebanon suddenly came with a completely different demand for a border line ("Line 29") which included not only all of "Qana" but also half of Israel’s "Karish" reservoir which until then was not at all under dispute...

7/ The new demand from Lebanon was far-fetched and was apparently intended to blow-up the negotiations, which it did. The US and Israel were not willing to discuss the matter and everything froze. There are many speculations as to why Lebanon suddenly came up with this demand.

8/ Perhaps they were waiting for the Trump administration to leave office, in hopes that the Biden administration would be more pro-Lebanon. Perhaps Hezbollah sabotaged negotiations at the request of Iran. In any case, all it did was delay Lebanon's chance of developing its field

9/ Now, after two years of economic ruin in Lebanon, the negotiations reopened and the sides returned to the same old compromise from 2020 of dividing the territory with a tendency towards line 23, with slight adjustments. The “Karish” reservoir is not being negotiated.

10/ What remains to be solved is the #2 issue of how to divide the rights for the "Qana" field that crosses both sides (which side will do the actual production? how will the costs and profits be divided?). It’s important to clarify again that this is still an unproven reservoir

11/ Both sides are working on estimates, and we don’t know yet whether it is even possible to produce a commercial amount of gas from Qana. However, the issue needs to be settled before any actual production begins. Cross-border oil and gas fields are unique in that sense.

12/ Oil and gas are not solid, so when I produce on my side I’m also "drinking" from your side (unlike coal or gold mines, which are solid). Therefore, both parties have to cooperate in some way, whether they like it or not.

13/ In the case of Israel-Lebanon, it is unlikely that two hostile countries (technically still in a state of war) will co-produce a gas field. The more likely scenario is that one side sells their share of the field to the other, without conceding the actual physical territory.

14/ In this case, Israel seems to have agreed to sell its rights to the field and let Lebanon produce it on its own. The exact compensation is unknown. It depends on how viable the field will be. It will take time and additional drilling to figure it out.

16/ Israel has an interest to present an atmosphere of regional stability and cooperation in order to encourage international energy companies to come and look for more gas in the waters of the East Mediterranean Sea. Conflict is not good for business.

17/ The more gas that companies find in the area (whether in Lebanon, Cyprus, Israel or Egypt), the more economically viable it will become to build expensive physical infrastructure that can export the gas to Europe and elsewhere.

18/ It also creates a kind of "balance of terror” (if you believe in that theory) because Hezbollah knows that if it sabotages Israeli gas fields (as it repeatedly tries to do), it will now jeopardize its own country’s gas fields.

19/ In any case, these negotiations have nothing to do with Israel’s “Karish” gas field. The Lebanese government is not claiming any rights over that field. Hezbollah tried to create this connection by sending drones to hit the “Karish” gas field a few months ago.

Final/ Hezbollah apparently wants to make it seem as if its attacks on Karish are what propelled the deal forward. But this is not the case. If it wasn’t for Hezbollah, the deal would have been signed two years ago, and perhaps today Lebanon would not be in this economic chaos.

I will add 3 tweets to answer critique that Israel essentially moved from holding 45% of the disputed area (Hof Compromise of 2020) to 0% of the area (Lebanon’s line 23). The specific division of the territory is meaningless so long as Qana itself is divided between the sides —>

These are international waters and no side has sovereignty over them. The only thing that matters is who owns the potential energy deposits in the area. If Israel cedes 100% of the disputed triangle, but still gets its share of the gas field, then it’s the same result —>

You can argue over the symbolic meaning of this, which is entirely subjective, but for all intents and purposes (physical control, economic control over the area), the difference is of no consequence. Both sides win here.